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INTRODUCTION
The title of the Phyllis W. Beck Chair in Law Symposium was "New Roles,
No Rules?" One of the "new roles" addressed at this Symposium is that of a
lawyer who works in an MDP (a multidisciplinary partnership with nonlawyers). 1
1. The term MDP sometimes is used as an abbreviation of the term multidisciplinary partnerships
between lawyers and nonlawyers and sometimes as an abbreviation of the term multidisciplinary
practice between lawyers and nonlawyers. Compare, e.g., Laurel S. Terry & Clasina B. Houtman-
Mahoney, What If? The Consequences of Court Invalidation of Lawyer-Accountant Multidisciplinary
Partnership (MDP) Bans, in PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD (June 17, 1998) [hereinafter What If?]
(manuscript passim, on file with author) (discussing multidisciplinary partnership bans), with ABA
President Philip S. Anderson Appoints Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Aug. 4, 1998)
(visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http'/www.abanet.org/media/aug98/multicom.html> (discussing appointment
of committee on multidisciplinary practice). This news release is part of the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice Homepage. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Homepage
[hereinafter Commission Homepage] (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
multicom.html>.
As the Reporter to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice ("the Commission") has
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Even though working in an MDP is perhaps a "new role" for a lawyer, it is not
accurate to say that there are "no rules" governing this situation. The current
rule is unequivocal: if a lawyer provides legal services, then the lawyer may not
provide legal services in an MDP setting.
2
This Article examines whether the current prohibition should be replaced
with a new approach that sets the conditions under which lawyers may work in
an MDP setting. This Article provides an introduction to, and overview of, the
many issues related to MDPs. Consistent with my designated role at the Beck
Symposium, the focus is breadth, not depth. Indeed, virtually all of the issues
referred to in this Article could appropriately be discussed, in and of themselves,
in an in-depth law review article. Because the work of the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice ("the Commission") is under consideration in many
states and may be discussed at the ABA 2000 Annual Meeting, I hope this
survey or one-stop shopping approach to MDP issues and the work of the
Commission will prove useful.
Given the length of this Article, a brief overview may be useful. The
Commission recommended that the long-standing U.S. ban on MDPs be lifted,
provided certain conditions are met.3 I endorse the Commission's views. The
Commission hearings,4 together with extensive anecdotal evidence, convince me
observed, multidisciplinary practice refers to an activity, whereas multidisciplinary partnership refers
to the legal relationships among those providing the services. See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men
Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary
Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 10 & n.15, on file with
author). Unless noted otherwise, this Article uses the term MDP to refer to multidisciplinary
partnerships or fee-sharing arrangements. It makes little sense to focus on multidisciplinary practice
because most commentators endorse the principle of providing multidisciplinary practice services and
because the fight is about the proper legal relationships that may be used to provide such services.
2. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4, which has been adopted in every jurisdiction
except the District of Columbia, forbids a practicing lawyer from being a partner with, or sharing legal
fees with, nonlawyers. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 5.4 (1999); see also What If?.,
supra note 1, at 32 & 68-69 n.60 (discussing adoption of Model Rule 5.4 and United States' regulation
of lawyers).
3. See infra Part VI.B for a discussion on why regulation is the best solution.
4. The term hearings refers to the three sets of public hearings held by the Commission prior to
issuing its Report, as well as the hearings subsequent to June 1999. The pre-Report hearings were held
in November 1998, February 1999, and March 1999. To date, the post-Report hearings were held in
August 1999, October 1999, and February 2000.
This Article relies extensively on this testimony before the Commission and other materials
submitted to it. All of the testimony and much of the other material is found on the Internet, as links
from the homepage of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. See Commission
Homepage, supra note 1.
Because the homepage is easy to cite and locate, the remainder of this Article will omit the
webpage citations in order to make the Article easier to read. For witnesses who personally appeared
before the Commission, this Article will include the date of testimony. The reader can locate this
testimony by selecting the appropriately dated hearings from the. Commission Homepage, supra note
1. Once the reader locates the appropriate hearing, the reader can simply click on the link to the
witness and materials identified. I have used the names, titles, and item descriptions on the
Commission Homepage, supra note 1.
In addition to the hearing testimony, this Article regularly cites to written comments not
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that there is an MDP phenomenon (i.e., a significant number of lawyers are now
working outside of law firm settings, doing work that would be considered the
practice of law if done by lawyers in a traditional law firm). 5 Because of the
current absolute MDP ban, these lawyers have taken the position that they are
not "practicing law" and therefore are not violating the MDP ban.
6
Regulators can respond to the MDP phenomenon in one of three ways: they
can ignore it; they can attempt to stop it; or they can regulate it. 7 In my view, the
last option is the only viable, desirable option.
If a regulator ignores the MDP phenomenon, the result will be parallel
worlds of lawyers. One set of lawyers will practice in a traditional law firm
setting and will be regulated through the ethics rules. The other set of lawyers
will practice in an MDP setting, which necessarily requires that lawyer to assert
that he or she is not practicing law with nonlawyers. Consequently, that lawyer
may ignore those ethics rules which apply only in connection with a lawyer's
practice of law. I consider this dual world of lawyers unhealthy.
The second option is to try to stop the MDP phenomenon through use of
unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") provisions. Even assuming this is a
desirable option, it is an available option only if one is able to define the
"practice of law" with sufficient clarity that it can be enforced in an exclusive,
criminal sense. This is doubtful. As one of the commentators at this Symposium
previously explained:
presented at any of the hearings. These materials also are accessible from a link on the Commission
Homepage, supra note 1, entitled "written comments." These items are cited hereinafter as "Written
Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Comment of [name and identification, if any, as it appears on
the webpage].
A third set of items consists of the written replies to the Commission's June 1999 Report to the
ABA House of Delegates. These materials also are accessible as a link from the Commission
Homepage, supra note 1, entitled "written replies." These items are cited hereinafter as "Written
Replies to the Commission, Reply of [name and identification, if any, as it appears on the webpage].
Finally, this Article contains frequent citation to the testimony and supporting materials I
provided to the Commission during my March 12, 1999 testimony and my July 1999 written reply to
the June 1999 Commission Report to the ABA House of Delegates. All of these materials, except the
written reply and oral testimony, appear in the ABA 25Th NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SUPPLEMENTARY COURSEBOOK MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
(June 3, 1999) (on file with author). The page numbers cited refer to the pages in this book. These
items are hereinafter referred to as Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999); Oral
Testimony of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999); Terry Appendix A: Issue Checklist (Mar. 12, 1999);
Terry Appendix B1-B7 (Mar. 12, 1999); Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Laurel S. Terry.
Appendices B1-B7 are charts that summarize the testimony of Commission witnesses concerning the
issues identified on the Issue Checklist; these charts permit one to examine the testimony of all
witnesses with respect to a single issue.
Although the terms witness and testimony are used throughout this Article, the individuals who
"testified" before the ABA were not under oath, nor was the proceeding an official one. The terms
are used in the legislative sense often used in the U.S. and have no formal or legal significance.
5. See infra notes 30-41 an accompanying text for a discussion of the MDP phenomenon and
ABA conclusions.
6. See infra Part VI.B for a discussion of the current MDP ban. See also infra notes 30-41 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the MDP phenomenon.
7. See infra Part VI.B for a more detailed discussion of these three options.
[Vol. 72
A PRIMER ON MDPS
... [T]he definition of the "practice of law" is frustratingly illusive.
Indeed aside from a few obvious functions (like the filing of pleadings
in court or the rendering of formal opinions), it is almost impossible to
define with precision what constitutes the practice of law in the United
States today, at least in any exclusive sense. While it is certainly
possible to list the hundreds of things that lawyers do, as bar counsel
and many courts have discovered, it is very difficult to come up with a
comprehensive list of many things that only lawyers can do. To cite
but a few examples: [contract negotiation, lobbying, tax and estate
planning are considered legal services when performed by a lawyer, but
few would argue that nonlawyers cannot do this.]
Stated differently, the scope of the "legal monopoly" in the U.S.-i.e.,
those activities that only lawyers may engage in-is fairly narrow and
arguably getting narrower. Thus, any regulatory scheme that is
premised on a tightly drawn exclusive definition of lawyering is likely
to be either too narrow to be much good in a regulatory sense or too
broad to be enforceable. I would accordingly be very suspicious of any
regulatory approach to dealing with the MDP concept that depends for
its effectiveness on a precise definition of the "practice of law."
Because I agree with this conclusion and have not heard anyone offer a
satisfactory definition of the "practice of law" that can be used in an exclusive
sense and defended on a principled basis if vigorously challenged, the second
option of trying to stop the MDP phenomenon does not seem viable.
Consequently, the remaining option is to permit MDPs but regulate MDP
lawyers in the best possible manner, so as to maximize the chance of protecting
clients and the public interest.
This Article summarizes the regulatory issues, analyzes the MDP
Commission Report according to those issues, and provides my analysis of the
Commission's work. Section I begins with a review of the current U.S. rules
regarding MDPs and their history. Section II provides an overview of the MDP
phenomenon. Section III places the U.S. approach to MDPs in a global context
by summarizing MDP developments and responses elsewhere in the world.
Section IV analyzes the common regulatory questions that have emerged in the
U.S. and elsewhere. Section V examines the work of the Commission. Section
VI articulates the rationales for recommending a change in the current
prohibition of MDPs. Section VII identifies those aspects of the Commission's
Report with which I disagree. Section VIII concludes by describing the post-
Commission shakeout and offers observations about the future.
I. THE CURRENT U.S. RULES REGARDING MDPs
In the U.S., partnerships and fee-sharing arrangements between lawyers
and nonlawyers are banned. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4, like
its predecessors DR 3-102 and DR 3-103, prohibits a lawyer from forming a
partnership with a nonlawyer if the partnership will engage in activities
8. Written Remarks of James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999).
1999]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
constituting the practice of law or the sharing of legal fees with a nonlawyer.
9
ABA Model Rule 5.4 lists three exceptions to the no partnership/no fee-sharing
rule: these exceptions permit payment to a lawyer's estate; sale of a law practice;
and participation of nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan
based on profit sharing.
10
Interestingly, the Comment to ABA Model Rule 5.4 provides only one
rationale for this rule: it observes that the traditional limitations on sharing fees
"are to protect the lawyer's independence of judgment."'" Commentators cite as
additional rationales concerns that fee sharing would undermine lawyer
confidentiality and create conflicts of interest. 12 Professor Mary Daly, who is the
reporter for the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, recently
summarized the history of Rule 5.4 and the bases for these additional rationales:
The original Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the ABA in
1908 barred neither fee sharing nor partnership with nonlawyers.
Those prohibitions did not formally enter the professional
responsibility pantheon until the adoption of Canons 33 through 35 in
1928. Canon 33 outlawed partnerships between lawyers and
nonlawyers "where a part of partnership business consists of the
practice of law." Canon 34 permitted the division of legal fees, but
only with other lawyers. Canon 35 warned lawyers against being
"controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate,
which intervenes between client and lawyer. . ." From 1928 to the
present, regulatory authorities have successfully invoked these
provisions and their Model Code and Model Rules successors to
prevent the establishment of MDPs that offered legal services to the
firm's clients.
The report accompanying the amendments is silent as to the precise
reason for their adoption, although it acknowledged "a substantial
difference of view in the profession respecting its recommendations as
to partnerships, and division of fees .... In words that resonate with
those exchanged in the current MDP debate, one dissenter
commented, "[Alside from professional policy, I think that there is
nothing inherently 'unethical' in the formation of partnerships between
lawyers engaged in certain kinds of work and an expert engineer,
student of finance or some other form of expert." A leading scholar
has concluded that the prohibitions reflect the public policy expressed
in then existing statutes, case law, and ethics opinions. Their adoption
is part-and-parcel of the unauthorized practice of law movement that
began to flourish in the 1920's.
When the ABA adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility in
1969, it left the prohibitions in Canons 33-35 basically unchanged. To
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1999) (stating rule for professional
independence of lawyers).
10. Id
11. Id at Rule 5.4 cmt.
12. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of rationales concerning fee
sharing.
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some extent, they are strengthened by the historical commentary to the
Code and the presence of Ethical Considerations addressed to the
prohibited conduct, both of which accept without question the
traditional justifications pressed in case law and ethics opinions. Those
justifications include competence, preservation of independent
professional judgment, and the existence of a lawyer-regulatory
scheme for the public's protection.
13
Unlike many of the ABA Model Rules, Model Rule 5.4 has been adopted
virtually intact in most states. 14 Indeed, the District of Columbia ("D.C.") is the
only jurisdiction that has departed in substance on the MDP issue from the ABA
Model Rule; D.C.'s rule permits fee sharing and partnerships between lawyers
and nonlawyers provided the partnership has as its sole purpose the provisions of
legal services to clients.15 This D.C. rule, however, provides little practical
guidance on the regulation of MDPs because it appears to be seldom used.
16
D.C. Ethics Counsel Susan Gilbert has offered two reasons for the infrequent
use of D.C. Rule 5.4. First, the requirement that the partnership have the
provision of legal services as its "sole purpose" is different than what many of
the currently proposed MDPs are interested in.17 In addition, ABA Ethics
Committee Formal Opinion 91-360 narrowed the scope of the rule even further
by concluding that a multi-jurisdictional law firm having a D.C. office cannot
have a nonlawyer partner in that office. Ms. Gilbert concluded that when the
multi-jurisdictional firms are eliminated, the rule is available only to D.C.-based
boutique law firms that identify a specific need (i.e., the need for an accountant
to do tax work or the need for an office manager).18 There has been no
disciplinary action under D.C. Rule 5.4(b). 19 In short, the D.C. experience on its
revision of Rule 5.4 offers little on the difficulty or ease of regulating MDPs.
Although the MDP ban in Model Rule 5.4 has been adopted throughout the
country, this traditional ban has faced one serious challenge. In 1980, the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, which drafted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and is known as the Kutak Commission, proposed
a version of Rule 5.4 that would have allowed fee sharing and MDPs when four
conditions were satisfied: (1) there was no interference by the nonlawyer with
the lawyer's professional judgment or the client-lawyer relationship; (2) client
13. Daly, supra note 1, at 36-38 (footnotes omitted).
14. See, e.g., STEPHEN GtLLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS 308.09 (1999) (indicating only few state variations); ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT 91:402 ("With one exception (the District of Columbia), few significant
variations from Model Rule 5.4(b) or (d) have arisen in the states that have based their ethics rules on
the Model Rules."). The Lawyers' Manual describes the small variations in the rules of North
Carolina, Illinois, Oklahoma, Washington, Florida, Kentucky, Utah, and the District of Columbia. Id.
15. See D. C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b)(1) (1999). For the legislative
history of D.C. Rule 5.4, see Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate
Proposals Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 392-400 (1988).
16. See Terry Appendix B1 at 2 (Mar. 12,1999), supra note 4, at Threshold Issues, Item F.





confidences were protected; (3) the arrangement did not violate the advertising
or solicitation rules; and (4) the arrangement did not involve an improper fee.
20
The Commission set forth the traditional explanations for the fee-sharing ban,
but concluded that "the assumed equivalence between employment and
interference with the lawyer's professional judgment is at best tenuous." 21 After
pointing out other contexts in which regulators once opposed lawyer-nonlawyer
affiliations on UPL grounds but then changed positions, the Commission
concluded: "[t]he exceptions to per se prohibitions on legal service arrangements
involving nonlawyers have substantially eroded the general rule, leading to
inconsistent treatment of various methods of organization on the basis of form or
sponsorship. Adherence to the traditional prohibitions has impeded
development of new methods of providing legal services."
22
The Kutak Commission's proposed rule was rejected during the February
1983 ABA Midyear Meeting. Interestingly, many commentators have concluded
that the "fear of Sears" is what killed the Kutak Commission's proposed rule,
23
although this ground is not cited in The Legislative History of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct .24 The "fear of Sears" phrase derives from the affirmative
20. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 159-63 (1987) [hereinafter THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]
(presenting proposed rule where lawyer may be employed by organization controlled by nonlawyers);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.5 (Discussion Draft Jan. 30, 1980) (presenting
rule where four same factors must be met for lawyer to practice with firm controlled by nonlawyers);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 175-78 (May 30, 1981)
[hereinafter PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT] (presenting rule for lawyers to be employed in firm controlled
by nonlawyers).
The "Kutak Commission" is the name commonly used to refer to the ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards. The Chair of this Commission was Robert J. Kutak of Omaha,
Nebraska, who died shortly before the ABA Meeting at which the text of the Model Rules was
approved. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 61 & n.72 (Prac. ed. 1986)
(discussing Chairman of Commission, Robert J. Kutak, and membership of Commission).
21. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 20, at 177.
22. Id. at 178. The "lay organizations" cited included legal services organizations, lawyer-referral
services, prepaid legal insurance plans, and corporate counsel.
23. See, e.g., ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 437 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES] ("The
prohibition of Rule 5.4(b) has been the subject of criticism similar to that directed at the prohibition of
Rule 5.4(a) regarding fee-sharing with a nonlawyer."); Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the
Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 577, 595-
96 (1989) (summarizing criticisms of rule, including "fear of Sears"); Daly, supra note 1, at 39 & n.93
(citing Andrews supra); Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 15, at 383 ("Quite literally, a 'fear of Sears'
predominated-a concern that nationwide retailers like Sears, Roebuck and Company might swoop
into legal practice.").
24. See THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, at 160 (stating opponents' arguments to
asserted amendment, which does not mention "fear of Sears" ides). According to The Legislative
History:
The proponents of the amendment [to change the Kutak-proposed rule] pointed out that the
proposed rule represented a significant departure from existing law and argued that such a
departure was neither constitutionally mandated nor warranted by circumstances. They
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answer and subsequent reaction to a question posed at the February 1983
Midyear Meeting; the question was whether the Kutak Commission proposal
would allow Sears to open a law firm.25
From the defeat of the Kutak Commission's proposed rule until quite
recently, there has been virtually no serious reconsideration of the MDP ban in
ABA Model Rule 5.4.26 For example, the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission had
not initially identified Rule 5.4 as one of the rules most pressingly requiring
reexamination. 27  In August 1998, however, then-ABA President Philip
Anderson announced the formation of a new ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice.28  Among other things, its assignment was to
recommend whether any changes should be made to the current MDP ban found
in Model Rule 5.4.29 This examination of the current MDP ban in Model Rule
contended that ownership and management of a law practice by nonlawyers, as would be
permitted under the proposed rule, was potentially harmful. A nonlawyer, motivated by a
desire for profit, would be unable to appreciate the ethical considerations involved in
representing a client, and further would not be subject to any regulation or control. In the
view of the amendment's proponents, the predecessor Model Code provisions defining and
restricting the way in which law may be practiced ensured compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct, guaranteed the independence of a lawyer, and also allowed for
experimentation in methods of delivering legal services.
Id.; see also Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 15, at 384-92 (providing more detailed and "behind the
scenes" history of Kutak proposal).
25. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 15, at 392 ("Professor Hazard has a strong memory of one
question that was asked of him: 'Does this rule mean that Sears, Roebuck will be able to open a law
office?' When he answered 'yes' to this question, the debate came quickly to a close and the General
Practice Section's version was adopted.").
26. North Dakota proposed adopting the Kutak Commission version of Rule 5.4, but this was
rejected by the North Dakota Supreme Court. See id. at 400-03 (noting North Dakota Supreme Court
offered no reason for rejection); see also GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 14, at 308-09 (discussing state
variations of Model Rule 5.4 including North Dakota).
27. See generally Ethics 2000-Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(visited Nov. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Ethics-2000 Homepage) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
ethics2k.html> (indicating workplans do not show Rule 5.4 as one of first rules addressed until
formation of Commission). Recently, however, in order to put the issue before the Ethics 2000
Commission, one of its reporters drafted a revised version of Model Rule 5.4 which lifted the MDP
ban. The proposed rule apparently was similar to D.C. Rule 5.4, discussed supra note 15, except that it
would have allowed MDPs if "a" purpose of the MDP was the provision of legal services, deleting the
D.C. requirement that the MDP have as its "sole purpose" the provision of legal services. A motion to
have the Ethics 2000 Commission state that its position was to leave Model Rule 5.4 unchanged was
tabled. See American Bar Association, Center For Professional Responsibility Commission on
Evaluation of The Rules of Professional Conduct, Minutes (Oct. 15-17, 1999) (visited Apr. 5, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/101599mtg.html>.
28. See ABA President Philip S. Anderson Appoints Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Aug. 4, 1998) (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/media/aug98/multicom.html>
(announcing formation of commission on multidisciplinary practice by ABA).
29. The mandate of the newly-formed Commission was as follows:
The incoming president of the American Bar Association, Philip S. Anderson, today
announced appointment of a Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to examine such
trends as international accounting firms purchasing law firms.
"Since the early 1990s, the Big-5 accounting firms have been acquiring law firms in Europe,
and have added legal services to their list of client offerings. In the U.S., accounting firms are
1999]
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5.4 was prompted by what can be called the "MDP phenomenon."
II. THE MDP PHENOMENON
As a result of the spate of publicity during the last eighteen months, many
U.S. lawyers have now heard the term "MDP. ' '30 They have learned that a
significant number of lawyers now work in one of the Big Five firms.31 In
November 1999, a leading journal reported that excluding tax lawyers, 6,362
lawyers worked for the Big Five firms.32 This journal integrated the statistics of
recruiting partners from leading law firms to work on complex corporate issues for
accounting firm clients," said Anderson, of Little Rock, Ark.
"These developments raise new issues for lawyers and their clients," said Anderson.
"This commission has a mandate to look at these issues from the standpoint of the public's
best interests. While all lawyers are required to place their clients' interests above their own,
this commission must set aside the financial interests of the profession and ensure that the
public interest is served. I am confident that the members of the commission will do that," he
said.
The commission is directed to study and report on the extent to which and the manner in
which professional service firms operated by accountants and others who are not lawyers are
seeking to provide legal services to the public.
Additionally, the commission will analyze:
The experience of clients, foreign and domestic, who have received legal services from
professional service firms and report on international trade developments relevant to
the issue;
Existing state and federal legislative frameworks within which professional service firms
may be providing legal services, and recommend any modifications or additions to that
framework that would be in the public interest;
The impact of receiving legal services from professional service firms on a client's
ability to protect privileged communications and to have the benefit of advice free from
conflicts of interest; and
Application of current ethical rules and principles to the provision of legal services by
professional service firms, and recommend any modifications or additions that would
serve the public interest.
Id.
30. See generally American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
Bibliography (visited Dec. 16, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicombibliography.html> (listing
publications and Internet links on multidisciplinary practice). A LEXIS search in the U.S. news file
for the past year, searching for the terms "multidisciplinary practice or multidisciplinary partnership"
yielded four hundred stories. While some of these are mere references to individuals who are on MDP
committees, this volume of articles within the past year has contributed to a much broader exposure of
the term MDP and the issues. See generally What If?, supra note 1 (citing numerous articles on MDP
phenomenon).
31. The term Big Five refers to Arthur Andersen L.L.P. ("Andersen"), Deloitte & Touche L.L.P.
("Deloitte & Touche"), Ernst & Young L.L.P. ("Ernst & Young"), KPMG Peat Marwick LLP.
("KPMG"), and PricewaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. ("PricewaterhouseCoopers"). For the sake of
neutrality, this Article will refer to these five firms as the "Big Five" firms. Opponents of the MDP
phenomenon tend to refer to these firms as the "Big Five accounting firms;" the firms refer to
themselves as "professional services" firms.
32. See IFLRI000 50 Largest Law Firms in the World [hereinafter 50 Largest Firms] (visited Nov.
9, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.comhomepage/news/data/top50.asp> (showing Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers/Landwell with 1735 lawyers, Andersen Legal Services with 1718, KPMG with 1264, Ernst &
A PRIMER ON MDPS
the Big Five firms with the statistics from traditional law firms; as a result, the
listing of the ten largest law firms worldwide included three of the Big Five.
33
Four of the Big Five ranked within the largest twenty law firms.34 Two years
earlier, this same journal reported that almost 2,500 lawyers worked as tax
lawyers for three of the Big Five firms.
35
This ranking is consistent with other data. A 1998 article in the American
Lawyer, for example, listed statistics for "The Global 50" law firms; a separate
set of figures gave the statistics for "accounting firms." 36 But if one combined
this data, three of the Big Five firms ranked among the ten largest law firms and
four of the Big Five firms were among the fifteen largest law firms. Indeed, one
of the Big Five firms recently adopted a new brand name to use in connection
with its offering of legal services. On October 11, 1999, PricewaterhouseCoopers
announced that its network of lawyers would be associated into a single firm
called Landwell and that it plans to be one of the world's top five global law
firms within five years.
37
Many of the Big Five lawyers included within this data work outside the
U.S. Consequently, some commentators believe that Europe is simply different
and that one can avoid the MDP phenomenon in the U.S. 38 I disagree.
Although the MDP phenomenon has been visible longer in Europe than in the
U.S., 39 the MDP phenomenon appears to have significant momentum in the U.S.
In November 1999, for example, several lawyers from King & Spaulding left
Young with 954, and Deloitte & Touche with 691). "The Big Five are registered in the rankings only
for their non-tax lawyers." Clifford Chance World's Largest Firm, Big Five Close Behind (visited Nov.
9,1999) <http://www.lawmoney.compublictsearch/PreviewStory.asp?\ StoryNum=3165>.
33. See 50 Largest Firms, supra note 32 (indicating PricewaterhouseCoopers was ranked third,
Andersen was ranked fourth, and KPMG was ranked seventh).
34. See id (indicating Ernst & Young was ranked sixteenth, in addition to those firms cited supra
note 33).
35. Phillippa Cannon, The Big Six Move In, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1997, at 5. These statistics
showed tax and non-tax lawyers working for three of Big Five firms; KPMG and Ernst & Young did
not provide figures that were segregated by tax and non-tax work. See also What If?, supra note 1, at
7-6 (containing chart summarizing statistics provided in Cannon article).
36. The Global 50, AM. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 46-47.
37. See PricewaterhouseCoopers Unifies Law Firm Branding (visited Oct. 18, 1999)
<http://www.lawmoney.comhomepage/display-story/previewstory.asp?storyNum=3137> (announcing
consolidation of PricewaterhouseCoopers network of lawyers into one firm, Landwell); see also
PricewaterhouseCoopers Explains its Law Firm Branding (visited Dec. 1, 1999)
<http://www.lawmoney.com/public/search/previewstory.asp?StoryNum=3164> (discussing relaunching
of PricewaterhouseCoopers international legal network); Landwell Adds South African Law Firm
(visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.com/homepage/Display-Story/Previewstory.asp?
StoryNum=3482> (discussing Landwell's addition of South African firm of Bell Dewar & Hall).
38. See, e.g., Phyllis W. Beck Chair in Law Symposium Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, (Nov. 12,
1999).
39. See, e.g., What If?, supra note 1, § 7.02 (comparing MDP developments and publicity in
Europe with relative lack of activity and publicity in U.S. and also identifying 1997 and 1998 U.S.
conferences that addressed MDPs, which were some of first U.S. conferences to do so); Charles W.
Wolfram, Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the Law Practice of European and American Lawyers, in
LAWYERS' PRACTICE AND IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE VtEw 301-16 (1999) (summarizing pre-1997
MDP developments in Europe and Australia).
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their firm in order to form the new law firm of McKee Nelson Ernst & Young,
which is affiliated with Ernst & Young.4° According to the press release, the new
law firm plans to expand to a full-service law firm, expects to have as many as
fifty lawyers within the first year, will not engage in fee or profit sharing with
Ernst & Young, will be financed by a loan from Ernst & Young, will lease
contiguous space with the accounting firm's D.C. office, and may contract for
administrative services.
41
In August 1999, Big Five firm KPMG announced a strategic alliance for
state and local tax work with the West Coast law firm Morrison & Foerster,
Chicago firm Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered, and University of Georgia
Professor Walter Hellerstein.42 On another front, the world's largest law firm
was created in 1999 by the merger of U.K. firm Clifford Chance, U.S. firm
Rogers & Wells, and Germany's firm Pinder, Volhard, Axel & Webster.
Because Pinder is an MDP, New York lawyers presumably are now partners
with nonlawyer partners in Germany.43 And in early 1999, the new chair of
Pillsbury Madison & Sutro pushed for relaxation of the no-MDP rule, convinced
that clients want MDPs.44
The increased number of lawyers practicing in Big Five firms has come
about not only through mergers with existing firms or practices, but also through
recruitment of individual lawyers45 and law school graduates. Indeed, some
40. See Ernst & Young Launches First Domestic Law Firm, TAX NOTES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 719
("Described in a November 3 news release as 'an alliance' and a 'venture,' the D.C.-based law firm is
being co-founded by legal heavyweights .... Housed in Ernst & Young's Washington office, the firm
will be called McKee Nelson Ernst & Young L.L.P."); Jonathan Groner & Siobhan Roth, Envisioning
A Big 5 Law Firm, LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1 ("For the past several weeks, company
representatives have been negotiating with lawyers in the D.C. and Atlanta offices of King &
Spaulding to create a business that could, for the first time, allow it to provide clients a full array of
legal services...."); Tom Herman, Ernst & Young Will Finance Launch Of Law Firm in Special
Arrangement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at B10 ("The new law firm is headed by William S. McKee
and William F. Nelson, both former partners at King & Spaulding, an Atlanta law firm.").
41. See Ernst & Young LLP Announces Alliance with New Washington, D.C.-based Law Firm
(visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.ey.com/global/gcr.nsf[US/11-02-99_-_Release_-_NewsRoom_-
_Ernst_&_YoungLLP> (announcing Ernst & Young's new "alliance" with law firm).
42. See Morrison & Foerster Hitches Tax Practice to KPMG, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Sept. 1999, at 5
(stating alliance is first of its kind for U.S. law firms); Martha Neil, As Firm Here Forges Alliance with
CPAs, CHICAGO DAILY L. BuLL, Aug. 9, 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS NEWS file (reporting
Horwood, Marcus & Berk Chartered's alliance with KPMG).
43. See, e.g., Clifford Chance Becomes the World's Largest Firn, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Aug. 1999, at
31 (discussing merger with opinions of competitors and clients); JUVE HANDBUCH 1998/99,
WIRTSCHAFrsKANZLEIEN, REcHTsANwALTE FOR UNTERNEHMEN 428 (Juve Verlag 1998) (reporting
219 of 284 service providers at POnder, Volhard, Axel & Webster were lawyers).
44. See New Pillsbury Madison Chair Aims for MDP, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 1999, at 4 (quoting
Pillsbury Madison Chair, "It is so obvious that the market wants this.").
45. See Baker & McKenzie Loses Tax People to Big Five (visited June 10, 1999)
<http://www.lawmoney.compublic/news/hotnews/news9906/news990609.4.html> (reporting departure
of six partners to Big Five firms; two of these lawyers assumed positions of heads of international tax
groups at Deloitte & Touche and PricewaterhouseCoopers.); Ernst & Young Scoops Leading
Canadian Lawyer (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.com/public/news/hotnews/news9902/
news990225.2.html> (reporting departure of lawyers from leading firms Strikeman Elliott and Bennett
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recent reports indicate that as many as twenty percent of graduates at some law
schools are going to Big Five firms.4
So what do these lawyers working in a Big Five setting do? In addition to
their traditional services of auditing, tax advice, and business management,
lawyers in Big Five firms provide: estate planning; litigation support (including
dispute resolution efforts and front-end services, such as investigation and
discovery); valuation and business planning advice (including issues of
environmental and labor law compliance and employee benefits issues); and
financial planning.
47
According to testimony before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, these lawyers are quite careful to tell their customers that they are not
providing legal services and that they do not hold themselves out as lawyers.48
At one conference, for example, a lawyer working in a Big Five firm said that he
did not practice tax law, but practiced "tax." 49 This limitation is not surprising; a
lawyer who admits sharing fees with a nonlawyer is subject to discipline and
possible loss of his law license.
50
Although Big Five lawyers deny that they practice law, they appear to do
the same type of work that they did while working in a traditional law firm.51
Jones Verchere as well as statement of departing lawyer who said he may not be last to leave law firm
for Big Five because attraction of international practices will be hard to resist); Ernst & Young Takes
on Law Firms (visited Apr. 16, 1999) <http:I/www.lawmoney.conpublic/news/hotnews/news9904/
news990413.2.html> (reporting hiring by Ernst & Young of Glen Kohl, tax group chair of Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; James Eads, former general counsel for AT&T; Robert Ackerman of
Mayer, Brown & Platt and former director of IRS advance pricing agreement program; Prentiss
Willson, former managing partner of Morrison & Foerster's San Francisco office).
46. See, e.g., New York State Bar Association, Report of Special Committee on Multi-Disciplinary
Practice and the Legal Profession n.52 (Jan. 8, 1998) ("The placement office of the New York
University School of Law estimates that 20% of its recent graduating classes have been hired by the
Big Five."), available on Commission Homepage, supra note 1; Written Remarks and Oral Testimony
of Abbie F. Willard (Assistant Dean of Career Services, Georgetown University Law Center) (Feb. 5,
1999) (discussing Big Five recruiting practices at Georgetown and other U.S. law schools).
47. What If?, supra note 1, 7-4 n.5.
48. See Oral Remarks of Roger Page (Deloitte & Touche) (Mar. 11, 1999); Oral Remarks of
Irwin Treiger and William J. Lipton (Co-Chairs, National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants) (Mar. 11, 1999) (stating U.S. accounting firms do not hold themselves out as providing
legal services).
49. Ronald E. Friedman, Multidisciplinary Partnerships: Attorneys Working in Professional
Service Firms, in ABA 24TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
COURSEBOOK, Tab 1, at 4-8 (May 28-30, 1998) (indicating attorneys in personal services firms do not
practice law, they practice tax).
50. See supra notes 2, 14, 15, 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of ABA Model Rule 5.4,
which sets forth the principles in force throughout the country. A violation of an ethics provision such
as Rule 5.4 can expose a lawyer to discipline and possible loss of the lawyer's license. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 10 (1996) <http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/disenf/rulel0.html> (enumerating such sanctions as disbarment, suspension, probation, reprimand,
and admonition for acts of misconduct).
51. See, e.g., Oral Remarks of Irwin Treiger and William J. Lipton (Co-Chairs, National
Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants) (Mar. 11, 1999) (stating U.S. accounting
firms have lawyers working for them doing things that would traditionally be thought of as providing
1999]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
ABA Commission Witness Ward Bower, president of the legal consulting firm
Altman, Weil, Pensa, Inc., found conservative the estimate that one-half billion
dollars of legal fees are currently included in consulting bills.52
There have been a few highly publicized efforts to pursue unauthorized
practice of law charges against Big Five lawyers, but to date these efforts have
been unsuccessful.53 Thus, there are a large number of lawyers practicing in Big
Five firms doing things that if done in a traditional law firm setting would be
considered the practice of law; and this number is only increasing. As a result,
the MDP phenomenon is real.
This discussion of MDPs, like much of the public discussion, has focused on
lawyers working in Big Five firms. But as the Commission learned, lawyers
practicing in smaller communities and smaller firms also are interested in
forming MDPs.54 (Lawyers practicing in smaller communities or small firms will
be referred to as Main Street lawyers, in contrast with Wall Street lawyers. 55)
Indeed, some have predicted that if the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct were changed to permit MDPs, there would be as many Main Street
MDPs as Wall Street MDPs.56 In analyzing whether the ban on MDPs should be
lifted, one must consider the impact of any changes and regulation upon Main
Street clients and lawyers as well as Wall Street clients and lawyers. A Main
legal services).
52. See Testimony of Ward Bower (Altman Wel) (Nov. 12, 1998).
53. See, e.g., Testimony of William Elliott (Kane, Russell, Coleman & Logan) (Nov. 13, 1998)
(describing unsuccessful efforts of Texas UPL committee against Andersen); ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice, Updated Background and Informational Report and Request for Comments
n.30 and accompanying text [hereinafter Updated Background Report] (visited Dec. 15, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/ cpr/febmdp.html> (commenting on dismissal of Virginia UPL investigation
against unnamed Big Five firm). The Updated Background Report is found as a link from the ABA
Commission Homepage, supra note 1.
54. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Lynda Shely (State Bar of Arizona and ABA Standing
Committee on Client Protection) (Feb. 5,1999).
55. See generally Mary C. Daly, Practicing Across Borders: Ethical Reflections for Small-Firm and
Solo Practitioners, THE PROF. L. 123 (1995) (focusing on the ethical issues facing small firm lawyers
engaged in international work as distinguished from the problems of large firm lawyers); Appendix:
Issue Checklist, infra, at Item I(C).
56. See, e.g., Testimony of Ward Bower (Altman Well) (Nov. 12, 1998) (stating that in England,
Main Street lawyers like idea of MDPs); Oral Remarks of Neil Cochran (Dundas & Wilson C.S.) (Feb.
4, 1999) (finding MDPs are of value to Main Street clients); Oral Testimony of John Dzienkowski
(Professor, University of Texas School of Law) (Feb. 5, 1999); Oral Remarks of Richard Miller
(General Counsel, AICPA) (Mar. 12, 1999); Oral Remarks of Wayne Moore (Director, AARP) (Mar.
11, 1999); Testimony of M. Peter Moser (ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility) (Nov. 13, 1998) (stating that MDPs are issue for all, not just big firm lawyers); Oral
Remarks of Roger Page (Deloitte & Touche) (Mar. 11, 1999) Oral Testimony of Larry Ramirez
(Chair, ABA General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section) (Feb. 6, 1999); Oral Testimony of Lynda
Shely (State Bar of Arizona and ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection) (Feb. 5, 1999)
(finding MDPs are of value to Main Street clients); Oral Testimony of Sidney Traum, David Ostorve,
and Philip D. Brent (American Association of Attorney-CPAs) (Feb. 5, 1999); Oral Testimony of
James Turner (Executive Director, H.A.L.T.) (Feb. 5, 1999); Testimony of M. Elizabeth Wall (Cable
& Wireless) (Nov. 12, 1998); Oral Remarks of Lora H. Weber (Consumers Alliance of the Southeast)
(Mar. 11, 1999).
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Street MDP phenomenon may not have been what prompted the formation of
the Commission; nevertheless, if Model Rule 5.4 is revised to permit MDPs and
adopted by individual states, then there likely will be significant development of
Main Street MDPs.
III. GLOBAL RESPONSES TO MDPs
Because the MDP phenomenon is occurring on a global scale, bar
association and regulatory responses have occurred not just in the U.S., but
globally as well. An extensive analysis of these developments is beyond the
scope of this Article, but a brief summary is useful to better understand the
issues and to place the U.S. responses in context.
5 7
A. Jurisdictions Expressly Permitting MDPs
At least four jurisdictions have regulations that expressly permit some form
of MDPs. These jurisdictions are Germany, the Netherlands, the Law Society of
Upper Canada, and the territory of New South Wales, Australia.58 Germany
and the Netherlands permit full integration between lawyers and certain
identified categories of nonlawyers. In Germany, the categories include patent
lawyers, tax advisors, auditors, and notaries. 59 The Netherlands also permits full
integration between lawyers and certain categories of nonlawyers, including tax
advisors and notaries, but not auditors.6° The Netherlands' exclusion of auditors
is currently on appeal before the Dutch court in the case of Wouters v. Arthur
57. For a more detailed discussion of various bar association and regulatory responses to MDPs,
see Terry Appendix B1 (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4 (summarizing IBA, UIA, CCBE, French, Dutch,
German, and Australian approaches to MDPs, organized according to 40 issues).
58. See, e.g., Written Remarks of Dr. Hans-Jirgen Hellwig (Vice-President, Deutscher
Anwaltverein) (Feb. 4, 1999) (describing Germany's regulation of MDPs); Testimony of Thomas 0.
Verhoeven (Oppenhoff & Ridler) (Nov. 13, 1998) (same); What If?, supra note 1, § 7.04 (describing
Netherlands regulation SV 93, which permits lawyer to form partnership with certain nonlawyers
whose profession has been recognized by Netherlands Bar Association; recognized categories of
nonlawyers included tax advisors and notaries, but not auditors); Testimony of Andrew Scott (Law
Institute of Victoria) (Nov. 13, 1998) (describing New South Wales, Australia's regulation of MDPs, as
well as proposed policies by Law Council of Australia and Law Council of Victoria, Australia). But
see ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Final Report, Appendix C-Reporter's Notes, at 4
& 12 nn. 11 & 15 and accompanying text [hereinafter Reporter's Notes] (visited Sept. 24, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixc.html> (stating "[o]nly Switzerland permits the
establishment of a fully integrated MDP" and "it appears that the Law Society of New South Wales,
Australia is the only regulator that has adopted ethics rules specifically directed to multidisciplinary
practice"). Despite this statement, this author believes that the Netherlands' SV 93 and Germany's
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung § 59a constitute ethics rules specifically directed to MDPs. This author
has written an article on Germany's regulation of MDPs as part of a February 2000 Symposium at the
University of Minnesota. See Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 Minn. L.Rev. 1547
(2000) (forthcoming).
59. See Testimony of Thomas 0. Verhoeven (Oppenhoff & Radler) (Nov. 13, 1998) (discussing
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung § 59a).
60. See What If?, supra note 1, § 7.04 [2][b]6 (discussing SV 93, which permits partnerships
between lawyers and patent lawyers, tax advisors, notaries, but not auditors).
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Andersen and Price Waterhouse.61 Because the Dutch appellate court has
referred certain antitrust issues to the European Court of Justice, a ruling is not
expected soon.62 To my knowledge, this Dutch case is the first case in which
MDP regulations have been challenged.
Similar to the Dutch rule, the New South Wales' regulation of MDPs had
been under a cloud until it was recently amended. Section 48G of the Legal
Profession Act of 1987 expressly regulates MDPs. This provision states: "A
barrister or solicitor... may be in partnership with a person who is not a
barrister or solicitor, except to the extent (if any) that the regulations, barristers
rules, solicitors rules or joint rules otherwise provide."
63
Until December 1999, the Solicitors Rules required, inter alia, that the
lawyers "maintain effective control of the legal practice and delivery of legal
services." 64 Lawyers had to maintain majority voting rights in the affairs of the
partnership and receive not less than 51% of the gross income earned by the
partnership.65 On June 24, 1997, the New South Wales Attorney General asked
the Legal Profession Advisory Council ("the Council') to examine the issues
related to the Solicitors Rules regarding MDPs; the Attorney General has the
power to declare barristers and solicitors rules inoperative if they "impose
restrictive or anti-competitive practices" which are not in the public interest, or if
the rules are otherwise not in the public interest.66 The Council advised the
Attorney General that the Solicitors Rules were indeed anti-competitive and
against public policy; the Council further decided that the statute should be
amended to omit the reference to the Solicitors Rules in order to avoid further
61. See also European Court to Rule on MDPs (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.
com/public/news/hotnews/news9908/news990826.4.html> ("According to the [Dutch] Bar, the
companies are breaking professional rules by allowing lawyers and accountants to work together in
multi-disciplinary partnerships (MDPs).").
62. See id. ("The ECJ is to decide whether national Bar rules in the Netherlands contravene
European competition laws."). For a discussion of the lower court Dutch case, which upheld the
lawyer-auditor partnership ban, see generally What If?, supra note 1, § 7.04; see also Dutch Bar
Dispute on MDPs Grinds to Conclusion (visited May 31, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.com/
public/news/hotnews/news9812/news981218.5.html> (presenting viewpoints of both sides in Wouters);
Dutch Bar Resolves Dispute with Ernst & Young (visited May 31, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.com/
public/newslhotnews/news9901/news990129.1.html> (reporting "Dutch Bar is continuing its case
against rival Big Five firms PricewaterhouseCoopers and Arthur Andersen").
63. New South Wales Consolidated Acts, Legal Profession Act 1987, Sec. 48G found in
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol act/lpa1987179> (visited Apr. 5, 1999).
64. See Professional Conduct and Practice Rules (Solicitors' Rules), Rule 40, Multi-disciplinary
Partnership (section 48G), History of Amendments to Rule 40 [hereinafter Solicitors Rules] (visited
April 8, 2000) <http://www.lawsocnsw.asn.au/resources/soruleslsolrules-40.htm]#Heading76.html>; see
also Solicitors Rules: Changes to Provide More Opportunities for MDPs, LAW SOCIETY J. (New South
Wales, Australia), Dec. 1999, at 36, available at <httpl/www.lawsocnsw.asn.au/resources/lsj/archivel
dec1999/86_l.html> (visited Apr. 9,2000).
65. See id. (citing Solicitors Rules 40.1.1 and 40.1.6, NEW SOUTH WALEs GOVERNMENT).
66. Legal Profession Advisory Council, Legal Profession Advisory Council Reports:
Multidisciplinary Partnerships, Preamble (visited Dec. 16, 1999) <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/
lpac.nsf/pages/paper2>. The Council is a statutory body that advises the Attorney General on matters
related to the legal profession.
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promulgation by the Solicitors of rules that would hinder MDPs. 67 The Attorney
General agreed that the rules were anticompetitive. 68 The revised Solicitors
Rules, which became effective in December 1999, eliminated the lawyer majority
control requirement and are much more liberal, permitting MDPs so long as five
requirements are met.69 Interestingly, the Law Society of Upper Canada
recently adopted a model that shares many similarities with the now-revoked
New South Wales' Solicitors Rules. After an extensive study, the Law Society of
Upper Canada recently adopted a by-law that allows nonlawyer partners in firms
provided that the main business remains the provision of legal services.
70
67. The entire recommendation of the Council was as follows:
1. The Legal Profession Advisory Council considers rules 40.1.1 and 40.1.6 of the Solicitors
Professional Conduct and Practice Rules are restrictive and not in the public interest or not
otherwise in the public interest, in that such rules adversely discriminate against non-solicitor
partners in a multidisciplinary partnership and would effectively act as a bar to the
formation of such partnerships, which is against the spirit of the Legal Profession Act and
contravenes competition policy generally and therefore the Advisory Council recommends
that the Attorney General declare such rules inoperative; and
2. It is further recommended by the Advisory Council so as to ensure that no further rules
are promulgated that would hinder the formation of multidisciplinary practices, sections
48F(1) and 48G(1) of the Legal Profession Act, 1987 should be amended by deleting the
reference to the 'Solicitors Rules or joint rules' where it occurs in each section.
Id. at Recommendation. As explained supra, the Solicitors Rules have now been amended.
Moreover, the ABA Commission recently reported that "legislation has been introduced in New
South Wales, Australia that will allow law firms to incorporate, share profits with nonlawyers, and
raise capital through passive investment. Shares in these law firms will float on the Australian Stock
Exchange." Updated Background Report, supra note 53, at n.21 and accompanying text. See also Jeff
Shaw, Incorporation of Legal Practices Under the Corporations Law, LAW. Soc. J. (New South Wales,
Australia), Nov. 1999, at 67 (report by New South Wales Attorney General of legislation he would
propose).
68. See National Competition Policy Review of the Legal Profession Act 1987: Chapter Ten-
The Business Associations of Solicitors and Barristers (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.lawlink.nsw.
gov.au/crd.nsf/pages/ncp_10>.
69. These rules impose an obligation on the solicitor practicing in an MDP to ensure that : (1) the
solicitors have the authority and responsibility for the management of the legal practice and delivery
of legal services in NSW; (2) the MDP conducts the legal practice and delivers legal services in
compliance with the Legal Profession Act, the Regulations and Rules made thereunder; (3) the MDP
delivers legal services in conformity with the general requirements of the law, established ethical and
professional standards in relation to areas such as client privilege, conflict of interest and duties to
disclose; (4) the MDP delivers legal services in a way that ensures that the ethical and professional
duties of the solicitors are not affected by other members of the partnership; and (5) the services and
qualifications are accurately and fairly represented to clients and potential clients. See Solicitors Rules,
supra note 64, at Rule 40.1-40.5.
70. See By-laws of the Law Society of Upper Canada, By-law 25-Multi-Discipline Practices
[hereinafter By-law 25] (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/services bylaws-
en.html>; Materials listed under Law Society of Upper Canada Task Force on Multidisciplinary
Partnerships from the "Related Links" item on the Commission's Homepage, supra note 1. See also
The Law Society of Upper Canada, The "Futures" Task Force-Report of the Working Group on
Multi-Discipline Partnerships: Implementation Phase (reports 1 & 2) (Apr. 30, 1999 and May 28, 1999)
[hereinafter Law Society of Upper Canada, Report] (on file with author) (discussing implementing
MDP model adopted by Convocation on Sept. 28, 1998).
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B. Jurisdictions Where MDP Regulation is Under Consideration
In addition to the express regulation of MDPs in Australia, Germany,
Upper Canada, and the Netherlands, several other jurisdictions are considering
regulation of MDPs. These include the Law Society of England and Wales,
various provinces in Canada, and various French regulators. Each of these is
discussed briefly below.
The Law Council of Australia, an umbrella organization similar to the
ABA, adopted a policy in December 1998 endorsing MDPs and calling on
Australian states and territories to remove existing restrictions on lawyers'
business structures. 71 Victoria's The Legal Ombudsman issued a report on
MDPs prior to the vote of the Law Council of Australia; this report also
endorsed changing the current regulations in order to permit MDPs.72 Several of
the Big Five firms either have or are contemplating opening new offices in
Australia in order to take advantage of expected liberalization of the rules
regarding MDPs.
73
Although England and Wales currently do not have legislation or rules
expressly permitting MDPs, that soon could change. In October 1999, the
Council of the Law Society of England and Wales voted by a 93% majority to
support the long-term goals set forth in the report of its MDP Working Party; the
Working Party endorsed the principle of MDPs and identified seven long-term
goals concerning the conditions under which MDPs should be permitted. 74 The
71. See Law Council of Australia, Policy Statement on Multi-Disciplinary Practices (Dec. 1998)
(on file with author) ("A fundamental tenet of the Law Council's approach is that the regulation of
MDPs should focus on compliance by individual lawyers with their ethical standards and professional
duties rather than on the regulation of the business entity.").
72. See Testimony of Andrew Scott (Law Institute of Victoria) (Nov. 13, 1998); The Legal
Ombudsman, Discussion Paper: Multi-Disciplinary Practices 23 (Dec. 1997) (on file with author)
(stating The Legal Ombudsman's approach focuses on "consumer protection regime of the Legal
Practice Act and how best it can be maintained within an MDP context"). At the December 5, 1998
meeting of the Law Council of Australia, the Victorian Bar Council cast the only vote in opposition to
the proposed policy favoring MDPs whereas the Law Institute of Victoria supported the Law Council
of Australia's proposal. See Minutes of the Law Council of Australia Council Meeting (Dec. 5, 1998)
(on file with author) (reporting votes discussing MDPs).
73. See PricewaterhouseCoopers Launches Australian Law Firm as MDP Lobbying Heats Up
(Apr. 1999) (visited Nov. 8, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.com/homepage/Display-Story/Preview
Story.asp?StoryNum=274.html> (reporting PricewaterhouseCoopers launched new firm in Sydney and
Ernst & Young was rumored to be gearing up for expansion of its legal services as it and other Big
Five practices hope to take advantage of anticipated relaxation of MDP regulations).
74. See E-mail Letter from Denise Collis, Professional Ethics Department, The Law Society, to
Laurel S. Terry, Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law (Nov. 12, 1999) (on file with
author) ("The council agreed by a 93% majority to support both the long term goals and more work
on the interim solutions. We will be looking to develop the interim solutions over the next year and
may see how they go before going further.") and attached document, The Law Society, Multi-
Disciplinary Practices Proposals for the Way Forward: A Preliminary Report for Debate ) [hereinafter
Law Society, Preliminary Report] (on file with author) (discussing MDPs and possible proposals for
dealing with them in future).
The seven long-term goals included allowing solicitors to provide legal services through any
medium to anyone, while still providing the necessary safeguards to protect the public interest;
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Council also voted to move forward in exploring the two interim solutions
proposed by the MDP Working Party which were designed to avoid the necessity
of legislative change.
75
Although these interim solutions do not correspond to the five models set
forth in the Law Society's October 1998 report and questionnaire to its members,
called a "Consultation," the MDP Working Party and Law Society Council
clearly benefited from the discussion generated by the Consultation.76 Thus,
after years of discussion of the MDP issue,77 it appears that England and Wales
are on the road to changing the relevant rules in order to permit MDPs. 78 The
identifying as necessary protections the core principles of professional practice including
independence, freedom of choice, conflict of interest, and confidentiality; identifying the key client
protections as privilege, indemnity cover, dishonesty cover, and complaints systems; recognizing the
need to concentrate on those protections that can be achieved by regulating the individual rather than
the MDP entity; the emergence of new issues, including transparency; and the likely ultimate need for
legislation. Id. 1 21.
75. The interim solutions were: (1) that the Solicitors Rules be amended to permit non-solicitor
partners in a solicitor's firm which provides legal services and (2) that linked partnerships or
"alliances," between, for example, an independent solicitor's firm and an accountancy firm be
permitted. Id. 22; see also UK Law Society Votes in Favour of MDPs (visited Nov. 9, 1999) <http://
www.lawmoney.com/homepage/Display-story/PreviewStory.asp?StoryNumber=3242> (reporting Law
Society's approval of MDPs).
76. See The Law Society, Multi-Disciplinary Practices Why?... Why Not?: A Consultation Paper
Issued by the Law Society of England and Wales (Oct. 1998) [hereinafter Law Society, Consultation
Paper] (on file with author; distributed at Nov. 1998 Commission Hearings). This twenty-nine page
brochure was accompanied by a lengthy questionnaire and supporting memo. This Consultation
predates much of the work of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice ("the Commission")
and was available to it. Alison Crawley, who is head of professional ethics for the Law Society,
testified in November 1998 before the Commission and brought copies of the Consultation with her
for distribution. The Commission's Hypotheticals and Models differ in substance from the Law
Society's Consultation but share a similar approach in that both attempted to set forth possible forms
of association of MDPs. See infra Section IV.C.1 and Section V.B.
77. The recommendations of the MDP Working Party and Law Society Council vote are the
culmination of over ten years of consideration of the MDP issue. The Law Society issued consultation
papers in 1987 and 1993, seeking the views of its membership about MDPs. The 1987 consultation
showed that 54% favored a relaxation of the MDP ban if solicitors remained in control. In 1989, the
Law Society opposed the Government's proposal to remove the statutory ban on MDPs. A 1993
consultation showed that 49% were opposed to MDPs and 43% were in favor. But in 1996, the Law
Society decided that its policy of blanket opposition to MDPs could leave the profession unprepared
to deal with changing market development. It created an MDP Working Party to consider how MDPs
could be structured to protect the public and to consider the necessary legislative changes. That
working party reported in January 1998. In October 1998, the Law Society issued a consultation paper
which requested comments by the end of February 1999. Because only 272 people responded, the Law
Society did not commission a detailed analytical report for publication. Thereafter, a new MDP
Working Party was established, which met on three occasions from June through September 1999.
This Working Party issued the preliminary report, which was the basis of the Council's vote in October
1999. See Law Society, Preliminary Report, supra note 74 (presenting summary of history of MDPs,
overview of responses on Law Society's, Consultation Paper, and outline of proposals for future); see
also Law Society, Consultation Paper, supra note 76 (presenting consultation containing possible
models for MDPs and pros and cons of MDPs).
78. The Law Society of England and Wales cannot, however, effect a change in the Solicitors'
Rules by itself. After a decision by the Council of the Law Society of England and Wales to make a
specific change, the Master of the Rolls must concur. In some cases, the Lord Chancellor must also
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July 1999 report of the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Legal
Education and Conduct also concluded that "the status quo was unlikely to be
maintained."
79
In addition to the activity in England and Wales, France may soon revise its
rules to permit MDPs in some form. The situation in France is unusual because
of the merger in 1992 of the professions of avocat and conseil juridique.
Although conseil juridiques were not licensed as avocats [lawyers], could not
appear in a courtroom, and need not have attended law school, they performed
what in the U.S. would be considered transactional legal work.s ° As a result of
the New Reform Act of 1992, the professions of avocat and conseil juridique
were merged into the profession of avocat and the current conseil juridiques
were deemed avocats.81 As a result, France now has avocat firms that are
networked or affiliated with the Big Five firms.s2 Thus, although MDPs
technically are not allowed in France, they exist de facto. Within the last year,
the Paris Bar Council, the General Council of French Bars, and Henri Nallet, the
former Minister of Justice who was appointed by the Prime Minister to submit a
report on the MDP situation, have made proposals that would regularize the de
facto MDP situation. All would recognize MDPs, but would establish the
conditions under which lawyers could work in an MDP setting.8 3 The July 1999
Nallet proposal ("The Nallet Report"), for example, would allow MDPs between
lawyers and all professions; would establish a new MDP regulator; would require
disclosure to this new regulator of MDP intra-firm agreements; and would
continue to prohibit fee sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers.84 The Nallet
Report acknowledged the fine line between fee sharing, profit sharing, and
expense sharing, but recommended that the new MDP regulator address this
issue.85 On July 22, 1999, the Paris Bar Council discussed The Nallet Report.86
give his approval and he may request advice from the Consultative Committee, the Director General
of Free Trading, and Senior Judges. See Paul Venton, MDPs and the Future of the Profession, in
COURSE MATERIALS FOR OSNEY MEDIA CONFERENCE ON THE THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND HOW TO PREPARE YOUR FIRM
(June 30, 1999) (on file with author) (presenting information on MDPs and effect on legal profession).
79. Neil Rose, Take Your Partners, LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES GAzETrE (Oct. 25,
1999) (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/archives/1999-10-25/000000064.html>.
80. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Background Paper on Multidisciplinary
Practice: Issues and Developments (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter ABA, Background Paper] (visited Nov. 30,
1999) <http://www.abanet.org/ cpr/multicomreportOl99.html> (discussing work of counseil juridique
before occupation merged with avocat).
81. ld
82. ld.
83. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Bftonnier Henri Ader (Ordre des Avocats A la Cour de Paris)
(Aug. 8, 1999); Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, The Nallet Report; see also Materials
from Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris and The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
Conference on "Multidisciplinary Legal Practice: Opportunities and Challenges for the Future" (June
8,1998) (on file with author) (discussing potential for regulation of lawyers in MDPs).
84. See Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, The Nallet Report.
85. See id
86. See Oral Testimony of Bitonnier Henri Ader (Ordre des Avocats A la Cour de Paris) (Aug.
8, 1999).
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According to the Bar President [BAtonnier] Henri Ader, the Paris Bar had
concerns about The Nallet Report, insofar as it permits lawyers to form
partnerships with nonregulated individuals, but the Paris Bar approved in
principle many of the provisions in The Nallet Report, including the requirement
that the MDP law firm use a different name than the MDP firm and the principle
that any sharing of fees is an attack on independence.87 Meanwhile, in March
1999, the General Council of French Bars approved a provision that defined a
"network" very loosely and required that advocates in a network ensure that the
invoicing of services reflect the value of the advocat's own services.
Canada already has seen a rule change and may soon see more, although
different provinces have reacted quite differently to MDPs. Although the Law
Society of Upper Canada recently adopted a by-law following the narrow D.C.-
type approach, recent reports from the Canadian Bar Association and the
Federation of Law Societies of Canada recommended even further
deregulation.88 The Federation of Law Societies of Canada, for example, has not
only recommended a national approach to MDPs but also has written Draft
Model Rules for Multi-Disciplinary Practices; these draft rules were tabled at the
February 2000 meeting but are scheduled for consideration at the August 2000
meeting in Halifax.8 9 Although it proposes many types of regulation, it would
allow a fully integrated partnership of lawyers and nonlawyers.90 Similarly, the
Canadian Bar Association withdrew its Interim Report recommendation, which
also advocated the D.C. approach, and instead endorsed the fully-integrated
MDP.91
C. Voluntary International and Regional Bar Associations with MDP Policies
The two major international bar associations-the International Bar
87. See id.
88. See The Canadian Bar Association, Striking a Balance: The Report of the International
Practice of Law Committee on Multi-Disciplinary Practices and the Legal Profession (August 1999)
[hereinafter Canadian Bar Association, Report] (on file with author) (favoring regulating lawyers
individually instead of regulating MEPs); Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Multi-Disciplinary
Partnerships: Report to Delegates (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Federation of Law Societies of Canada,
Report] (on file with author) (recommending development for model rules for lawyers in MDPs).
Both of these documents are available by clicking on the "Related Links" item on the Commission
Homepage, supra note 1. The Barreau de Quebec also issued a report in June 1999. See Rdsum
synthese du Rapport du Comiat du Barreau du Quebec sur la multidisciplinariti entre avocats et
comptables [hereinafter Resum6] (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http//www.barreau.qc.ca/opinions
memoires/1999/resumemulti.pdf>. Compare R&sum6, supra, with By-law 25, supra note 70 (discussing
By-law 25 of the Law Society of Upper Canada).
89. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Report, supra note 88, at 12; see The Federation of
Law Societies of Canada, Draft Model Rules for Multi-Disciplinary Practices (visited Apr. 9, 2000)
<http://www.flsc.calenglish/committeeslmdp/reportslmodelrule/htm> (containing draft MDP rule);
The Federation of Law Societies of Canada, What's New? (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.flsc.ca/
english/whatsnew/whatsnew.hitm> (reporting on status of draft rules).
90. See id at 11 (proposing full integration of lawyers and nonlawyers).
91. See Canadian Bar Association, Report, supra note 88, at 29, 37 (favoring regulating lawyers
individually instead of MDPs generally).
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Association ("IBA") and the Union Internationale des Avocats ("UIA")-have
issued policy statements on MDPs; these policies do not reject the concept of
MDP, but instead identify the issues regulators should consider when deciding
whether to permit them.92 In contrast to these policies, one of the major regional
bar associations, the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community ("CCBE"), has issued a policy statement that rejects MDPs.
93
Although the CCBE recently reconsidered its policy banning MDPs and
reported that a majority favored adoption of a more moderate version
permitting MDPs under certain conditions,94 it ultimately issued a policy strongly
condemning MDPs.
95
IV. COMMON REGULATORY QUESTIONS
This global response to MDPs reveals similar but complex responses and
regulatory issues. This Section begins with an overview of the arguments most
frequently offered for and against MDPs and continues by providing a survey of
92 See Council of International Bar Association, Resolution on Multi-Disciplinary Practices
Adopted by the Council of International Bar Association (Sept. 13, 1998) [hereinafter IBA, MDP
Resolution] (on file with author) (identifying issues that regulations governing MDPs should address);
Union Internationale des Avocats, Proposed U1A-Recommended Minimum Standards for MDP's
(adopted Nov. 1999) (on file with author) (recommending guidelines governing MDPs); see also IBA
Faces Up to Multidisciplinary Partnerships, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Oct. 1998, at 5
<http://www.lawmoney.com/publiccontents/publications/IFLR/ifr9810/12.html> (noting IBA's
resolution calling for national regulations on MDPs); Written Replies to Commission, Reply by Delos
N. Lutton (U.S. National Vice President, Union Internationale des Avocats) (documenting comments
of U.S. National Vice President of UIA about UIA proposal on MDPs, which was subsequently
adopted at General Assembly meeting in New Delhi, India).
93. See The Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community ("CCBE"),
Declaration on Multidisciplinary Partnerships 2-3 (confirmed unanimously Nov. 29, 1996) (on file with
author) (declaring MDPs should not be permitted). The CCBE has been recognized by the European
Union as the representative body of lawyers in Europe. See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the
European Community's Legal Ethics Code: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct (pt. 1), 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5-6 (1993) (providing background and history of CCBE). For a discussion of the
CCBE policy, see What If?, supra note 1, § 7.03[2] and Testimony of Michel Gout (CCBE) (Nov. 12,
1998); see also CCBE, Summary of the Questionnaire on Multidisciplinary Partnerships (on file with
author) (discussing approaches to MDPs by CCBE members).
94. See Testimony of Michel Gout (CCBE) (Nov. 12, 1998); CCBE, Preliminary Draft of the
CCBE Position Considered at the Plenary Session of April 1998 2-3 (on file with author) (moderating
CCBE's stance on MDPs).
95. See Position of CCBE on Integrated Forms of Co-operation Between Lawyers and Persons
Outside the Legal Profession, adopted in Athens on November 12, 1999 (on file with author),
available as a ZIP file at CCBE Documents (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.ccbe.org/
uk/homeuk.htm>. ("CCBE consequently advises that there are overriding reasons for not permitting
forms of integrated co-operation between lawyers and non-lawyers with relevantly different
professional duties and correspondingly different rules of conduct. In those countries where such
forms of co-operation are permitted, lawyer independence, client confidentiality and disciplinary
supervision of conflicts-of-interests rules must be safeguarded.") See also Neil Rose, Take Your
Partners, LAW SociETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES GAZETrE (Oct. 25, 1999) (visited Nov. 11, 1999)
<http:llwww.lawgazette.co.uklarchivesl1999-10-25/000000064.html> ("However, a long-running debate
within the council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe seems likely to end with little change to its
opposition to MDPs.").
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the numerous issues faced by an MDP regulator.
One of the most complex tasks a regulator faces is deciding how to
approach the MDP issues. The Appendix to this Article is an issue checklist that
identifies forty different issues related to MDPs, grouped according to three
categories: threshold issues, functional issues, and substantive ethical issues.%
In my view, a regulator's and reader's task is much easier if the myriad of
MDP issues are grouped into these three categories. First, a regulator must
decide whether to lift the MDP ban. In reaching this decision, the regulator will
analyze a number of threshold issues. If, and only if, a regulator is willing to lift
a MDP ban, the regulator must consider functional issues related to the manner
in which an MDP may be organized and operate. The third category is the
substantive ethics issues which ask how to apply traditional legal ethics concepts
in the new MDP setting.
This Article introduces the reader to these key issues in the MDP debate. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a definitive treatment of each issue
because each issue itself could be the basis for a law review article.
A. Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of MDPs
Throughout the world, the arguments offered in support of and in
opposition to MDPs have been similar. Those who favor MDPs argue, inter alia,
that MDPs provide one-stop shopping, better service (because of the broader
expertise of the service-providers and closer cooperation of an interdisciplinary
team), and cost-effectiveness. 97 Steven Bennett, for example, testified that from
his perspective as corporate counsel to one of the U.S.'s ten largest banks,
clients' problems are not just "legal problems," but instead require an
interdisciplinary approach.98  He warned that if lawyers do not adopt a
multidisciplinary approach, they risk becoming a mere footnote in the twenty-
first century.
99
Those opposed to MDPs argue that MDPs would impair a lawyer's
independent judgment. Larry Fox perhaps best articulates this argument by
stating, "he who pays the piper calls the tune." 10° The concern is that lawyers
96. See Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999). I identified forty different issues
that a regulator might want to consider. To review the entire issue checklist, see infra Appendix: Issue
Checklist at the end of this Article. When I testified before the Commission, one of the principal
things I tried to do was determine what issues the Commission needed to decide, in what order, what
the possible answers were, and which answer I thought most sensible on each of the identified issues.
97. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Larry Ramirez (Chair, ABA General Practice, Solo and Small
Firm Section) (Feb. 6,1999); Reporter's Notes, supra note 58, at 4 & 12 n.10 (listing testimony from Big
Five representatives concerning most efficient way to provide services to clients was through
integrated service entity).
98. See Testimony of Steven A. Bennett (Banc One) (Nov. 13, 1998).
99. Id
100. I have heard Larry Fox orally make this remark at conferences. Although I did not find this
exact language in writing, he expressed a similar sentiment during his testimony to the Commission.




ultimately would follow the dictates of their employers, who don't understand
client needs, rather than following the lawyers' own judgment. A related
argument is that because of the loss of independence, MDPs would undermine
the rule of law that is important in a democratic country. 10 1 Additional
arguments are that there is a fundamental conflict between a lawyer's duty of
confidentiality and an auditor's duty to the public' 2 and between the lawyers'
and accountants' handling of conflicts of interest.10 3 An argument against
MDPs, espoused more by European lawyers than U.S. lawyers, is that MDPs are
bad because they would reduce the number of lawyers available from whom
clients could choose. 1°4 Opponents also express a concern about the impact of
MDPs on the attorney-client privilege, and issues related to protecting clients'
funds and providing professional indemnity. 10 5 Perhaps most fundamentally,
many opponents worry that there will be no effective way to enforce any MDP
regulations.1°6 Although these arguments are made on a global basis, the
Commission's website is an excellent source to find all of the above arguments
collected in one place.
1°7
"It's the money." Follow the money and you'll follow the power. Follow the power and
you'll know who is in control. And as soon as the power rests with non-lawyers not trained
in, not dedicated to, and not subject to discipline for our ethical principles, you will see the
independence of the profession fall away.
It reminds me of what happens when the biggest company in a town gets purchased by folks
from far way. The new buyer may give lip service to giving back to the community. But the
reality is the town will soon learn it has lost its soul.
Id.
101. See, e.g., IBA MDP Resolution, supra note 92. The Resolution states:
WHEREAS recognition of the rule of law places heavy emphasis on the necessity for
adequate access to justice and lawyers form an essential element of access to justice so that
the legal profession is a necessary element in the implementation of any system based on the
rule of law.
THAT in the process [of considering MDPs], such regulators and authorities consider the
possible risks to clients and the public that may be posed by MDPs, taking into account the
vital role of the legal profession in upholding the rule of law.
Id.
102. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Accountant Bosses Pose Ethical Threat, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 6, 1997,
at A23 (discussing difficulty of assessing and clearing conflicts in MDPs).
103. See id (discussing problems in clearing conflicts in MDPs).
104. See, e.g., Law Society, Consultation Paper, supra note 76, at 17 (discussing various
arguments made by opponents of MDPs); see also Law Society, Preliminary Report, supra note 73
(discussing goals and potential solutions for MDP concerns).
105. See, e.g., Law Society, Consultation Paper, supra note 76, at 18 (listing additional problems
MDPs can create).
106. See, e.g., Written Reply of Sydney M. Cone, III (June 22, 1999) (visited Dec. 1, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cone3.html>.
107. See generally Commission Homepage, supra note 1 (providing links to a spectrum of
opinions on MDPs).
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B. Key Threshold Issues
The threshold issues are those questions one will want to ask when deciding
whether to lift an existing MDP ban. The first threshold issue is the proper
standard to use when deciding whether to retain an MDP ban. Although it may
seem obvious that public interest and client protection are proper bases for such
a decision, the exercise is useful to remind oneself that protecting lawyers'
incomes or "turf" is not a legitimate basis for regulation under the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct 1°8
Having articulated the appropriate standards for decision making, one
should next identify the core values of lawyers, if any, that must be protected in
order to achieve the regulatory goals.1°9 The values most often cited are
independence, confidentiality, loyalty (avoiding conflicts of interest), and
competence.
110
The third threshold issue is whether to adopt the same rules for a Big Five-
affiliated MDP as for a very small MDP. In other words, should there be the
same rules for Main Street lawyers as for Wall Street lawyers? The fourth
threshold issue is whether there is any client demand for MDPs, the extent of
such demand, and the relevance of such demand. The witnesses before the
ABA, for example, disagreed strenuously about the extent of client demand for
MDPs and whether the demand was client or supplier driven."' Regulators
must next ask whether there is any evidence that MDPs have harmed clients in
those jurisdictions in which they have been offered.
The last two threshold issues may be the most important. A regulator
explicitly or implicitly allocates a burden of production and persuasion; these
108. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Larry Ramirez (Chair, ABA General Practice, Solo and Small
Firm Section) (Feb. 6, 1999) (identifying service to client as basis on which decision should be made,
but observing MDPs may help solo and small firm lawyers by bringing in more clients). One of the
difficulties, of course, is that the ABA serves, on the one hand, as a regulator insofar as it recommends
model laws, but on the other hand, many members may expect the ABA to act as their trade
representative.
109. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker Biddle & Reath) (Feb. 4, 1999)
(believing core values of independence, confidentiality, and loyalty must be protected). Penn State
Dickinson Dean Peter Glenn has observed that these are instrumental values and that the most
important core value is client service. See E-mail from Peter Glenn, Dean of Penn State Dickinson
School of Law, to Laurel S. Terry, Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law, (Dec. 2,
1999) (copy on file with author) (finding such values are instrumental values, rather than core values).
110. Interestingly, the Commission's Report and Recommendation did not cite competency as a
core value, although this was corrected in both the Commission's Updated Background and
Informational Report and Request for Comments and March 2000 Draft Recommendation. See infra
Part VII.D for a discussion criticizing this omission.
111. Compare Oral Testimony of Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker Biddle & Reath) (Feb. 4, 1999) and
Written Remarks of William M. Hannay, III (Chair, ABA International Law and Practice Section)
(Mar. 11, 1999) (believing MDP issue is being driven by Big Five supply), with Testimony of Steven A.
Bennett (Banc One) (Nov. 13, 1998) and Written Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker (Chair, ABA Section
of Taxation) (Feb. 4, 1999) (finding supply shows there is demand); see also Reporter's Notes, supra
note 58, at 7 (discussing demand for MDPs); Terry Appendices B1-B7, supra note 4, at Threshold
Issues, Item F (summarizing testimony of all witnesses on this issue.); Daly, supra note 1, at 93-94 &
nn. 240-43 (discussing solo practitioners and small firms are seeking partnerships with nonlawyers).
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burdens will be placed either on those who want to change the existing MDP ban
or those who want to retain the current rule. Because the issue of MDPs
involves an unknown future, this allocation of the burdens may determine the
ultimate answer.
The last threshold issue is whether the regulators believe that lawyers who
work outside a traditional law firm setting are doing what is considered "law
practice" when done by a lawyer in a law firm. As explained in greater detail
below, the regulators' views on this issue may shape their views about the
appropriate response to the MDP situation.
C. Key Functional Issues if MDPs are Permitted
If a regulator decides to consider lifting an existing MDP ban, that regulator
should next consider a series of functional issues.112  The three types of
functional issues are (1) form of association issues; (2) scope of practice issues;
and (3) functional ethics issues.
1. Form of Association Issues
The most fundamental form of association question is the legal form in
which multidisciplinary practice, as opposed to multidisciplinary partnerships,
may be offered. Some of the choices include: (1) allowing a fully integrated
MDP, in which lawyers and nonlawyers are partners; (2) requiring ownership
and control of the law firm by lawyers, but allowing an affiliation (contractually
or otherwise) with a firm of nonlawyers; or (3) achieving multidisciplinary
practice through cooperation of separate legal and nonlegal firms, as is currently
done in the U.S. The ABA Commission Models discussed later in Section V.B
present these options in greater detail.
113
A second form of association issue asks what professions or individuals may
form a partnership with a lawyer. During the Commission hearings, for example,
Chair Sherwin Simmons became well known for asking whether a lawyer and a
tow truck driver should be able to form a partnership.114 A less frequent
question, but one that raises the same issue, is whether a Nobel prize-winning
economist would be an acceptable nonlawyer partner if the economist was not
subject to a set of ethics rules.11 5 Interestingly, although many U.S. lawyers are
112. In my view, these functional issues are similar to the same functional issues that arise when
in a transnational legal practice context. See generally Laurel S. Terry, A Case Study of the Hybrid
Model for Facilitating Cross-Border Legal Practice: The Agreement Between the American Bar
Association and the Brussels Bars, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1382 (1998) (discussing cross-border legal
practice schemes such as European Union's Directives, GATS, NAFIA, and ABA and IBA Foreign
Legal Consultant rules).
113. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of the ABA Models and Hypotheticals.
114. See Oral Remarks of Samuel DiPiazza (PricewaterhouseCoopers) (Mar. 11, 1999); Oral
Remarks of Richard Miller (General Counsel, AICPA) (Mar. 12, 1999); Oral Testimony of Simon
Potter (Member, Canadian Bar Association International Practice of Law Committee) (Feb. 6,1999).
115. See Oral Testimony of John Dzienkowski (Professor, University of Texas School of Law)
(Feb. 5, 1999) (indicating Professor Dzienkowski was asked this question.).
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particularly worried about MDPs between lawyers and accountants, this is one of
the few types of MDPs allowed in Germany.
116
A third form of association issue asks what name the MDP may use. Many
European regulators and advisors, for example, seem particularly concerned
about this issue and have adopted rules which prohibit a law firm from using the
MDP's name.
117
A fourth form of association issue addresses the disclosure requirements, if
any. There are two separate kinds of disclosure or transparency requirements
that regulators might impose on MDPs. The first duty of disclosure is owed by
the MDPs toward its clients.118 A second type of disclosure involves disclosure
to regulators of the relationship between the MDP and the affiliated lawyers.
Several European provisions require this latter type of disclosure. n 9 Many U.S.
lawyers working in Brussels, for example, have agreed to comply with this
second type of disclosure. 120
A final form of association issue is whether to permit passive investment in
a law practice or MDP.121 Many lawyers oppose passive investment, but some
commentators argue that if Big Five-affiliated MDPs are permitted, then the
rejection of passive investment puts traditional law firms at a capitalization
116. See infra note 133 for a discussion of the acceptable MDPs in Germany. The anecdotal
evidence I collected during my 1998-99 German sabbatical was that many German lawyers believe that
lawyers and accountants, but not others, were particularly suited to form an MDP because their values
and protections were so similar.
117. See, e.g., Written Remarks of Bfitonnier Henri Ader (Ordre des Avocats & la Cour de Paris)
(Aug. 8, 1999) (summarizing Paris Bar's reaction to Nallet Report, he said, it "does approve that a law
firm must have a name different from the MDP's name while the law firm must advertise the fact that
it belongs to an MDP.").
11& See, e.g., Oral Remarks of Samuel DiPiazza (PricewaterhouseCoopers) (Mar. 11, 1999).
119. See ABA-Brussels Bars Agreement, art. 8, reprinted in Terry, supra note 112, at 1492. The
agreement provides:
Where one or more U.S. Lawyers form a Partnership with one or more [Brussels
lawyers]... the U.S. Lawyers participating in the Partnership ... shall submit to [the
regulatory authority]... information [about] the partnership agreement among themselves
or, if no written agreement exists, a written confirmation that such partnership agreement
does not conflict with any provisions of their agreement with the [Brussels lawyer].
Id.; see also Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, The Nallet Report, A Summary by Sydney
M. Cone, II & Franfois Berbinau. Cone and Berbinau summarize The Nallet Report and quote from
it saying:
Third, the Report would require that every MDP submit to the new commission, as well as
to existing professional disciplinary bodies relevant to the MDP, all agreements and
constitutive documents relating to the structure and operation of the MDP. According to the
Report, any such agreements and documents not so submitted would be void. The Report
would also give clients of the MDP access to such agreements and documents.
Id.
120. See Terry, supra note 112, at 1456-58 (discussing U.S. lawyers agreeing to disclose
partnership agreements to Brussels Bar and among themselves when forming partnerships with
tableau lawyers).
121. Passive investment means that individuals who are not practicing in the law firm or MDP





2. Scope of Practice Issues
The second set of functional issues addresses the appropriate scope of a
lawyer's practice within an MDP setting. The most commonly suggested scope
of practice limitation is that an MDP should not be able to simultaneously offer
legal services and audit services to the same client.123 One commentator
suggested that lawyers in an MDP not be permitted to litigate.124 A third
limitation on a lawyer's scope of practice is that a lawyer would only be
permitted to practice in an MDP if the sole or primary purpose of the MDP is to
provide legal services. This is the D.C. model, which also has been adopted by
the Law Society of Upper Canada. 125 Although the D.C. model raises form of
association issues, it also raises scope of practice issues.
3. Functional Ethics Issues
The third set of functional issues is whether, how, and by whom, lawyers in
an MDP should be regulated. If a regulator determines that the legal ethics rules
should apply to MDP lawyers, the regulator faces two major choices about the
conditions under which legal ethics rules would apply to the MDP lawyer. First,
a regulator could decide to apply the ethics rules to a lawyer based on the
lawyer's status within the MDP (i.e., ask if the lawyer is holding him or herself
out as a lawyer or is employed in the MDP in order to provide legal services).
Alternatively, a regulator could decide that the ethics rules apply only if the
particular activity in question involves the practice of law.
Functional ethics issues also arise with respect to the nonlawyers in the
MDP. A regulator might, of course, decide to take no action that affects MDP
nonlawyers. Alternatively, a regulator might insist that MDP nonlawyers
122. See Written Replies to Commission, Reply by Sydney M. Cone, II (Counsel, Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton) (noting that "[vliewed from the perspective of the capitalization of legal
practice, these features of the Report [forbidding passive investment] present an anomaly").
123. This type of limitation is present in the Paris Bar Policy, supra note 83, and Model A(1) in
the Law Society, Consultation Paper, supra note 76. A legal-audit ban was cited in the IBA and UIA
policies as an example of a regulation that might be particularly appropriate. See supra note 92 for
sources discussing the IBA and UIA policies. The CCBE MDP policy refers to the legal-audit conflict
as one justification for its "anti-MDPs" policy. See supra note 93 for a discussion of the current CCBE
policy towards MDPs. The Report by The Law Society Report of Upper Canada includes a legal-
audit ban. See supra note 70 for a discussion of this report. Wouters v. Nova, discussed in What If?,
supra note 1, § 7.04, upheld the Netherlands Bar's refusal to approve lawyer-auditor MDPs. Witness
Thomas 0. Verhoeven, who practices in a German MDP, testified that his firm has adopted a
voluntary legal-audit ban. Testimony of Thomas 0. Verhoeven (Oppenhoff & RAdler) (Nov. 13,
1998).
124. Compare Oral Testimony of John Dzienkowski (Professor, University of Texas School of
Law) (Feb. 5, 1999) (advocating litigation limitation), with Written Remarks of John Dzienkowski
(Professor, University of Texas School of Law) (Feb. 5, 1999) (retracting litigation limitation on MDP
lawyer's scope of practice.).
125. See D.C. RuLE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 5.4 (1999) (governing MDPs in District of
Columbia); Law Society of Upper Canada, Report, supra note 70 (discussing D.C. Rule).
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comply with legal ethics rules in all respects. A legal regulator probably has no
direct authority to establish rules for nonlawyers, but a regulator could indirectly
accomplish this by saying that a lawyer is only permitted to work in an MDP if
all nonlawyers use the legal ethics rules. This is the approach used in Germany's
MDP rules.1 26 Or, a regulator could decide that nonlawyers in an MDP must
register with the bar, as suggested by the Consultation Paper of the Law Society
of England and Wales.
127
The third approach to MDP nonlawyers takes a middle ground: it requires
MDP nonlawyers to use legal ethics rules in some, but not all, situations. This
approach recognizes that other professionals do not want to be told that they
have an absolute duty to comply with legal ethics rules, just as lawyers would not
want to be told to comply with another profession's rules at the expense of their
own rules. An accountant providing consulting services, for example, should not
have to use the lawyers' conflict of interest rules to decide whether to accept a
client, assuming that the client is not receiving or has not received legal services.
Similarly, the fee and reimbursement schedule of an engineer in an MDP should
not be governed by lawyers' fee rules.
On the other hand, this middle-ground approach recognizes that one cannot
simply say that MDP lawyers, and only MDP lawyers, are subject to legal ethics
rules. This middle-ground approach would require MDP nonlawyers to act
consistently with legal ethics rules either: (1) when working at the lawyer's
direction on a matter; or (2) when necessary in order for the lawyers to honor
their own ethical obligations. The first of these requirements is consistent with
the current legal ethics requirements. The Model Rules currently require
lawyers to ensure that nonlawyer personnel comply with the lawyers' ethical
obligations.128 No one imagines, for example, that it would be proper for a law
firm's secretary or paralegal to reveal client confidences.
The middle-ground's second provision is less traditional, but is consistent
with the reasons why the legal system asks nonlawyers to obey ethics rules. One
could say that in order for MDP lawyers to honor the duty of loyalty or
confidentiality, the nonlawyers in an MDP should not, without client consent,
accept a representation adverse to a former legal client. 129 Thus, this middle-
126. See BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSORDNUNG § 59(a) (stating attorneys are permitted to
associate with other professions "within framework of their professional rights"); BERUFSORDNUNG
§ 30 (The BerufsOrdnung which was adopted by the German mandatory bar association
BundesrechtsanwaltsKammern (BRAK) pursuant to the authority granted in the
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung (BRAO)); see also Testimony of Thomas 0. Verhoeven (Oppenhoff &
Rfidler) (Nov. 13, 1999) (explaining German rules); Testimony of Dr. Hans-Jtlrgen HeUwig (Vice-
President, Deutscher Anvaltverein) (Feb. 4, 1999) (same). For a discussion of the German approach
to MDPs, see Terry, German MDPs, supra note 58.
127. See Law Society, Consultation Paper, supra note 76, at 13 (suggesting bar registration for
nonlawyer owners of MDP).
128. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 5.3 (1999) (imputing ethical standards
of lawyers onto nonlawyers).
129. Commission Hypothetical 4.2 provides an example to which one could apply this second
principle. One might conclude, for example, that the nonlawyers in XYZ should act consistently with
the legal ethics rules when deciding whether to accept representation of Target, given that the Law
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ground approach recognizes that even if it is not proper for lawyers to
completely impose their rules on nonlawyers, there might be circumstances in
which it would be appropriate to have MDP nonlawyers use legal ethics in order
to facilitate MDP lawyers' own compliance with their rules.
The third functional ethics issue is regulation of the MDP itself. The very
first witness to testify before the Commission called for a new opt-in federal
mega-regulator of MDPs. 13° Some witnesses suggested that the MDP itself
should be regulated, just as law firms in New York are regulated by having the
law firm itself subject to discipline. 131 One of the members of the Commission,
U.S. District Judge Paul Friedman, suggested a court audit procedure. 132
A final functional ethics issue is what to do when the rules of different MDP
professionals clash. One leading German commentator, for example, has
pointed out various conflicts between the rules governing German accountants
and the rules governing German lawyers; one of his solutions was to propose a
new "mega-regulator" to eliminate these clashes.1 33
D. Key Substantive Ethics Issues if MDPs are Permitted
If a jurisdiction decides to lift its MDP ban, then it probably needs to
examine all of its ethics rules to determine how they apply in the new MDP
environment and whether the rules must be modified. In a U.S. context, this
means that at both the ABA and state level, every single ethical rule should be
reviewed to determine whether any revisions or new comments are necessary in
light of the new MDP context. Appendix A to the Commission's June 1999
Firm A & B already represent Raider in its efforts to take over Target. One could conclude that to do
otherwise compromises the lawyer's duties of confidentiality and loyalty. See Written Remarks of
Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12,1999), supra note 4, at 17.
130. See Testimony of Jim Holden (Steptoe & Johnson) (Nov. 12, 1998).
131. See generally Written Remarks of Sydney M. Cone, III (Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton) (Mar. 12, 1999) (discussing New York law firm discipline rule and need to create
institutional culture of adherence to lawyers' values).
132. See Oral Testimony of Sydney M. Cone, III (Mar. 12, 1999). A summation of Cone's
testimony reveals the position taken by Judge Friedman and Cone's response to it:
Judge Friedman proposed allowing lawyers to have multidisciplinary practices with other
professionals and split fees as long as they meet the following conditions: supervision by a
senior legal officer, training and other support to foster professionalism and independence of
judgment in the legal division, ethics advisory run by lawyers, only lawyers tell lawyers what
they can and cannot do, and the MDP being subject to an audit every five years by the
highest court of the state to determine whether it can continue to function as an MDP. An
MDP would be deleted from the list for failing to keep up its end of the bargain and because
a full report on what it was doing was submitted by the MDP the Court would not need a big
staff and could decide by a majority vote whether to allow an MDP to continue. Mr. Cone
said the approach might be "all right" if, in addition to the audit every five years, the court
had the power to require an audit whenever it had reasonable cause to believe it was
appropriate.
Id.
133. See Prof. Dr. Martin Henssler, Die Interprofessionelle Zusammenarbeit in der Sozietat
presented at DeutscherAnwalt Verein, Forum "Zukunft der Anwaltschaft" (Mainz Oct. 2, 1998) (on
file with author).
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Report contains possible amendments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in the event MDPs are permitted t34 As Appendix A and the literature
demonstrate, a significant number of U.S. ethics rules might require a rule or
comment change to explain how the rule should operate in an MDP context.
This Article does not repeat this analysis, but instead identifies those Model
Rules that require the most fundamental reconsideration.
Because I am most familiar with U.S. ethics rules, this Section refers to the
ABA Model Rules. Because many countries' ethics provisions have equivalent
concepts, 135 this discussion should be viewed as providing concrete examples of
common regulatory issues.
1. Independence
It is indisputable that if MDPs are permitted, there is a risk that a lawyer's
professional judgment could be pressured and perhaps compromised. Any loss
of independence potentially has consequences not only for the individual client
being served, but also for the entire society and, potentially, the rule of law in
that country. 136 Therefore, assuming a regulator is willing to permit MDPs, one
of the most pressing issues to consider is whether to adopt special rules to
protect a lawyer's independence in an MDP context.
There is precedent for a specifically-tailored ethics rule. Unlike the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct includes a separate rule that provides specific guidance to
corporate counsel about how to implement the traditional rules in a corporate
counsel setting.137  In my view, this rule has been successful and useful.
Similarly, a regulator might adopt a special rule for MDP lawyers that provides
guidance about how to protect independence in an MDP setting. This new rule
could address issues such as direction of an MDP lawyer's judgment and who
sets the MDP lawyer's compensation, among other issues.
2. Confidentiality
Some of the MDP regulator's most important substantive ethics decisions
134. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Final Report-Appendix A [hereinafter
Appendix A] (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixa.html> (illustrating
possible amendments to Model Rules of Professional Conduct to deal with MDPs). An earlier article
on MDPs explored some of the rule amendments that should be considered if Model Rule 5.4's MDP
ban were removed. See What If ?, supra note 1 (cited favorably in ABA, Background Paper, supra
note 80, at n.7).
135. See generally Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Code of
Conduct (pts. 1 & 2), 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1,345 (1993) (comparing provisions of CCBE Code of
Conduct and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, noting many similarities).
136. See, e.g., IBA, MDP Resolution, supra note 92, 3 (stating "that in the process, such
regulators and authorities [should] consider the possible risks to clients and the public that may be
posed by MDPs, taking into account the vital role of the legal profession in upholding the rule of
law").
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1999) (stating rules when
organizations are clients). Part of its success, in my view, is the dialogue it has engendered.
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will be the assumptions made about an MDP lawyer's duty of confidentiality. In
a traditional law firm setting, the law assumes that absent client direction to the
contrary, one lawyer in the firm may share information with other lawyers and
nonlawyers in the law firm.13s Because an MDP is a new practice setting, a
regulator has no existing assumptions to draw upon. Indeed, there are several
competing assumptions from which a regulator must choose.
In an MDP setting, the rule might be that lawyers may not share
information with anyone, absent client consent; this is the rule that accountants
use. 139 Alternatively, the rule might be that absent client consent, an MDP
lawyer may share information only with MDP lawyers; this second approach
would be consistent with the rule that currently applies to traditional law firms.
A third possibility is that MDP lawyers may share information with everyone in
the MDP.
There are two reasons why this decision about confidentiality is critical.
From a confidentiality perspective, the assumption will determine whether a
screen is required.14° If information is permitted to flow among all MDP
members, then there is no need to automatically put screens in place; on the
other hand, if the assumption is that information must be confined to the lawyer
working on the project, then a screening system must be put into place. The
confidentiality assumptions selected also directly influence the conflict of interest
analysis described below.
3. Avoiding Conflicts of Interest
Approximately six months after it was created, the Commission prepared a
document called Hypotheticals and Models.141 In addition to identifying the
different legal forms used to provide multidisciplinary practice, the document
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. g (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996). This section of the final draft of the Restatement states:
Thus, disclosure is permitted to other lawyers in the same firm and to employees and agents
such as accountants, file clerks, office managers, secretaries, and similar office assistants in
the lawyer's firm, and with confidential, independent consultants, such as computer
technicians, accountants, bookkeepers, law-practice consultants, and others who assist in
furthering the law-practice business of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm.
Id.
139. See, e.g., Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, American Association of
Attorney-Certified Accountants, Written Report and Summary (comparing lawyer and accountant
regulatory provisions); Letter from Richard I. Miller, General Counsel & Secretary, AICPA, to State
Society Chief Directors 5 (Aug. 24,1999) [hereinafter Miller letter] (on file with author). Miller noted
that whereas confidential information within law firm is imputed to all lawyers, "rules governing the
accounting profession are quite different. While the AICPA rules impose a duty of confidentiality,
they may not impute one firm member's knowledge of confidential client information to every other
member of a firm." Id. (citations omitted).
140. See infra note 146 for an explanation of the concept of imputation. Screens are efforts to
avoid imputation and disqualification by separating and isolating lawyers with confidential
information.
141. See infra Part V.B for an explanation of the models discussed in the Commission's
Hypotheticals and Models document.
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posed more than twelve different hypotheticals that raised some of the most
contentious conflicts of interest issues confronting the U.S. legal profession.
Indeed, if the facts of those hypotheticals were revised so that only lawyers and
traditional law firms were involved, lawyers throughout the U.S. probably would
still disagree about the proper resolution of those issues. However, if one
carefully examines those hypotheticals, one discovers that most of them only
presented one new question-the question of how the current conflicts of
interest imputation rule should be applied in an MDP setting. 142 Despite the
complexity of the Commission's hypotheticals, it has a relatively simple
mechanism it can use to express its conclusion. The Commission could define
the term firm as a mechanism for explaining how the imputation concept should
apply in an MDP setting.'
43
A second conflict of interest issue is created by the differing standards
lawyers and accountants use to determine the presence of a conflict of interest.
The testimony before the Commission, along with the supplemental submissions,
revealed that lawyers and accountants measure conflicts of interest quite
differently.
144
Professor Eleanor Myer's article in this Symposium issue addresses these
differences in depth.145 But for purposes of this Article, recognizing that it is a
radical oversimplification, one might make the following observations about the
differences between the lawyers' and accountants' rules on conflicts of interest.
Lawyers recognize indirect conflicts of interest, whereas accountants only
recognize direct conflicts of interest.146 In addition, lawyers recognize the
concept of nonconsentable conflicts, whereas accountants have no equivalent
142. See Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at 17. Imputation is
the principle expressed in Model Rule 1.10, which says that if one lawyer in a law firm has a conflict of
interest, then that conflict is imputed, i.e., extended, to all lawyers in the law firm. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.10 (1999).
143. See Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at 13-18
(recommending Commission use definition of "firm" to express its conclusion about imputation).
144. See, e.g., Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, American Association of
Attorney-Certified Accountants, Written Report and Summary (comparing lawyer and accountant
ethics); Written Remarks of Professor Linda Galler (Professor, Hofstra University School of Law)
(Nov. 13, 1998); Miller letter, supra note 139, at 1-4 (enclosing explanation of Commission's final
report with comparison of differences between lawyer and accountant rules.).
145. Eleanor W. Myers, Examining Independence and Loyalty, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 857-68
(1999).
146. See, e.g., Miller letter, supra note 139, at 2-4 (comparing lawyer and accountant rules
regarding directly adverse conflicts with concurrent representation and with unrelated engagements
and materially limited conflicts, noting in all three situations, accounting firm could proceed although
law firm could not, but noting many accounting firms would decline firm example); Oral Remarks of
Roger Page (Deloitte & Touche) (Mar. 11, 1999) ("[U]nder the rules of the accounting profession
today there is imputed disqualification of the firm if the clients are directly adverse. The difference in
the accountant's rules is that every conflict is waivable with full disclosure and consent of the
parties."); see also Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, American Association of




concept. 47 Third, accountants generally worry about being too closely aligned
with the client, whereas lawyers generally worry about being too closely aligned
with someone other than the client, such as a third-party payor, the lawyer, or
another client. Although Big Five representatives testified that MDP lawyers
would comply with legal ethics, they also made clear their discomfort with these
rules.
148
4. Money and Client Protection Issues
In addition to the three substantive ethics issues discussed above, there are
a number of other ethics issues an MDP regulator must confront. Indeed,
representatives from several ABA entities appeared to make sure that the
Commission did not lose sight of each group's perspective. 149 Among the many
issues that the regulator must confront is how client funds will be treated (i.e.,
fund segregation, random audits, application of IOLTA rules, malpractice
insurance) and pro bono requirements.
In sum, many world regulators are now confronting an MDP phenomenon
and are facing similar regulatory issues. This development does not mean, of
course, that all regulators should react similarly to MDPs or that U.S. regulators
must follow the actions of regulators in Germany, France, or elsewhere. 150 On
the other hand, U.S. regulators should recognize the similarities in many
regulatory issues and be willing to try to learn from experiences outside the U.S.
V. THE WORK OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
A. Overview
In comparison to foreign responses to MDPs, U.S. regulators and advisory
bodies were relatively slow to respond. But in August 1998, then-ABA
President Philip S. Anderson created the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
147. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.7(a)(1) & (b)(1) (1999)
(specifying that if conflict is present, lawyer must obtain client consent and must decide that
representation is objectively reasonable); see also Oral Remarks of Richard Miller (General Counsel,
AICPA) (Mar. 12,1999).
148. See, e.g., Oral Remarks of Lawrence M. Hill (White & Case) (Feb. 4, 1999); Oral Testimony
of James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999); Oral Testimony of Kathryn Oberly (Vice
Chair and General Counsel, Ernst & Young) (Feb. 4, 1999).
149. See Written Remarks of Judge Judith M. Billings (Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Pro
Bono and Public Service) (Feb. 6, 1999); Written Remarks of Herbert S. Garten (Chair, ABA
Commission on IOLTA) (Aug. 8, 1999); Written Remarks of Jan McDavid (ABA Antitrust Section)
(Nov. 13, 1998); Oral Remarks of Joseph P. McMonigle (Chair, ABA Standing Committee on
Lawyers Professional Liability) (Mar. 12, 1999); Testimony of M. Peter Moser (ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility) (Nov. 13, 1998); Written Replies to the
Commission, Reply by John S. Skilton (Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on the Delivery of
Legal Services); Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Standing Committee on
Specialization, American Bar Association.
150. See, e.g., Phyllis W. Beck Chair in Law Symposium Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, (Nov. 12,
1999).
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Practice ("the Commission"). 151 The Commission held multi-day hearings in
November 1998 and issued its Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice:
Issues and Developments before the February 1999 ABA Midyear Meeting.
5 2
The Commission held additional hearings at the Midyear Meeting and held a
third set of hearings in Washington, D.C. in March 1999.153 The Commission
issued its Report and Recommendation on June 8, 1 9 99 .154
The Commission's Report was considered at the ABA Annual Meeting in
Atlanta in August 1999. Following a debate, the House of Delegates adopted a
resolution that:
[T]he American Bar Association make no change, addition or
amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which permits
a lawyer to offer legal services through a multidisciplinary practice
unless and until additional study demonstrates that such changes will
further the public interest without sacrificing or compromising lawyer
independence and the legal profession's tradition of loyalty to
clients.
155
The Commission held additional public hearings in August 1999 at the
Annual Meeting; in October 1999, in connection with the meeting of the ABA
General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section; and in February 2000, at the
ABA Midyear Meeting in Dallas. 56 The Commission also issued an Updated
Background and Informational Report and Request for Comments in December
1999 and a Postscript to the February 2000 Dallas Midyear Meeting. 57 In March
2000, the Commission posted on its webpage a Draft Recommendation to the
ABA House of Delegates, which significantly modified and simplified the
Commission's earlier June 1999 Recommendation and arguably contains a
lawyer-control requirement.
158
151. See ABA President Philip S. Anderson Appoints Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Aug. 4, 1998) (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http:/www.abanet.org/media/aug98/multicom.html>
(announcing formation of Commission).
152. See generally Commission Homepage, supra note 1 (compiling information regarding,
among other things, Commission's papers, reports, and meetings).
153. See "Commission Hearings" heading on the Commission Homepage, supra note 1, for
information concerning the Commission's hearings.
154. See generally Commission Homepage, supra note 1 (linking to Report and Recommendations
of MDP Commission).
155. Florida Bar Association, Florida Bar Recommendation Statement [hereinafter FL Bar
Recommendation] (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http:J/www.abanet.org/cpr/flbarrec.html>.
156. See Commission Hearings, supra note 153 (linking to information regarding various public
hearings).
157. See Commission, Updated Background Report, supra note 53. See Commission February
2000 Postscript to Midyear Meeting (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.abanet.orglcpr/ postscript.html>.
15& See Draft Recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates [hereinafter Draft
Recommendation] (posted Mar. 22, 2000) (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
marchrec.html>. Instead of fifteen paragraphs, the Draft Recommendation contains only four
paragraphs. These paragraphs are quite general. In my view, this Draft Recommendation asks the
House of Delegates to focus on the issue of whether there should be MDPs under any circumstances,
while delegating to the states the decision about how to regulate MDPs. In my view, the Draft
Recommendation is so broadly drafted as to be ambiguous and leaves much room for disagreement.
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At this time, it is unclear what further action, if any, the ABA House of
Delegates will take. Despite this uncertainty, over forty state and local bar
associations are now engaged in an examination of the MDP issue.159 Indeed,
For example, paragraph one states that "Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with
nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal professional services
(Multidisciplinary Practice), provided that the lawyers have the control and authority necessary to
assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services." Draft Recommendation, supra, 1 1.
Although many undoubtedly will claim that this Recommendation requires MDPs to have a lawyer-
majority, I disagree. In my view, this paragraph is ambiguous because MDP lawyers practicing with a
nonlawyer majority could argue that they nevertheless have the control and authority necessary to
assure their independence. The remainder of this Draft Recommendation directs MDP lawyers to
protect five core values (independence, confidentiality, conflicts, competence and pro bono publico
obligations), see id. at 2; limits MDP lawyers to practicing with nonlawyer who are members of
recognized professions or other disciplines that are governed by ethical standards, see id. at 1 1;
continues the prohibition on passive investment and nonlawyers providing legal services, see id. at 1 4;
and directs regulatory authorities to enforce existing rules and adopt such additional enforcement
procedures as are necessary to implement the principles in the Draft Recommendation and protect the
public interest, see id. at 3. The Draft Recommendation does not explicitly address the difficult
issues of whether to have a ban on simultaneous legal-audit work, whether nonlawyers should be
included when applying legal ethics conflict of interest imputation rules, or whether nonlawyers ever
must comply with legal ethics rules.
159. A number of state and local bar associations, including Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
Massachusetts, Utah, and Minnesota currently are exploring issues related to MDPs. See generally
Commission Homepage, supra note 1 (linking to various state and state bar association internet sites
discussing MDP issues); See Commission February 2000 Postscript to Midyear Meeting, supra note 157
(stating that over forty-one state and local bars were studying the question of whether fee sharing and
nonlawyer partnership bans should be relaxed).
On March 23, 2000, the Philadelphia Bar Association reportedly became the first bar to adopt a
recommendation to relax the current MDP ban. The Philadelphia Bar Association Board of
Governors approved the task force recommendation that lawyer-controlled MDPs be allowed to
practice without delay and that other forms be allowed only after additional study and the enactment
of appropriate regulations. See Philadelphia Bar Association, Multidisciplinary Practice Task Force
Resolution [hereinafter Phila. Bar, Resolution] (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
pbamdpresolution.html>. The Pennsylvania Bar Association's Multidisciplinary Practice Commission
also endorsed lawyer-controlled MDPs and is awaiting a vote by the Pennsylvania Bar Association
Board of Governors in May 2000. See Pennsylvania Bar Association Multidisciplinary Practice
Commission, MDP Commission Report Dated March 2000 [hereinafter PA Bar, MDP Report] (visited
Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.pabar.org/mdphome.shtml>. Both of these items are available from the
"Related links" item on the Commission Homepage, supra note 1.
Bar associations in California, New Jersey, and New York appear to have been among the first
to examine the MDP issue. See, e.g., Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Comment of
Ethics 2000 Liaison Committee, Los Angeles County Bar Association (discussing Los Angeles County
Bar Association's position on MDPs); Written Replies to Commission, Reply of State Bar of
California (discussing California State Bar Association's position on MDPs); Written Comments Not
Presented at Hearings, Comment of Therese M. Stewart (President, Bar Association of San Francisco)
(discussing San Francisco Bar Association's position on MDPs); Written Replies to the Commission,
Reply of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (discussing New York Bar Association's
position on MDPs); Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of New York County Lawyers'
Association (discussing New York County Lawyers' Association's position on MDPs); New York
State Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Multi-Disciplinary Practice and the Legal
Profession (Jan. 8, 1999) (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.nysba.orglwhatsnew/multidiscrpt.html>
(discussing New York State Bar Association's position on MDPs); Written Replies to Commission,
Reply of New Jersey State Bar Association (discussing New Jersey State Bar Association's position on
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since the Commission began its hearings, and especially after issuing its Report, a
number of state bar journals and other legal periodicals have published articles
about MDPs.16°
Although a number of organizations around the world have considered
MDPs, the Commission's work is particularly useful for those interested in
learning about MDPs. The Commission's work has been extremely
"transparent.' 161 The Commission maintains an Internet web site on which it
has posted its mandate from Phil Anderson; its members; a bibliography; its
background report to the ABA House of Delegates; its Hypotheticals and
Models; the schedules of its hearings; together with all written materials
submitted; summaries of the oral testimony; written comments; written replies to
its report; and links to related materials.
162
The Commission's work also is quite useful because of the breadth of
witnesses from which the Commission heard. Because of the importance of the
U.S. legal market, witnesses from around the world came to the U.S. to provide
testimony.163 Although some have criticized the Commission for not hearing a
MDPs).
160. See generally, e.g., Multidisciplinary Practice: Is it the Wave of the Future, or Only a Ripple?,
66 DEFENSE COUNSEL J. 460 (1999) (presenting discussion on "prime issue" of MDPs); Robert Pack,
Lawyers, Nonlawyers, and the Future of the Practice of Law, WASH. L., Sept-Oct. 1999, at 25
(discussing lawyers practicing with nonlawyers and future of practice of law with this development);
Paul J. Sax, Chair's Page (ABA Section of Taxation), Fall 1999 (visited Nov. 17, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.orgltaxWchair/chair.html> (mentioning Section's MDP panel at one of its
meetings); Massachusetts Bar Association, Multi-Disciplinary Practice (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.massbar.org/mdpindex.html> (presenting links to articles dealing with MDPs).
161. Transparent is a term commonly used in the international law context to mean that the work
is visible and accessible.
162. See Commission Homepage, supra note 1 (linking to information on MDPs compiled by
ABA).
163. On a global scale, the Commission heard live testimony from witnesses from Australia,
Canada, England, France, Germany, Scotland, Sweden, and various regional or international bar
associations. See, e.g., Testimony of Andrew Scott (Law Institute of Victoria, Australia) (Nov. 13,
1998); Oral Testimony of Simon Potter (Member, Canadian Bar Association International Practice of
Law Committee) (Feb. 6, 1999); Testimony of J. Rob Collins (Law Society of Upper Canada) (Nov.
12, 1998); Testimony of Alison Crawley (Law Society of England and Wales) (Nov. 12, 1998);
Testimony of M. Elizabeth Wall (Cable & Wireless) (Nov. 12, 1998); Dan Brennan QC (Chairman,
General Council of the Bar of England and Wales) (Aug. 8, 1999); Oral Testimony of Gerard Mazet
(President of the International Commission of the French National Bar Council) (Feb. 6, 1999); Oral
Testimony of Bftonnier Henri Ader (Ordre des Avocats A la Cour de Paris) (Aug. 8, 1999); Testimony
of Gerard Nicolay (PricewaterhouseCoopers) (Nov. 12, 1998); Oral Remarks of Dr. Hans-Jurgen
Hellwig (Vice-President, Deutscher Anvaltverein) (Feb. 4,1999); Testimony of Thomas 0. Verhoeven
(Oppenhoff & Rddler) (Nov. 13, 1998); Oral Remarks of Neil Cochran (Dundas & Wilson C.S.) (Feb.
4, 1999); Elisabet Fura-Sandstrom (President, Swedish Bar Association) (Aug. 8, 1999); Testimony of
Michel Gout (CCBE) (Nov. 12, 1998); Ramon Mullerat (Former President, Council of the Bars and
Law Societies of the European Community (CCBE)) (Aug. 8, 1999); see also Testimony of Ward
Bower (Altman Weil) (Nov. 12, 1998); John Craig (President-Elect, Inter-Pacific Bar Association)
(Aug. 8, 1999); Delos N. Lutton (Union Internationale des Avocats (UIA) Subcommittee on
Multidisciplinary Practices) (Aug. 8, 1999). In addition to the live testimony, the Commission received
written comments from several foreign clients. See, e.g., Written Comments Not Presented at
Hearings, Comment of Damin Gisbert (Financial Director, Kellogg's Espana, S.A.); Written
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wider range of views, witnesses included consumer representatives; 164 bar
counsel;165 state and local bar representatives;166 actual or potential MDP
clients;167 Big Five and accounting organization representatives; 168 lawyers
working for ancillary businesses or in a nonlegal capacity;169 private legal
practitioners from very large firms170 and very small firms;
171 in-house counsel;172
lawyers and judges who had observed the Big Five's lawyer and nonlawyer work
product;173 representatives of ABA sections, committees, or other entities;
174
Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Comment of Remarks of Jos6 M Marti (European Financial
Manager, NALCO ESPANOLA, S.A. and NALCO FRANCE, S.A.R.L);.
164. See Oral Testimony of William A. Bolger (Executive Director, National Resource Center
for Consumers of Legal Services) (Mar. 11, 1999); Oral Remarks of Wayne Moore (Director, AARP)
(Mar. 11, 1999); Written Remarks of James Turner (Executive Director, H.A.L.T.) (Feb. 5, 1999);
Written Remarks of Lora H. Weber (Consumers Alliance of the Southeast) (Mar. 11, 1999).
165. See Testimony of Susan Gilbert (D.C. Bar) (Nov. 12, 1998); Oral Testimony of Lynda Shely
(State Bar of Arizona and ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection) (Feb. 5, 1999).
166. See Testimony of James R. Silkenat (Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (Nov.
13, 1998). The following witnesses testified after the Commission issued its report: Samuel Bufford
(Los Angeles County Bar Association) (Aug. 8, 1999); Steve Hoffman (President, New York County
Lawyers' Association) (Aug. 8, 1999); Written Remarks of Steven Krane (New York State Bar
Association) (Aug. 8, 1999); James M. Self (State Bar of California) (Aug. 8,1999).
167. See Testimony of Steven A. Bennett (Banc One) (Nov. 13,1998); Testimony of M. Elizabeth
Wall (Cable & Wireless) (Nov. 12,1998).
168. See Written Remarks of Neil Cochran (Dundas & Wilson C.S.) (Feb. 4, 1999); Written
Remarks of Samuel DiPiazza (PricewaterhouseCoopers) (Mar. 11, 1999); Oral Remarks of Richard
Miller (General Counsel, AICPA) (Mar. 12, 1999); Written Remarks of Kathryn Oberly (Vice Chair
and General Counsel, Ernst & Young) (Feb. 4, 1999); Written Remarks of Roger Page (Deloitte &
Touche) (Mar. 11, 1999); Written Remarks of Richard Spivak (Managing Partner-Tax-North
America, Andersen) (Mar. 12, 1999); Written Remarks of Irwin Treiger & William J. Upton (Co-
Chairs, National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants) (Mar. 11, 1999).
169. See Written Remarks of James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999).
170. See Written Remarks of Sydney M. Cone, III (Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton) (Mar.
12, 1999); Written Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker Biddle & Reath) (Feb. 4, 1999); Oral
Remarks of Lawrence M. Hill (White & Case) (Feb. 4, 1999).
171. See Oral Testimony of Jay G. Foonberg (Bailey & Marzano) (Feb. 6, 1999); Written
Remarks of Charles F. Robinson (Law Offices of Charles F. Robinson) (Feb. 5,1999).
172. See, e.g., Written Remarks of Steven A. Bennett (Banc One) (Nov. 13, 1998); Testimony of
Elizabeth Wall (Cable & Wireless) (Nov. 12,1998).
173. See Testimony of Ward Bower (Altman Wel) (Nov. 12, 1998); Oral Remarks of Lawrence
M. Hill (White & Case) (Feb. 4, 1999); Testimony of Karen D. Powell (Petrillo & Powell) (Nov. 12,
1998); Testimony of Les Shapiro (Padgett Foundation) (Nov. 12, 1998); Written Remarks of Samuel
B. Sterrett (Vinson & Elkins) (Feb. 4,1999).
174. See Written Remarks of Judge Judith M. Billings (Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Pro
Bono and Public Service) (Feb. 6, 1999); Written Remarks of William M. Hannay, III (Chair, ABA
International Law and Practice Section) (Mar. 11, 1999); Testimony of Jan McDavid (ABA Antitrust
Section) (Nov. 13, 1998); Oral Remarks of Joseph P. McMonigle (Chair, ABA Standing Committee on
Lawyers Professional Liability) (Mar. 12, 1999); Testimony of M. Peter Moser (ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility) (Nov. 13, 1998); Oral Testimony of Larry
Ramirez (Chair, ABA General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section) (Feb. 6, 1999); Written
Remarks of Charles F. Robinson (Law Offices of Charles F. Robinson) (Feb. 5, 1999);Written
Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker (Chair, ABA Section of Taxation) (Feb. 4,1999).
The following witnesses testified after the Commission issued its report: Oral Testimony of
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other lawyer organizations; 175  malpractice insurance representatives;
76
unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") committee representatives; 177 law school
placement officials; 178 organizations and individuals who have dual CPA and
lawyer qualifications; 179 representatives from the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC");1s as well as academics in tax, accounting, legal history,
and ethics. 181 Witnesses included those who were strongly opposed to lifting the
MDP ban1s2 and those who were strongly in favor of adopting regulations to
permit MDPs.183 In addition to these witnesses, the Commission received over
thirty written comments not personally presented at the hearings.1l 4 The
Commission also received over forty written comments in response to its Report
which was issued June 8, 1999.185
Herbert S. Garten (Chair, ABA Commission on IOLTA) (Aug. 8,1999); Leo J. Jordan (ABA Tort
and Insurance Practice Section) (Aug. 8, 1999); Pam H. Schneider (Chair, ABA Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law) (Aug. 8, 1999); Oral Testimony of John S. Skilton (Chair, ABA
Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services) (Aug. 8, 1999).
175. See Testimony of Stephen McGarry (Lex Mundi) (Nov. 13, 1998). The following witnesses
testified after the Commission issued its report: Richard P. Campbell (International Association of
Defense Lawyers) (Aug. 8, 1999); Patricia J. Kerrigan (President, Texas Association of Defense
Counsel) (Aug. 8, 1999); Oral Testimony of John Kouris (Executive Director, Defense Research
Institute) (Aug. 8, 1999).
176. See Testimony of William Freivogel (Attorney Liability Assurance Society) (Nov. 13, 1999);
Oral Remarks Joseph P. McMonigle (Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers Professional
Liability) (Mar. 12, 1999).
177. See Testimony of William Elliott (Kane, Russell, Coleman & Logan) (Nov. 13,1999).
178. See Oral Testimony of Abbie F. Willard (Assistant Dean of Career Services, Georgetown
University Law Center) (Feb. 5, 1999).
179. See Oral Testimony of Sidney Traum, David Ostrove, and Philip D. Brent (American
Association of Attorney-CPAs) (Feb. 5,1999).
180. See, e.g., Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Comment of Lynn E. Turner (Chief
Accountant, United States Securities and Exchange Commission); Written Replies to Commission,
Reply of Harvey J. Goldschmid, General Counsel; Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant; Richard H.
Walker, Director of Enforcement (United States Securities and Exchange Commission).
181. See Written Remarks of John Dzienkowski (Professor, University of Texas School of Law)
(Feb. 5, 1999); Testimony of Professor Linda Galler (Professor, Hofstra University School of Law)
(Nov. 13, 1999); Testimony of Harold Levinson (American Association of Attorney-Certified Public
Accountants) (Nov. 13, 1998); Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Professor, The Dickinson School
of Law of the Pennsylvania State University) (Mar. 12, 1999); Written Remarks of Bernard Wolfmnan
(Professor, Harvard Law School) (Mar. 12,1999).
182. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Jay G. Foonberg (Bailey & Marzano) (Feb. 6, 1999); Written
Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker Biddle & Reath) (Feb. 4, 1999); Oral Remarks of Bernard
Wolfman (Professor, Harvard Law School) (Mar. 12,1999).
183. See, e.g., Testimony of Steven A. Bennett (Banc One) (Nov. 13, 1998); Written Remarks of
James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999); Written Remarks of Charles F. Robinson
(Law Offices of Charles F. Robinson) (Feb. 5, 1999); Written Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker (Chair,
ABA Section of Taxation) (Feb. 4, 1999); Written Remarks of Lora H. Weber (Consumers Alliance of
the Southeast) (Mar. 11, 1999).
184. See generally the "Written Comments" heading on the Commission Homepage, supra note 1
(visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.abanet.orglcprlmulticomcomments.html> (presenting comments of
persons with various viewpoints on MDPs).
185. See generally the "Written Replies" heading on the Commission Homepage, supra note 1
[hereinafter Written Replies] (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreplies.html>
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B. The Commission's MDP Models
As explained earlier, one of the issues relevant to MDPs is the manner in
which an MDP may be organized. 186 On March 3, 1999, shortly before its third
and last set of pre-report hearings, the Commission posted a document entitled
Hypotheticals and Models.187 The Commission identified five different models in
which multidisciplinary practice could be offered.
The Commission's Model 1 was called the Cooperative Model; it reflects the
U.S. status quo in which lawyers and nonlawyers cannot be partners or share
legal fees but can work jointly to provide multidisciplinary services. Model 2 was
called the Command and Control Model; it was analogized to D.C. Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.4, which permits MDPs, provided the MDP's sole
function is to provide legal services. Model 3 was called the Ancillary Business
Model and addressed the situation covered in ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.7, in which a law firm operates an ancillary business that provides
professional services to clients. Model 4, which was called the Contract Model,
envisioned a situation in which the law firm was an independent entity controlled
and managed by lawyers, but which had a contractual relationship with a
professional services firm. According to the Commission's Hypotheticals and
Models:
A typical contract might include terms such as (1) the law firm
agreeing to identify its affiliation with the professional services firm on
its letterhead and business cards, and in its advertising (e.g., A & B,
P.C., a member of XYZ Professional Services, LLP); (2) the law firm
and the professional services firm agreeing to refer clients to each
other on a nonexclusive basis; and (3) the law firm agreeing to
purchase goods and services from the professional services firm (e.g.,
staff management, communications technology, and rent for the
leasing of office space and equipment). The law firm remains an
independent entity controlled and managed by lawyers, and accepts
clients who have no connection with the professional services firm.1ss
Model 5 was the Fully Integrated Model, in which lawyers and nonlawyers
could serve as partners and share legal fees. The Commission heard testimony
from lawyers who had practiced in all five settings, several of whom practice in
MDPs outside the U.S.
18 9
(reflecting range of views on Commission's Report).
186. See supra Part IV.C.1 for a discussion of the form of association issues.
187. American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Hypotheticals and
Models [hereinafter Hypotheticals and Models] (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr
multicomhypos.html>; see also Daly, supra note 1, at 11-14 & nn.21-27 (discussing Commission's
Hypotheticals and Models).
188. Daly, supra note 1, at 13.
189. See Written Remarks of Neil Cochran (Dundas & Wilson, C.S. [an Andersen-affiliated
firm]) (Feb. 4, 1999) (describing experiences in firm that falls under Model 4); Written Remarks of
James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999) (remarking about APCO, former Arnold and
Porter ancillary business, which was sold and is now independent entity, thus describing Models 2 and
3); Testimony of Stephen McGarry (Lex Mundi) (Nov. 13, 1998) (describing his firm, which would fall
under Model 1); Testimony of Gerard Nicolay (PricewaterhouseCoopers) (Nov. 12, 1998) (describing
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As noted earlier, it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a detailed
analysis of foreign treatment of all MDP issues. Nevertheless, when looking at
the various foreign proposals, it may be useful to correlate the foreign
jurisdictions' handling of the form of association with the five models identified
by the Commission.19 The charts below show my evaluation of these foreign
provisions:
Jurisdictions Expressly Permitting MDPs
* District of Columbia, U.S. Rule 5.4 .................................................... Model 2
* Law Society of Upper Canada ............................................................ Model 2
* New South Wales, Australia's Solicitors Rules ................................. Model 5
-New South Wales' Legal Profession Advisory Council
Recom m endation ............................................................................. M odel 5
-New South Wales' Prior Solicitor Rules ........................................ Model 4
" Netherlands' Bar Rules for MDPs with Tax Advisors ...................... Model 5
" Netherlands' Bar Rules for MDPs with Auditors ............................. Model 1
" Germany's Bar Rules for MDPs with Auditors and Tax Advisors.Model 5
Jurisdictions in Which MDP Regulation is Under Consideration
" Law Council of Australia ..................................................................... Model 5
" Law Society of England and Wales .................................. [probably] Model 5
" Canada Bar Association ...................................................................... Model 5
" Federation of Law Societies of Canada .............................................. Model 5
" Paris Bar Council ..................................................................... [strict] M odel 4
* Nallet Report Requested by French Minister of Justice ...... [strict] Model 4
" French National Bar Council ................................................... [strict] Model 4
Voluntary International and Regional Bar Associations with MDP Policies
" Current CCBE Policy ........................................................................... M odel 1
" CCBE Proposed but Rejected Policy .................................... [strict] Model 4
* IB A ............................................................................................................. N one
" U IA ............................................................................................................. N one
* U.S. Kutak Commission, 1980 Proposed Rule .................................. Model 5
C. The Commission's June 1999 Report and March 2000 Draft
Recommendation
On June 8, 1999, in accordance with the mandate given to it by ABA
President Phil Anderson, the Commission issued a unanimous final report to the
experiences in firm that falls under Model 4); ; Testimony of Thomas 0. Verhoeven (Oppenhoff &
Rildler) (Nov. 13,1998) (describing his experience in Model 5-type organization).
190. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of these models.
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ABA House of Delegates about its work. 191 In addition to its six-page Report,
the Commission submitted a three-page Recommendation, which included
fifteen paragraphs, a general information form required by the rules of the ABA
Annual Meeting, and three appendices. 192 Appendix A was a set of illustrations
of possible amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; Appendix
B identified the witnesses that testified before the Commission; and Appendix C
was the Reporter's Notes.
The Commission sought approval from the House of Delegates only with
respect to its Recommendation.193 As the Reporter's Notes explain, the proposed
rule changes in Appendix A were included only for illustration purposes, and the
specific language was not intended to bind the relevant drafting committees. 194
The Commission concluded in this June 1999 Recommendation and again in
its March 2000 Draft Recommendation that, subject to safeguards to prevent
erosion of the legal profession's core values, a lawyer should be able to share
fees with a nonlawyer or practice in an MDP.195 Some commentators have
suggested that the Commission's membership made its conclusions inevitable. 196
I disagree. In my view, the Commission's recommendations were not a "done
deal" at the time the Commission was appointed. Indeed, my observation of the
191. ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates
[hereinafter Report] (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalreport.html>.
192. See generally id. (presenting Recommendation and Appendices).
193. See Reporter's Notes, supra note 58, at 2 ("The Commission is asking the ABA House of
Delegates to approve only the Recommendation."). The Recommendation can be found at ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to House of Delegates, Recommendation
[hereinafter Recommendation] (visited Sept. 24, 1999) <http.//www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdprecommendation.html>.
194. Reporter's Notes, supra note 58, at 2. The proposed model rule changes in Appendix A have
been the subject of numerous critiques. See generally Written Replies, supra note 185 (discussing
potential harms to legal community). In my view, Appendix A was a creative and effective manner in
which to present very complex and difficult issues. From a logistical perspective, if the Commission
intended to take a leadership role in deciding how MDPs should be structured and regulated, then I do
not see a better method for the Commission to have presented its conclusion to eliminate the complete
MDP and fee- sharing ban. The Commission's Recommendation has given U.S. lawyers, state
regulators, and the ABA House of Delegates a concrete set of principles to debate and vote upon.
The Report provides the rationale for the Recommendation and the Reporter's Notes serve as
legislative history. The proposed Model Rules changes in Appendix A were not intended to be
binding and they did serve as a useful mechanism to help lawyers envision the likely impact of the
Commission's Recommendation. I do not think the Commission can be faulted for not drafting the
proposed changes perfectly. The issues are difficult and new and, as the multiple drafts prepared by
the Ethics 2000 Commission demonstrate, it is not a simple job to draft rule language even after there
is agreement on the basic principles. See generally Ethics 2000-Commission on the Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, Minutes, available on Ethics 2000 Homepage, supra note 27 (presenting
links to minutes from Ethics 2000 Commission's meetings).
195. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 2 (recommending ABA amend Model Rules of
Professional Conduct reflecting these values). The Commission's March 2000 Draft Recommendation
reflects the same conclusion, although the Commission identified two additional core values. See
Draft Recommendation, supra note 158, 1 2.
196. This type of comment has been made to me by several lawyers who know of my work
regarding MDPs.
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Commission members during the hearings leads me to believe that when the
Commission began its work, many Commission members were skeptical of
MDPs, if not downright hostile.197
The Commission's materials explain how it first reached its conclusion that
the current MDP ban should be lifted. First, the Commission explained that it
was guided by the need to protect "clients and the public and the core values of
the legal profession. '198  The Commission identified independence,
confidentiality, and loyalty as core values.t99 The Commission concluded that
there was client demand for MDPs on the part of both individual and corporate
clients, as well as interest among lawyers in forming partnerships with
nonlawyers.2°° The Commission did not define the degree of demand nor
resolve the controversy between those who thought the demand was minimal
197. One of the Commission members, Seth Rosner, had spoken against MDPs only one year
previously at the 24th National Conference on Professional Responsibility held in Montreal in May
1998. Indeed, the Dutch Bar obtained an expert opinion from Mr. Rosner in connection with its ban
on lawyer-auditor MDPs, which is still pending in the case of Wouters v. NOVA. See Letter from Seth
Rosner, to Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Jan. 2, 1997), in ABA 24TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY COURSEBOOK, at Tab 1 (May 28-30, 1998). Mr. Rosner has also
participated actively in efforts to defeat the Kutak Commission rule. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Kutak Commission's proposed rule; see also Gilbert &
Lempert, supra note 15, at 391-92 & nn.37-38 (describing formation of ad hoc committee that later
proposed continuing traditional rules relating to law firm ownership and fees).
The Commission's evolving and ultimately unanimous support for regulating MDPs echoes what
has happened elsewhere in the world. In June 1999, I spoke at a conference on MDPs. One of the
other panelists was Toby Greenbury, who was chair of the London Law Society MDP Working Party.
During his remarks, he stated that he initially had despaired about having to prepare a report because
his committee had such diverse views about MDPs. Ultimately, however, his committee issued a
unanimous report, approving MDPs in concept and proposing various types of regulations. He
explained that some committee members were enthusiastic about MDPs while others endorsed them
reluctantly, but all ultimately concluded that it was better to regulate lawyers within MDPs than have
them go without regulation; see also Written Materials of Toby Greenbury, DJ Freeman/The City of
London Law Society, in COURSE MATERIALS FOR OSNEY MEDIA CONFERENCE ON THE THREATS
AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND How TO
PREPARE YOUR FIRM (June 30, 1999) (on file with author) (listing members of London MDP working
party and providing further details on report).
198. Report, supra note 191, at 1. At the time this Article was published, the Commission had
not yet posted a report or explanation of its reasoning concerning the March 2000 Draft
Recommendation.
199. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 1. This paragraph of the Recommendation
proposes:
The legal profession should adopt and maintain rules of professional conduct that protect its
core values, independence of professional judgment, protection of confidential client
information, and loyalty to the client through avoidance of conflicts of interest, but should
not permit existing rules to unnecessarily inhibit the development of new structures for the
more effective delivery of services and better public access to the legal system.
Id.
200. Report, supra note 191, at 1 ("After extensive reflection and analysis, the Commission has
concluded that there is an interest by clients in the option to select and use lawyers who deliver legal
services as part of a multidisciplinary practice (MDP).").
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and those who thought the demand was overwhelming. 2 1 The Commission
further concluded "that it is possible to satisfy the interests of clients and lawyers
by providing the option of an MDP without compromising the core values of the
legal profession that are essential for the protection of clients and the proper
maintenance of the client-lawyer relationship. ' '2°2 The Commission recognized
the concerns about independence, confidentiality, and loyalty, but determined
that appropriate safeguards could be developed "to adequately address the
concerns and maintain the core values while providing broader access to legal
services for the public."20 3
Thus, the Commission's treatment of the functional and substantive ethics
issues was intended to protect clients, lawyers, and the public, while not
"unnecessarily inhibit[ing] the development of new structures for more effective
delivery of services and better public access to the legal system.' '2°4 Perhaps the
most significant of the Commission's decisions in its June 1999 Report was its
recommendation to allow Model 5-fully integrated MDPs, although the
Commission appears to have backtracked from that position in its March 2000
Draft Recommendation.2°5 In its earlier Report, the Commission did not require
lawyer-majority control or ownership, as in New South Wales' prior rule,2°6 but
the Commission did recommend a different enforcement mechanism if an MDP
were controlled by nonlawyers. 2°7 The Commission stated that if nonlawyers
201. See infra note 233 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflicting witness
testimony regarding the demand for MDPs.
202. Report, supra note 191, at 1-2.
203. Id at 2.
204. Recommendation, supra note 193, 1. A recent law review article by the Commission's
Reporter, Professor Mary Daly, makes this three-step process even clearer:
The Commission's analysis proceeded in three steps. First, it asked whether allowing the
delivery of legal services by MDPs was in the best interest of the public and clients; second, it
identified independence of professional judgment, the protection of confidential client
information, and loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conflicts of interests as the
core values of the legal profession; and third, it searched for measures that would protect
those core values without impeding the delivery of legal services by MDPs.
Daly, supra note 1, at 91 (footnotes omitted).
205. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 3. This paragraph of the Recommendation states:
A lawyer should be permitted to deliver legal services through a multidisciplinary practice
(MDP), defined as a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that
includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of
legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as
providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services. It includes an arrangement by which a law firm
joins with one or more other professional firms to provide services, including legal services,
and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.
Id. See supra note 158 for a discussion of the Commission's treatment of Model 5 and the lawyer
control issue in the March 2000 Draft Recommendation.
206. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prior rule in New South
Wales.
207. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 14. Paragraph 14 of the Recommendation states:
As a condition of permitting a lawyer to engage in the practice of law in an MDP not
controlled by lawyers, the MDP should be required to give to the highest court with the
authority to regulate the legal profession in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in
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control the MDP, then the MDP should be subject to a court audit procedure. 2°8
None of the Commission's submissions defined "control" nor did they provide
significant detail about the content of the audit.
With respect to the other form of association issues, the Commission's
Recommendation seemingly did not limit the types of individuals with whom a
lawyer might join to form an MDP, although such a limitation is included in the
Commission's March 2000 Draft Recommendation.2°9  The Commission
recommended that all lawyers in an MDP make disclosures to a client that the
lawyer practiced in an MDP. 210 Additionally, for nonlawyer-controlled MDPs,
the Commission's certification process contemplates disclosures by the MDP to
the state supreme court or its designee.211 The Commission recommended
against allowing passive investment 212 and did not address the issue of what
the delivery of legal services (the "court"), a written undertaking, signed by the chief
executive officer (or similar official) and the board of directors (or similar body), that [it has
complied with the nine specified requirements].
Id.
20& See Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 14(H) (providing for court review and audit
procedures of nonlawyer controlled MDPs); see also Appendix A, supra note 134, at Rule 5.8(c)
(requiring nonlawyer controlled MDPs to submit to review by highest court written undertakings that
allow for administrative audits by that court). The Commission's March 2000 Draft Recommendation
made no reference to this court certification or audit requirement, but instead referred the mechanics
to the states, stating: "To protect the public interest, regulatory authorities should enforce existing
rules and adopt such additional enforcement procedures as are needed to implement the principles
identified in this Recommendation." See Draft Recommendation, supra note 158.
209. As discussed infra at Part VII.F, Comment 2 to Rule 5.8 in Appendix A referred to
professions that may "appropriately" be included in an MDP. This language could be interpreted to
place a limitation on who may join with a lawyer in an MDP. The Commission's March 2000 Draft
Recommendation clearly limits MDPs to nonlawyer professionals who are members of recognized
professions or other disciplines that are governed by ethical standards. See Draft Recommendation,
supra note 158, 91 .
210. See Recommendation, supra note 190, 1 9 ("[A] lawyer should be required to make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the client sufficiently understands that the lawyer and nonlawyer may
have different obligations with respect to disclosure of client information and that the courts may treat
the client's communications to the lawyer and nonlawyer differently."). No analogous requirement is
contained in the March 2000 Draft Recommendation. See Draft Recommendation, supra note 158. But
see Phila. Bar, Resolution, supra note 159, at I 2(H) (requiring an MDP lawyer to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the client understands that communications unrelated to the provision of legal
services are not protected by the attorney-client privilege).
211. See Appendix A, supra note 134, at Rule 5.8(c)(8). This rule establishes the basis for such
disclosure or transparency when it says:
[The MDP] will permit the highest court with the authority to regulate the professional
conduct of lawyers in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the delivery of legal
services to review and conduct an administrative audit of the MDP, as each such authority
deems appropriate, to determine and assure compliance with subsections (1)-(7)....
Id.
212. See Report, supra note 191, at 3. The Report found:
The Commission is not prepared to recommend any change in the present provisions
limiting the holding of equity investments in any entity or organization providing legal
services. Ownership would be limited to members of the MDP performing professional
services. It would not be permitted for an individual or entity to acquire all or any part of the
1999]
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constitutes an acceptable MDP name.
The Commission did not recommend any scope of practice limitations on
lawyers practicing in an MDP. Unlike the D.C. Rule, the Commission's
Recommendation did not require that lawyer-nonlawyer partnerships be limited
to providing legal services. 213 Nor did the Commission recommend a per se rule
that would prohibit MDPs from providing simultaneous legal and audit services
to the same client.
214
Concerning functional ethics, the Commission concluded that lawyers
practicing law in an MDP setting should comply with the legal ethics rules, a
conclusion reaffirmed in the March 2000 Draft Recommendation.215  As
mentioned earlier, the Commission also recommended a certification and audit
procedure for MDPs controlled by nonlawyers. 16 In addition, the Commission
ownership of an MDP for investment or other purposes.
Id. The March 2000 Draft Recommendation explicitly states that the Recommendation does not
change the existing rules prohibiting passive investment in a law firm. See Draft Recommendation,
supra note 158, 4.
213. Compare supra note 27 and accompanying text which discusses the D.C. Rule and this scope
of practice limitation with Appendix A, supra note 134, at Comment 2 of Rule 5.8, which states,
"[w]hile the provision of legal services is one function of an MDP, it need not be the principal
function."
214. In its Updated Background Report, the Commission stated that any such omission from the
June 1999 Report was unintentional and that it recommended a legal-audit ban. Updated Background
Report, supra note 53, 9 ("The Commission shares the SEC's position and regrets that it did not
make this point sufficiently clear.") In the March 2000 Draft Recommendation, however, the
Commission omitted any reference to a legal-audit ban. See Draft Recommendation, supra note 158.
In its June 1999 Report, the Commission noted that the ABA would review the Independence
Standards Board's study of the incompatibility of the roles of attorneys and auditors under federal
securities law. The June 1999 Report states:
In a letter from the Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), this Commission was advised that the SEC has asked the Independence
Standards Board (ISB) to place the topic of legal advisory services on its agenda. The SEC
intends to look to the ISB for leadership in establishing auditor independence regulations
applicable to the audits of the financial statements of SEC registrants. According to the
letter, the SEC auditor independence regulations specifically state that the roles of auditors
and attorneys under federal securities laws are incompatible. The OCA would consider an
auditing firm's independence from an SEC registrant to be impaired if that firm also
provides legal advice to the registrant or its affiliates. The Commission believes that this
issue is correctly initially discussed in those fora. When the ISB completes its study,
appropriate ABA entities will wish to comment on its recommendations and, possibly, to
take formal positions.
Report, supra note 191, at 6, n.3. But see infra Part VII.B for a discussion of how the supporters of a
legal-audit ban might rely on the language of Recommendation paragraph 9.
215. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 5 ("A lawyer in an MDP who delivers legal services
to the MDP's clients should be bound by the rules of professional conduct."). But see infra notes 310-
14 and accompanying text calling for greater clarity in this language. Accord Draft Recommendation,
supra note 158, 4 ("This Recommendation does not alter the prohibition on nonlawyers delivering
legal services and the obligation of all lawyers to observe the rules of professional conduct."
216. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 11 12 & 14 (discussing scope and procedures for
certification and auditing of nonlawyer-controlled MDPs). See supra note 208 for a discussion of the
absence in the March 2000 Draft Recommendation for an analogous requirement.
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recommended that when an MDP lawyer provides legal services in conjunction
with a nonlawyer providing nonlegal services, the nonlawyer must act in a
manner that is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.217 In
other words, if there is a conflict between the two professions' rules, and if legal
services are involved, then the legal rules trump.
The substantive ethics issues addressed in the Recommendation include
independence, confidentiality, conflicts of interest, to whom deference may be
given, the obligation to have measures in place to avoid ethics violations, and, for
nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, pro bono obligations.218  Although the
Recommendation and Report urge MDP lawyers to maintain independence, the
only special measures put in place are for lawyers practicing in nonlawyer-
controlled MDPs; otherwise, MDP lawyers are simply told to remain
independent and that an MDP lawyer is not excused from the rules of
professional conduct when the lawyer defers to a nonlawyer supervisor.
219
The Recommendation does not specifically address confidentiality other
than to identify it as a core value and require disclosure to clients of the risks of a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 220 Because no special screening rules
were established, the Recommendation apparently treats confidentiality within
an MDP similarly to confidentiality within a traditional law firm; i.e., absent
client direction to the contrary, information may flow among all partners and
employees in a firm, with the caveat that all are required to keep the information
217. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 10 (recommending requirement of nonlawyer
compliance with lawyer standards of professional conduct). The March 2000 Draft Recommendation
did not explicitly address the issue of nonlawyers' compliance with legal ethics provisions. See Draft
Recommendation, supra note 158.
218. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 (protecting core values, identified as
independence, confidentiality, and avoiding conflicts); id. 6 (stating lawyers may not defer to
nonlawyer supervisor's resolution of unclear ethics issues); id. 1 8 (addressing conflicts of interest and
imputation issues); id. 1 10 (adopting measures to ensure ethically compatible behavior); id. I 14(E)
(discussing pro bono requirements).
219. See id. 11 6 & 14 (discussing primacy of rules of professional conduct as guide for lawyers'
conduct even when practicing with nonlawyers); see also Report, supra note 191, at 2. The Report
states:
[T]he Commission does not recommend any change to Model Rule 5.4(c) .... Nevertheless,
as an added protection, the Commission recommends that the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct clearly state that a lawyer who is supervised by a nonlawyer may not
use as a defense to a violation of the rules of professional conduct the fact that the lawyer
acted in accordance with the nonlawyer's resolution of a question of professional duty.
Id. The March 2000 Draft Recommendation contained even less guidance because it omits any specific
reference to nonlawyer supervisors. Draft Recommendation, supra note 158, 1 1 ("Lawyers should be
permitted to share fees and join with nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal and
nonlegal professional services (Multidisciplinary Practice), provided that the lawyers have the control
and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services." ); id. 1 4
("This Recommendation does not alter.., the obligations of all lawyers to observe the rules of
professional conduct.")
220. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 9 (presenting recommended disclosure
requirements); Report, supra note 191, at 3 (addressing concerns and suggestions for avoiding
potential impairment of attorney-client privilege). The March 2000 Draft Recommendation similarly




The Commission's Report confirms this observation, stating:
The Commission recommends that no change be made to the lawyer's
obligation to protect confidential client information.
Acknowledging that a nonlawyer in an MDP may be subject to an
obligation of disclosure that is inconsistent with the lawyer's obligation
of confidentiality.... the Commission specifically recommends several
safeguards to assure that a nonlawyer who works with, or assists, a
nonlawyer in the delivery of legal services will act in a manner
consistent with the lawyer's professional obligations.221
On the interrelated issue of imputation of conflicts of interest, the June 1999
Commission Recommendation decided that imputation should occur on an
MDP-wide basis, rather than on a legal-services basis, although this issue was not
addressed in the March 2000 Draft Recommendation.
22
The Commission's June 1999 position on pro bono was that nonlawyer-
controlled MDPs must certify annually that lawyers in an MDP have the same
special obligation to render voluntary pro bono legal services as lawyers
practicing solo or in law firms; in the March 2000 Draft Recommendation, the
certification requirement was eliminated but pro bono was listed as one of the
core values of the legal profession. 223 Neither the Commission's June 1999
Recommendation nor the March 2000 Draft Recommendation specifically
address the various money-related issues beyond the statement that MDP
lawyers must comply with the rules of professional conduct. The Report,
however, provided additional guidance:
[A] lawyer in an MDP must take special care that payment for legal
services and funds received on behalf of a legal services client are
clearly designated as such and segregated from other funds of the
MDP .... In this regard, the MDP must also comply with any and all
financial recordkeeping rules of the jurisdiction in which the legal
221. Report, supra note 191, at 3.
222. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 18. Paragraph 8 of the Recommendation states:
In connection with the delivery of legal services, all clients of an MDP should be treated as
the lawyer's clients for purposes of conflicts of interest and imputation in the same manner
as if the MDP were a law firm and all employees, partners, shareholders or the like were
lawyers.
Id.; see also Report, supra note 191, at 3-4 (concluding MDP lawyers must treat every MDP client as
lawyer's own client). But see infra Part VIIJ for a discussion endorsing the MDP-wide imputation
concept, but criticizing the Commission's choice of language. See Draft Recommendation, supra note
158 (omitting any reference to the imputation standard).
223. See Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 14(E) (discussing enforcement of pro bono
requirements for MDP lawyers); Report, supra note 191, at 4 (same). In my view, this portion of the
Recommendation will not be particularly helpful. Because pro bono is currently voluntary, requiring
MDP lawyers to honor the same obligations as traditional lawyers may not be saying very much. As
the exchange with Judith Billings demonstrated, MDPs may provide an opportunity for the bar to
reconsider a mandatory pro bono requirement. See Oral Testimony of Judge Judith M. Billings
(Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service) (Feb. 6, 1999). See Draft
Recommendation, supra note 158, 1 2 (identifying pro bono publico obligations as a core value of the
legal profession).
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services are being delivered.224
The last substantive ethics issue addressed by the Commission was the issue
of "holding out." The Commission concluded:
A lawyer in an MDP should not represent to the public generally or to
a specific client that services the lawyer provides are not legal services
if those same services would constitute the practice of law if provided
by a lawyer in a law firm. Such a representation would presumptively
constitute a material misrepresentation of fact.225
In its illustrations of possible amendments to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the Commission included a definition of the practice of law in the
"Terminology" section.226 The Commission also stated that nonlawyers in an
MDP should not be permitted to deliver legal services.
227
This latter substantive ethics issue has proven to be exceedingly
controversial. Over one-quarter of the written replies to the Commission's June
1999 Report addressed these provisions.228 Because I criticize this aspect of the
Commission's Report and because the interplay of these provisions is rather
complex, I have postponed until the next section an explanation of the
significance and operation of these provisions.
All of the above substantive ethics provisions apply to lawyers who share
legal fees with nonlawyers or who practice in an MDP. The Commission defined
an MDP as follows:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity
that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its
purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the
MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal,
as well as legal, services. It includes an arrangement by which a law
firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide
services, including legal services, and there is a direct or indirect
224. Report, supra note 191, at 4.
225. Recommendation, supra note 193, 11. No comparable provision is found in the March
2000 Draft Recommendation. See Draft Recommendation, supra note 158.
226. See Appendix A, supra note 134, at 1 (defining "practice of law" to center around
relationship of trust or reliance and providing several examples of conduct that presumptively
constitutes "practice of law").
227. Recommendation, supra note 193, 4. This was one of the few points from the June 1999
Recommendation that was carried forward into the March 2000 Draft Recommendation. See Draft
Recommendation, supra note 158, 4 ("This Recommendation does not alter the prohibition on
nonlawyers delivering legal services .... )
228. See, e.g., Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of American Antitrust Institute (AAJ);
Reply of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA); Reply of Stephen R. Conafay
(Managing Director, Shandwick); Reply of Consumer Representatives, The Consumer Alliance;
Reply of Kenneth E. Feltman (President, American League of Lobbyists); Joint Response from 15
Government Affairs Firms, Washington, D.C.; Reply of James A. Klein (President, Association of
Private Pension and Welfare Plans (APPWP)); Reply of Wayne Moore, J.D. (Director, Legal
Advocacy Group, AARP Foundation); Reply of James P. Schaller, Esq.; Reply of Laurel S. Terry
(Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law); Reply of Louise G. Trubek (Senior




sharing of profits as part of the arrangement. 229
In sum, the Commission's June 1999 Report addressed most of the key
threshold, functional, and substantive ethics issues previously identified. In
other words, the Commission's June 1999 Recommendation attempted to
provide guidance not only on the issue of whether MDPs should be permitted,
but also the issue of how they should be permitted, resolving issues of the forms
of association, scope of practice, functional ethics and substantive ethics. In
contrast to this approach, the March 2000 Draft Recommendation appears to
concentrate on the issue of whether to permit MDPs and omits, for the most part,
any recommendation about how they should be permitted, leaving those
decisions to the "regulatory entities." Although the lack of details in the
Commission's March 2000 Draft Recommendation may make it easier for the
Commission to obtain an affirmative vote from the ABA House of Delegates,
the state regulatory authorities ultimately will have to address the difficult
questions of details about how to permit MDPs if they are allowed.
Consequently, state and local bars and state regulatory authorities likely will
continue to look to the June 1999 Recommendation. Therefore, although the
Commission has backtracked from its June 1999 Recommendation, Sections VI
and VII of this Article evaluate both the general conclusions and the details
contained in the Commission's June 1999 Recommendation.
VI. MY ENDORSEMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS
In my view, the Commission basically "got it right" when it recommended
that the fee-sharing ban of Model Rule 5.4 be eliminated. This Section explains
the bases for my agreement with the Commission.
A. Starting Premises: Points of Consensus Within ABA Testimony
Although the Commission participants disagree on many points, an
examination of the testimony and submissions demonstrates that the following
points cannot be seriously disputed.
First, virtually all commentators agree that the proper bases for regulation
are client protection and public interest. 230  Some have argued that the
Commission and commentators have not placed enough emphasis on the public
interest aspect231 and some have slipped into talking about the competitive effect
229. Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 3.
230. See Terry Appendices B1-B7 (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at Threshold Issues, Item A
(summarizing testimony of witnesses on this issue).
231. See generally David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 839, 839-855
(1999). In his article, Mr. Luban analysis of MDPs revolves around this theme. He writes:
Too often, the questions about multidisciplinary practice ("MDP"), mediation and
arbitration, and in-house lawyering are whether they are good for lawyers and good for
clients.... The right question is not whether new roles with no rules are good for lawyers
and clients, but rather whether they are good for the rest of us-"us" being the citizenry who
count on lawyers to be guardians of the law, and whom market forces will not necessarily
protect.
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of MDPs,232 but the fact remains that the dialogue generally has remained
focused on the issues of what is in the best interest of clients and the public.
Second, a consensus emerged that there is at least some client and lawyer
demand for MDPs. The witnesses disagreed, however, about whether the
demand is overwhelming or is minor and is being driven by the suppliers.
233
Third, the testimony and submissions has shown that the MDP
phenomenon exists not only outside the U.S., but within the U.S. as well.
Significant numbers of lawyers now are working outside traditional law firms
doing work that if done in a law firm would be considered the practice of law.
23
Fourth, the testimony and submissions has established that U.S. lawyers
working outside a traditional law firm setting claim they are not practicing law
and therefore are outside the scope of the profession's general regulatory net.
235
Several witnesses expressed the view that if the MDP ban were lifted and
lawyers were permitted to work outside a traditional law firm setting, these
lawyers gladly would subject themselves to the authority of the disciplinary
bodies in exchange for the ability to hold themselves out as lawyers providing
legal services.
236
Fifth, witnesses agreed that there are numerous uncertainties about MDPs.
No one knows what the future will hold.
237
Id. at 839.
232. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Larry Ramirez (Chair, ABA General Practice, Solo and Small
Firm Section) (Feb. 6, 1999); Oral Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999) (indicating one question
was about effect on lawyers' practices of lifting MDP ban).
233. See Reporter's Notes, supra note 58, at 7-8 (addressing extent of and origins of demand for
MDPs); Terry Appendices B1-B7 (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at Threshold Issues, Item F
(summarizing testimony of witnesses on this issue).
Larry Fox, on occasion, has denied that there is any demand for MDPs. I consider these
statements to be hyperbole in view of the testimony of witnesses such as former corporate counsel M.
Elizabeth Wall (Cable & Wireless) (Nov. 12, 1998) and Steven A. Bennett (Banc One) (Nov. 13,
1998), that they want the ability to chose an MDP; and Lynda Shely (State Bar of Arizona and ABA
Standing Committee on Client Protection) (Feb. 5,1999), the Arizona ethics counsel who said that she
gets several calls a month from lawyers who want to form an MDP. In my view, a consensus emerged
that there is at least some client and lawyer demand for MDPs.
234. See Terry Appendices B1-B7 (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at Threshold Issues, Item G
(summarizing testimony of witnesses on this issue).
235. There are some ethical provisions, of course, that apply to a lawyer twenty-four hours per
day, regardless of the lawyer's professional employment. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct
8.4(c), for example, authorizes discipline for dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, regardless
of whether it happens in a professional context. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
8.4(c) (1999) (finding it is misconduct for lawyer to engage in any of these activities). Most ethics
rules, however, apply only in connection with legal services provided by a lawyer to a client.
236. See, e.g., Testimony of Jim Holden (Steptoe & Johnson) (Nov. 12, 1998); Oral Testimony of
James Turner (Executive Director, H.A.L.T.) (Feb. 5, 1999); see also Oral Testimony of James W.
Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999) (expressing uncertainty). But see Oral Remarks of
Richard Spivak (Managing Partner - Tax - North America, Andersen) (Mar. 12, 1999) (opining that
significant number of lawyers in MDPs would turn in their licenses).
237. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Simon Potter (Member, Canadian Bar Association
International Practice of Law Committee) (Feb. 6, 1999) (advising ABA Commission to only address
what was absolutely necessary because world is in turmoil); Testimony of M. Elizabeth Wall (Cable &
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B. Pragmatic Perspective: Regulation is the Best Option
One of the major reasons why I endorse lifting the current MDP ban is
pragmatism. Regulators in the U.S. have three options for responding to the
MDPs: (1) ignore them; (2) try to stop them; or (3) try to regulate them. As
described below, I believe the first two options are either undesirable or
infeasible, and thus, I conclude that regulation is the best option.
If one chooses to simply ignore MDPs, the result will be two worlds of
lawyers, one regulated and one unregulated. Lawyers practicing in a traditional
law firm, acknowledging that they are practicing law, remain subject to the
applicable ethics rules. These lawyers are bound by the applicable ethics rules
even if they dislike certain rules such as the firm-wide imputation rule or the
concept of nonconsentable conflicts of interest.238 In contrast, if the regulators
choose to ignore MDPs and maintain the current ban, lawyers practicing in an
MDP must continue to claim that they are not practicing law; to do otherwise
would subject them to discipline for violation of Rule 5.4.239 These lawyers,
then, would operate on an unregulated basis and might consider themselves free
to ignore legal ethics rules they disagree with or consider inconvenient. This
parallel world of lawyers-some regulated and some unregulated-will only
become larger as MDPs proliferate. I consider this type of world dangerous: it
will breed disrespect for the law and legal ethics rules, and it may create a race to
the bottom. Some lawyers can obtain a competitive advantage by ignoring the
legal ethics rules. Moreover, even if the current ethics rules, such as the
imputation and nonconsentable conflicts rules need amendment, I favor
changing them through a process such as the Ethics 2000 Commission, in which
the pros and cons can be weighed.
The second possible response to MDPs is to try to stop them. Many
commentators rely on this option, arguing that the ABA or some other entity
should simply enforce the UPL laws against these lawyers (and nonlawyers)
practicing together in an MDP. 24° This is the position Larry Fox took during this
Symposium. 241 One can argue, of course, about whether UPL enforcement in
Wireless) (Nov. 12, 1998) (finding issues will take long time to work out).
238. See generally American Bar Association, Center For Professional Responsibility,
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Minutes (Oct. 15-17, 1999) (on file
with author) (containing criticisms of both of these concepts).
239. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons why lawyers
would be subject to discipline if they admitted practicing law and sharing fees with nonlawyers.
240. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Jay G. Foonberg (Bailey & Marzano) (Feb. 6, 1999) (proposing
ABA resolution to call for increased UPL enforcement and support it financially); Oral Testimony of
Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker Biddle & Reath) (Feb. 4, 1999); Testimony of Karen D. Powell (Petrillo &
Powell) (Nov. 12, 1998).
241. See Phyllis W. Beck Chair in Law Symposium Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, (Nov. 12, 1999).
See generally Lawrence J. Fox, Old Wine in Old Bottles: Preserving Professional Independence, 72
TEM]'. L. REv. 971, 983 (1999) ("[W]e must call on those who enforce our disciplinary rules to do so.
Where are the regulators when the violations of Rule 5.4 are so blatant?... It's summary judgment
time for these miscreants .... ).
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this context is a desirable outcome.242 Aside from the issue of whether this result
is appropriate or desirable, I have become convinced that this result is not
achievable.
One of the Commission's standard questions during the hearings was: "How
would you define the practice of law (for UPL enforcement purposes)?" None
of the witnesses had a particularly satisfactory answer. As witness Jim Jones
explained, it is very easy to define the practice of law in an inclusive sense that
describes what it is that lawyers do.243 Malpractice insurance policies, for
example, describe the practice of law in an inclusive sense.244 Jones explained,
however, that it is very difficult to define the practice of law exclusively, so as to
prohibit nonlawyers from engaging in the specified activities.
245
There are several reasons why it will be difficult to define the practice of
law in an MDP context. First, if UPL is enforced criminally, the MDP and its
lawyers can argue that any ambiguities in the definition of the practice of law
should be construed in their favor.24 Additionally, many UPL cases have been
brought against disempowered defendants who do not have unlimited resources
to spend in litigating the definition of the practice of law.247 Moreover, judges
have not been particularly sympathetic to UPL claims when there is no evidence
of client harm.248 Finally, one must examine the cases cited by those who
242. See generally ABA Commission on Nonlawyer Practice, Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related
Situations: A Report with Recommendations 61-74 (1995) (reporting on unmet needs for legal services
and discussing UPL); Daly, supra note 1, at 48-54 & nn.116-39 (discussing history and development of
rules restricting UPL); Deborah L Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981) (describing
history, empirical evidence, and constitutional implications of UPL); see also Oral Remarks of Wayne
Moore (Director, AARP) (Mar. 11, 1999) (seeking broadest change possible while protecting clients
because it promotes access to justice).
243. See Written Remarks of James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999).
244. Id
245. Id. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty in defining
the "practice of law" precisely.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 77 (1984) (Rehnquist J., dissenting)
(asserting statutory construction requiring "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes ... be
resolved in favor of lenity" in construing applicable statute); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812
(1971) (noting doubts in criminal statutes resolved against imposing harsher statutes).
247. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 20, at 838-49 (providing numerous case examples). In
June 1998, for example, "the web page for the Pennsylvania Bar Association Unauthorized Practice of
Law Committee ... list[ed] 17 opinions. Only five of these opinions involve alleged UPL by a non-
Pennsylvania lawyer. The other opinions involve alleged UPL by noniawyers." What If?, supra note
1, at n.104.
248. See, e.g., Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion - Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension Plans, 571
So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. 1990) (refusing to adopt recommendation of Florida UPL committee that it is
unauthorized practice of law for nonawyers to design and prepare pension plans because court was
not convinced by record that there was public need for protection sought by UPL committee); Perkins
v. CTX Mortgage Co., 969 P.2d 93, 100 (Wash. 1999) (declining to find activities of mortgagee in
connection with completion of financing documents constituted practice of law); see also In re NJ.
Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 507 A.2d 711, 714 (N.J. 1986) (noting "in cases involving an
overlap of professional disciplines we must try to avoid arbitrary classifications and focus instead on
the public's realistic need for protection and regulation."); In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules
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endorse using UPL to stop the MDP phenomenon. Lawline v. American Bar
Association2 9 is one of the cases that has been cited for the proposition that
UPL is alive and kicking and should be used against MDP lawyers. 250 In
Lawline, a plaintiff challenged on antitrust grounds the defendants' adoption and
use of the ABA Model Rules' UPL provisions. The defendants were: the ABA;
the Illinois State Bar Association; the Chicago Bar Association; the justices of
the Illinois Supreme Court in their official capacities; members of the Illinois
Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility; members of the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Illinois Supreme
Court; members of six executive committees of the court in their official
capacities; and the U.S. Trustee for the Northern District of Illinois and his
assistant.251 Is it any wonder that the court upheld the UPL provision given the
context of this suit? I submit that it will be a very different case if a Big Five firm
or lawyers practicing in the Big Five are charged with UPL violations; there is
enough money at stake that they undoubtedly will litigate vigorously. 212 One
cannot assume based on Lawline that the UPL provisions can be enforced. In
short, I have not yet been convinced that the "stop it" option could be successful,
even if it were desirable.
If ignoring MDPs is not desirable, and stopping MDPs is not feasible, the
only remaining option is to regulate. This is the pragmatic reason why I endorse
lifting the MDP ban.
My decision to endorse Model 5-the fully integrated MDP-as opposed to a
more limited model of MDP-also was based on pragmatism. Various
Commission witnesses testified that form of association limitations, such as rules
Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124-25 (S.C. 1992) (concluding CPAs may
represent clients before agencies and probate court without violating state's UPL prohibition). Cf.
Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer Representation in Securities Arbitration, 696 So. 2d
1178, 1181 (Fla. 1997) (holding nonlawyer retained to represent investor, for compensation, in
securities arbitration against broker is engaged in unauthorized practice of law); Sharon Village Ltd. v.
Licking County Bd. of Revision, 678 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ohio 1997) (affirming dismissal of tax appeals
because board of revision lacked jurisdiction to hear complaints about property tax assessments filed
for clients by nonlawyer and also found nonlawyer had engaged in unauthorized practice of law). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Final Draft No. 2,
1998), § 4, Reporter's Note, cmt. c (listing cases).
249. 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992).
250. See, e.g., Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Therese M. Stewart (President, Bar
Association of San Francisco). Ms. Steward wrote:
We also note that ethics rules prohibiting lawyers from entering into partnerships with
non-lawyers if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law, and rules
forbidding lawyers from assisting lay persons in the unauthorized practice of law have been
upheld against constitutional challenges of due process and equal protection as well as
challenges under the First Amendment.
Id. (citing Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n., 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992)).
251. See Lawline, 956 F.2d at 1387 (discussing claims that adopting disciplinary rules violates
Sherman Act, First Amendment, as well as Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
252 See, e.g., Testimony of William Elliott (Kane, Russell, Colemand & Logan) (Nov. 13, 1998)
(describing Texas UPL complaint against Andersen and resources expended in investigation and
defense of complaint).
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requiring lawyers to have a majority ownership or a controlling interest, or
requiring a separate legal entity to provide legal services, are not the correct way
to go about protecting lawyers' core values, clients, or the public.253 I became
convinced these types of requirements are easily manipulated.254 It would be
inefficient to concentrate on detecting violations of these issues, rather than
violations of our underlying concerns. Moreover, there is not a complete
correlation between these formalistic requirements and the underlying goals.
For example, a majority ownership requirement might or might not translate
into protecting a lawyer's ability to exercise independent legal judgment.
Furthermore, the global experience suggests that less-than-fully-integrated-
MDPs are merely an interim step. New South Wales recently amended its rule
to delete the requirement of a lawyer majority interest and the Law Council of
Australia endorsed a similar policy. 255 Witnesses testified that the rules in their
jurisdictions of France, England, and Scotland ultimately will be relaxed.256 The
Canadian Bar eliminated from its final report restrictions in its Interim Report
that had received extensive criticism.257 Germany's recent law requiring a lawyer
majority interest in limited liability firms has been in operation approximately
one year and already is the subject of criticism. Moreover, it is the Big Five-
affiliated German firms, rather than traditional firms, that first embraced this
new statute that has a lawyer-control requirement.
258
If the U.S. ultimately will have a fully-integrated model, there is something
to be said for starting off immediately with that model and trying to get it right.
Rather than using rules about legal forms as a proxy for our true concerns, U.S.
regulators should focus on the underlying issues. This is especially true because
developments such as McKee Nelson Ernst & Young suggest that a lawyer
majority requirement will not allay concerns about independence but may
instead prevent Main Street MDPs. I therefore endorse Model 5 and urge U.S.
253. See, e.g., Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Richard P. Campbell (International
Association of Defense Counsel); Reply of Sydney M. Cone, III (Counsel, Clearly, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton); Reply of Defense Research Institute; Reply of Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker Biddle & Reath,
LLP); Reply of Steven Krane (New York State Bar Association); Reply of Ramon M. Mullerat, Esq.;
Reply of New York County Lawyers' Association; Reply of Karen D. Powell (Petrillo & Powell,
P.L.L.C.); Reply of State Bar of California; Reply of Stuart P. Werling, Esq.; Reply of Bernard
Wolfman (Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
254. See, e.g., Testimony of Stephen McGarry (Lex Mundi) (Nov. 13, 1998); Oral Remarks of
Roger Page (Deloitte & Touche) (Mar. 11, 1999); Oral Remarks of Richard Spivak (Managing
Partner-Tax-North America, Andersen) (Mar. 12, 1999). But see Oral Remarks of Lawrence M. Hill
(White & Case) (Feb. 4, 1999) (finding Model 4 could make regulation issues less complicated).
255. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of Australia's MDP
provisions.
256. See Oral Remarks of Neil Cochran (Dundas & Wilson C.S.) (Feb. 4, 1999) (discussing post-
hearing proposals to modify English and French MDP rules); Testimony of Alison Crawley (Law
Society of England and Wales) (Nov. 12 1998); Testimony of Gerard Nicolay
(PricewaterhouseCoopers) (Nov. 12, 1998);.
257. See supra note 70 and accompanying text for a discussion of testimony concerning this
charge by the Canadian Bar.
258. See Henssler, supra note 133; Terry, German MDPs, supra note 58.
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regulators not to focus on the form of practice in an MDP, but instead to focus
on the underlying concerns, and then attempt to respond directly to those
concerns.
In sum, having determined that an MDP phenomenon exists and having
identified only three ways of reacting to that phenomenon, I concluded that the
effort to regulate the phenomenon made much more sense than ignoring or
trying to stop it.
C. Theoretical Perspective
In addition to the pragmatic grounds discussed above, there are several
theoretical reasons why I favor lifting the current MDP ban. The most
significant of these grounds concerns a concept I have referred to as "burden of
proof."259
As explained above, the world is changing before our eyes and we are
unsure as to what will happen and whether these changes will be for the better or
worse.26° Given this uncertainly, assignment of the burden of proof regarding
MDPs is critical because the side with the burden will likely lose.
There are two major options with respect to the burden.261 A regulator
might, for example, decide that those who want to change the current MDP ban
must convince the regulator that the proposed change is good and the risks
minimal. Alternatively, a regulator might decide that those who want to keep an
existing MDP ban have the burden to justify the limitations on the way lawyers
can organize and practice.
Although very few of the pre-Commission Report commentators expressly
acknowledged the burden of proof issue, that situation changed dramatically
during the summer of 1999. During the plenary session on MDPs at the June
1999 25th National Conference on Professional Responsibility, for example,
there was a colloquy with the panel about who had the burden and whether it
259. See Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999). Burden of proof is an imprecise
term that encompasses concepts such as burden of pleading, burden of production, and burden of
persuasion. It is also a term I tell my students never to use. Nevertheless, this is the term I used
throughout my testimony and in subsequent conferences such as the 25th National Conference on
Professional Responsibility. See supra note 4 for presentation of the author's testimony and remarks
distributed at this conference. Because of the dialogue that already has occurred about the correct
allocation of the "burden of proof," I have continued in this Article to use this imprecise term. By this
term, I intend to refer to both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. See also
Wolfram, supra note 39, at 344 ("The answer to any MDP discussion may well turn on who has the
burden of carrying the argument.").
260. See also Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Comment of Robert W. Gordon
(Professor of Law, Yale Law School) (stating our "profession is evidently undergoing a major
revolution in the organization and delivery of legal services").
261. Other permutations may emerge as the thinking about these issues develops and becomes
more sophisticated. At this beginning stage of the analysis, however, I found it a useful-enough
exercise to think about the burden of proof issue in a binary, zero-sum sense, in which the burden is
entirely assigned either to those who wish to retain the current MDP ban or those who wish to delete
the current MDP ban.
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had been met.262 Perhaps because Larry Fox is a member, the Pennsylvania
MDP Commission's July 1999 report explicitly addresses the burden of proof
concept.
26 3
Similar to the Pennsylvania MDP Commission resolution, the Florida bar
resolution adopted by the ABA House of Delegates during the August 1999
Annual Meeting is based on a burden of proof concept. Some of the comments
since the Commission's Report also refer expressly to the concept of burden of
proof. Supporters and critics of the MDP ban often have very different views on
whether those who seek to maintain the current MDP ban have the burden to
show that the ban is justified or whether those who seek to change the status quo
and permit MDPs have the burden of showing that the risks are minimal and the
benefits outweigh the risks.
264
In my view, those who wish to retain the current MDP ban have the burden
of proof to justify such a ban given the testimony showing at least some client
and lawyer demand for MDPs.265 The current MDP ban tells clients: "I am
262. See ABA 25TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
SUPPLEMENTARY COURSEBOOK MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE (June 3, 1999), Testimony of Laurel
S. Terry (Mar. 12,1999), app. A, at 3 (on file with author).
263. See Pennsylvania Bar Association, Pennsylvania Bar Association Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice & Related Trends Affecting the Profession, Recommendation [hereinafter PA
Bar Recommendation] (adopted by PBA Board of Governors July 27, 1999) (visited Dec. 8, 1999)
<http://www.pabar.org/mdprecom.shtml>. The Pennsylvania Bar Association's Recommendation read
as follows:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association make no change, addition or amendment
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which would permit a lawyer to offer legal
services through a multidisciplinary practice, unless and until extensive evidence and
well-reasoned analysis demonstrate that such change will further the public interest without
sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession's tradition of
loyalty to clients, and that the Recommendation of the American Bar Association's
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice be disapproved.
Id. As explained supra note 159, the Pennsylvania Bar Association MDP Commission has endorsed
MDPs that are 60% controlled by lawyers and meet certain other conditions, which was somewhat
surprising given this earlier report. See PA Bar, MDP Report, supra note 159.
264. Compare FL Bar Recommendation, supra note 155 (recommending ABA should "make no
change, addition or amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which permits a lawyer to
offer legal services through a multidisciplinary practice unless and until additional study demonstrates
that such changes will further the public interest") and PA Bar Recommendation, supra note 263
(recommending no change to Model Rules of Professional Conduct until "extensive evidence and
well-reasoned analysis" show public interest will be furthered without harming duties of lawyers), with
Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at 4-5 (asserting people wishing to
keep Model Rule 5.4 have burden of convincing Commission that rule should be kept) and Written
Reply to the Commission, Reply of Theodore J. DelGaizo, PE, Esq. ("The Pennsylvania Bar
Association (of which I am a member) argues that the rules should not be changed without evidence
that problems (conflicts, independence, etc.) will not occur. I think it is the other way around.
Defenders of the status quo should be required to provide the rational basis for the current rule, other
than some arcane notion of tradition.").
265. While not used consistently, this is the approach that I believe is used throughout the Model
Rules. When a limitation is placed on client choice (such as with nonconsentable conflicts or limiting
clients' right to have a fee based on literary rights), regulators try to justify those actions and
limitations. In my view, we assume good cause must be shown for the limitations, rather than
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sorry, I know you want MDPs, but for your own good or for the sake of the
public good, I am not going to let you use an MDP." While there certainly are
situations in which it is appropriate to have paternalistic rules, I think the burden
should be on the person or institution imposing the paternalistic rule to justify
that limitation on client choice.266
In my view, those who wish to retain the MDP ban did not carry their
burden of proof nor show why an MDP ban was necessary. The Commission
heard relatively little testimony about clients who had been injured by lawyers
practicing in an MDP. Former U.K. corporate counsel Elizabeth Wall was one
of the few witnesses with first-hand knowledge of such a problem. She described
the efforts of one Big Five firm to include (and disguise) legal services in a bid,
even though the request for bids specifically excluded such services. 267 Although
she lamented what she described as the "Trojan Horse" problem, she indicated
that she wanted the freedom to choose an MDP as a legal services provider.268
On the other hand, the Commission heard testimony about places in which
MDPs currently are functioning, without any evidence that this has eroded the
rule of law or fundamental nature of the profession. 269 The Commission also
heard testimony from lawyers currently practicing in an MDP who felt they
could do so without compromising their legal values. Witness Gerard Nicolay,
for example, essentially said: "I am a sixth generation lawyer. My ethics and
honor are important to me. I would never compromise them while working for
PricewaterhouseCoopers." 270  Witness Neil Cochran testified similarly.271
Witnesses Jones, Ramirez, Robinson, and Tucker predicted that it would be
possible for a lawyer to work in an MDP context without compromising one's
values or independence.
272
assuming the limitation is fine absent a showing to the contrary. Obviously, this issue of burden of
proof is one of the many issues deserving of in-depth treatment in a separate law review article.
266. See supra note 265 and accompanying text for a discussion of who bears burden for
justifying client limitations. See also Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Comment of
Robert W. Gordon (Professor of Law, Yale Law School) (explaining poor record of bar in opposing,
on client protection grounds, practice innovations that now appear to benefit clients and to have been
economically threatening to some lawyers).
267. See Testimony of M. Elizabeth Wall (Cable & Wireless) (Nov. 12,1998).
268. Id
269. See Witnesses Neil Cochran (Feb. 4, 1999), Gerard Nicolay (Nov. 12, 1998), and Thomas
Verhoeven (Nov. 13, 1998), all of whom practice in an MDP, and Witnesses Allison Crawley (Nov. 12,
1998), Michel Gout (Nov. 12, 1998), Gerard Mazet (Feb. 6, 1999), and Andrew Scott (Nov. 13, 1998),
who are regulators or bar advisors in countries with MDPs. In contrast to these witnesses, Witness Dr.
Hans-Jirgen Hellwig (Feb. 4, 1999 and August 8, 1999) stated that he thought there had been an effect
on the legal profession in Europe in terms of over-commercialization of the legal profession and that
Big Five MDPs in Germany had been a failure. My research in Germany, however, did not uncover
these problems. See Terry, German MDPs, supra note 58.
270. See Testimony of Gerard Nicolay (Pricewaterhousecoopers) (Nov. 12, 1998).
271. See Written Statement of Neil Cochran (Dundas & Wilson C.S.) (Feb. 4,1999).
272. See Oral Testimony of James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc) (Feb. 6, 1999); Oral
Testimony of Larry Ramirez (Chair, ABA General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section) (Feb. 6,
1999); Oral Testimony of Charles F. Robinson (Law Offices of Charles F. Robinson) (Feb. 5, 1999);
Oral Testimony of Stefan F. Tucker (Chair, ABA Section of Taxation) (Feb. 4, 1999).
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Weighed against this testimony is the concern that one cannot believe these
lawyers, or that these lawyers are anomalies. Witness Gerard Mazet testified, for
example, that he wouldn't be worried if all lawyers were like
PricewaterhouseCoopers' Gerard Nicolay.273 Larry Fox has argued that it is
unrealistic to expect all lawyers in these MDP settings to resist the pressures they
will face.
274
In short, although I have concerns about whether MDP lawyers will honor
their obligations, I am not ready to override client choice on this basis. As the
Commission heard, there are many situations in which lawyers face pressures to
compromise their independent legal judgment: pressures within a large law firm,
pressures because of high student debt loans that must be paid, pressures from
nonlawyers in a government agency, pressures within a corporate law setting,
and pressures from insurance companies.275 Yet the U.S. system (unlike many
European systems) has been willing to put lawyers in situations in which they
face such pressures. The U.S. system is based on the integrity of the individual
lawyer and has been willing to trust the lawyer to resist such pressures.
276
Fox and Foonberg suggest that the corporate counsel situation is
distinguishable because corporate counsel has only one client, whereas the MDP
lawyer will have many clients. In my view, this distinction does not undercut the
value of the analogy. Although corporate counsel may have only one client, we
expect the lawyer to honor the lawyer's ethical obligations with respect to that
client, notwithstanding pressure from nonlawyers and other constituents of the
client.
Professor Eleanor Myers also argues that the corporate counsel situation
can be distinguished. In her view, the most significant risk to corporate counsel
is that they will identify too closely with their clients, whereas the risk from
MDPs is that the lawyer will identify too closely with the third-party employer,
rather than the client.277 Even if Professor Myers is correct that identification
with the client presents the major risk to corporate counsel's independence,
corporate counsel also face pressures from third parties such as a president with
the power to hire, fire, and set salaries for counsel.278 Despite these risks, U.S.
states, unlike many European countries, permit licensed lawyers to serve as in-
273. See Oral Testimony of Gerard Mazet (President of the International Commission of the
French National Bar Council) (Feb. 6,1999).
274. See Written Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker Biddle & Reath) (Feb. 4,1999).
275. See, e.g., Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Comment of Robert W. Gordon
(Professor of Law, Yale Law School); Oral Testimony of Stefan F. Tucker (Chair, ABA Section of
Taxation) (Feb. 4,1999).
276. See, e.g., Phyllis W. Beck Chair in Law Symposium Remarks of Professor Mary Daly (Nov.
12, 1999) (observing that Big Five have tremendous resources and lobbying power, as evidenced by
quick adoption of the Tax Preparer Privilege). I do not believe this lobbying power is sufficient
justification to deny MDP lawyers the opportunity to comply with the existing ethics rules.
277. See Phyllis W. Beck Chair in Law Symposium Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, (Nov. 12, 1999);
See generally Myers, supra note 145 (contrasting risks to lawyer independence which occur in in-house
and MDP settings).




house counsel.279 In other words, U.S. regulators trust that corporate counsel
will comply with their ethical obligations despite pressures from third parties.
Some commentators also have argued that the third-party insurance
company payor situation shows that it is a bad idea to permit nonlawyer
employment of a lawyer and demonstrates that allowing MDPs will make a bad
situation worse.2  There is no doubt that the insurance company payor situation
has placed new and tremendous pressures on lawyers. 281 The current problems
with third-party insurance company payors, however, is not sufficient to justify
the MDP ban. Given the restriction on client autonomy, I am uncomfortable
using a rationale of "don't make a bad situation worse," especially because some
of the "bad situations" involve pressures within a large law firm and because law
firms may benefit economically from such a decision to retain the MDP ban.
282
Additionally, the legal profession's response to the third-party payor-insurance
situation demonstrates that many (and hopefully most) lawyers will resist
pressure to undermine their judgment. The American Law Institute, for
example, amended the proposed rule in the Law Governing Lawyers to ensure
that in third-party payor situations, lawyers obtain client consent before agreeing
to let the insurance company direct the lawyer's actions.283 Thus, because there
279. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 93, at 20 (finding conflict problems led some European countries
to exclude "house counsel from their definition of lawyer").
280. See Oral Testimony of Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker Biddle & Reath) (Feb. 4,1999).
281. A perusal of the ABAJBNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct, Current Reports, for
example, contains an insurance-related article in almost every issue. See, e.g., Confidentiality: Lawyer
Must First Obtain Insured's Consent Before Sending Confidential Data to Auditor, in 15 LAWYER'S
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (ABA/BNA) 554-55 (1999). See generally 15 LAWYER'S
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDucT (ABA/BNA) (1999) (presenting issues concerning
professional conduct).
Arizona Ethics Counsel Lynda Shely testified that this was a much greater problem than MDPs.
See Oral Testimony of Lynda Shely (State Bar of Arizona and ABA Standing Committee on Client
Protection) (Feb. 5, 1999).
28Z See generally Written Comments Not Presented at Hearings, Comment of Robert W.
Gordon (Professor of Law, Yale Law School) (observing many lawyer actions that were justified at
time on client protection grounds appear, in hindsight, as measures to protect lawyers' income or
stature).
283. On May 12, 1998, the American Law Institute approved the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers project. See ALl Completes Restatement on Lawyers, Gives Final Approval to All
Sections, in 14 LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (ABA/BNA) 211 (1998) [hereinafter
ALl Completes Restatement). Section 215, regarding the tripartite insured-insurer relationship, proved
quite controversial. Section 215, as originally proposed, provided:
A lawyer's professional conduct on behalf of a client may be directed by someone other than
the client when:
(a) the direction is reasonable in scope and character, such as by reflecting obligations
borne by the person directing the lawyer, and
(b) the client consents to the direction under the limitations and conditions provided in
§ 202.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 248, § 215(2). The comment
to section 215 indicated, and the reporters defended, the proposition that a lawyer is not required to
speak directly with the client to obtain the client's consent. Id. at cmt. b. The comment stated:
In insurance representations, when there appears to be no substantial risk that a claim
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are other situations in which lawyers face pressure, and because MDPs do not
seem qualitatively different, I do not believe a showing was made at the
Commission hearings which would justify a limitation on client choice.
The closest I can find to a principled basis for distinguishing the MDP
practice is the size of the entity with which the lawyer would be practicing.
Although the point was not explicitly framed in this manner, some
commentators appear to believe that if a lawyer is only a small part of a large
organization and the lawyer is not in control, then pressures will be placed on the
lawyer that we cannot expect the lawyer to resist.284 The unstated assumption
may be that lawyers currently have enough power and prestige so that their
judgments are respected. But, lawyers in a large MDP will be powerless and
therefore their ethical judgments will not be respected.
In my view, the size of the MDP entity should not be the basis for a
principled decision. First, there is the line-drawing problem: How big is too big?
Second, there is the problem of uneven application; as Commission Witness
Jones said: Will we apply this rule to large law firms? Third, many of the MDPs
which the Commission heard about and which would be excluded by an MDP
ban, would be small MDPs-used by Main Street, not Wall Street, lawyers for
Main Street clients. Fourth, every witness who addressed the topic urged the
Commission not to fragment the bar, which might happen if there was a rule that
made small but not large MDPs acceptable.
285
Larry Fox has argued that the fact that problems currently exist does not
mean lawyers cannot get better or that lawyers cannot say: "Here is where we
draw the line." I would agree with him if I thought the decision was only about
lawyers getting better. But I would rephrase the issue to ask whether lawyers
have a legitimate basis for adopting a paternalistic rule that denies some clients
what they want. In my mind, legitimate concerns about size and pressure of a
large MDP firm are not sufficient justification to override the will of clients,
given that we have been willing in the past to rely on a lawyer's integrity and a
lawyer's promise to abide by the applicable ethics rules and given the lack of
evidence of specific dangers to clients or the public interest.
A second but related theoretical basis for my willingness to lift the MDP
ban is my willingness to trust MDP lawyers to follow any newly-promulgated
ethics rules. Some critics argue that MDP lawyers currently are engaged in
against a client-insured will not be fully covered by an insurance policy pursuant to which the
lawyer is appointed and is to be paid, consent other than that implicit in the action of the
insured in forwarding the claim to the insurer is not required.
Id. This comment to section 215 was amended by a voice vote, to require the lawyer or insurer to
inform the insured in writing of the general terms of the representation. See ALl Completes
Restatement, supra, at 283. The ALl also voted 166-118 to amend section 215 to add the language
from ABA Model Rule 1.8(f) that a lawyer may be paid by a third party only if "the direction does not
interfere with the independent professional judgment of the lawyer." Id
284. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 102, at A23 (discussing dangers of relative size). In my view, this
perspective runs throughout his article.
285. See Terry Appendices B1-B7 (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at Threshold Issues, Item C
(summarizing testimony of witnesses who urged Commission not to fragment bar).
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massive civil disobedience because they are sharing fees with nonlawyers in
violation of Rule 5.4.286 They strenuously criticize such lawyers, stating that they
are flaunting the law, displaying their contempt for the legal ethics rules, and
thereby proving that an MDP system will not and cannot work. I do not share
these views. Realistically, one must recognize that U.S. lawyers who currently
work in an MDP context must claim that they are not practicing law. To do
otherwise would be to concede a violation of Rule 5.4.287 Therefore, U.S.
lawyers currently working in non-traditional firms are engaged in civil
disobedience only if their actions are a clear violation of the unauthorized
practice of law provisions.
As explained in Section VI.B above, I have not been able to come up with a
precise definition of the practice of law which could be upheld in a criminal or
quasi-criminal context if vigorously challenged.2  And if one cannot articulate
an enforceable definition of the practice of law, then lawyers working in
nontraditional firms are taking advantage of a "loophole," namely the ambiguity
in the definition and enforcement of UPL. Unlike Larry Fox, I have been
unwilling to assume that because MDP lawyers use a loophole, they would not
comply with new explicit rules regulating their role in an MDP. Indeed, the
Commission testimony suggested that many MDP lawyers would welcome the
opportunity for regulation and to acknowledge their status as lawyers who
provide legal advice. 289 Consequently, I worry more about designing effective
rules than I worry that the rules will be ignored.
VII. SPECIFIC CRIcIsMs OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT
A. Introduction
Although I generally endorse the Commission's June 1999 Report to the
ABA House of Delegates, there are some aspects with which I disagree and
some points that should be clarified before any similar accompanying
Recommendation is adopted.29°
286. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 38, at 983 ("The truth is the Big Five ... engage in systematic civil
disobedience today--employing thousands of lawyers who are violating Rule 5.4 and all of our other
core value rules everyday .... ").
287. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Model Rule 5.4.
288. See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of why it is difficult to define
the practice of law in a MDP context.
289. See infra note 321 and 336 and accompanying text for a summary of testimony of lawyers
who would "opt in."
290. I realize that these comments may be more detailed and specific than will be of interest to
the general reader. I have included them, however, because they may be of interest to those lawyers
who may soon have to vote on specific MDP proposals that contain this level of detail. As explained
supra note 158, the Commission now appears to have abandoned this Recommendation. Because it
provides details about the how of MDPs as well as the question of whether to have MDPs, I address
the Recommendation in detail.
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B. Disagreement on Scope of Practice: Address (and Ban) the Issue of
Simultaneous Legal and Audit Work for the Same Client
My first disagreement with the Commission concerns a scope of practice
issue. As explained earlier, the Commission deferred consideration of the
controversial issue of whether a lawyer practicing in an MDP should be
permitted to provide legal services to a client if the MDP also provides audit
services to that client.291 The Commission initially expressed the view that it
made sense to wait until after the Independence Standards Board completes its
current study, later clarified that it intended such a ban, but then omitted it from
the March 2000 Draft Recommendation.
292
In my view, the Commission inappropriately ducked this issue. The analysis
of the Independence Standards Board necessarily will focus on the requirement
that an auditor be independent. Regardless of the answer with respect to an
auditor's obligations, the ABA and state regulators have an obligation to analyze
the effect of simultaneous legal and audit services upon a lawyer's professional
obligations.
It is possible that the Commission initially considered this issue, could not
reach agreement, but declined to make its disagreement public. One could read
into Recommendation paragraph 9, for example, a disagreement within the
Commission about whether legal and audit services are incompatible:
To the extent that the delivery of nonlegal services to a client is
compatible with the delivery of legal services to the same client and
with the rules of professional conduct, a lawyer should be required to
make reasonable efforts to make sure that the client sufficiently
understands that the lawyer and nonlawyer may have different
obligations with respect to disclosure of client information and that the
courts may treat the client's communications to the lawyer and
nonlawyer differently.
293
The Updated Background Report was therefore a useful clarification in my
view.294 The Commission should not deprive the legal community of its
significant expertise by remaining silent on this important issue.
Turning to the merits of this scope of practice limitation, I believe it is
appropriate to include a simultaneous legal-audit ban, at least initially.295 One of
the points that has most troubled MDP critics is whether there is an inherent,
nonconsentable conflict of interest between the lawyer's duty to a client and the
291. See supra note 205 and accompanying text for a discussion of Recommendation paragraph 3.
See also supra note 197 for a description of some commentators' views that there is an inherent
conflict between a lawyer's duty of confidentiality and duty toward the client on the one hand, and the
auditor's duty toward the public on the other hand.
292. See supra note 214 for a discussion of the Commission's position on a legal-audit ban.
293. Recommendation, supra note 193, 9 (emphasis added).
294. See supra note 214 for a discussion clarifying recommendation of the Commission for when
legal and nonlegal services are performed for a client.
295. The Commission might have chosen to have a "sunset" aspect to this rule. It might have
said, for example, that this scope of practice limitation would lapse absent a finding that simultaneous
legal and audit services should be viewed as creating a nonconsentable conflict of interest.
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auditor's duty to the public.296 Indeed, a number of foreign rules and proposals
include a ban on performing simultaneous legal and audit services.297 A
temporary legal-audit ban would provide time to learn more about the risks and
benefits of MDPs and to learn whether the topic of nonconsentable conflicts will
be further revised as a result of the Ethics 2000 Commission deliberations. In
short, because MDPs are such a new situation, I urge caution on this point.
C. Disagreement About Functional Ethics: Apply the Court Audit Requirement
in Recommendation T 14 to All MDP Lawyers
My second disagreement with the Commission concerns a functional ethics
issue. I disagree with the Commission's decision in Recommendation paragraph
12 to limit the court-audit procedure to nonlawyer-controlled MDPs.
298
I am not alone in criticizing the Commission's requirement that nonlawyer-
controlled MDPs comply with a court audit procedure.299 Some commentators
contend that the court audit will not provide an effective control mechanism,
whereas the consumer advocacy representatives worry that the audit will prove
too expensive and will serve to discourage Main Street MDPs.3°° My criticism of
Recommendation paragraph 12 is different.
My criticism is that if a court audit requirement is adopted, it should apply
296. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences in lawyer
and auditor conflict of interest standards, including the fact that there are many situations in which an
accountant could proceed after obtaining client consent, but a lawyer could not proceed even if the
client consented.
297. See supra note 72 for a discussion of foreign rules and proposals that ban simultaneous legal
and audit services.
298. Recommendation, supra note 193, 112. Paragraph 12 of the Recommendation reads:
A lawyer should not share legal fees with a nonlawyer or form a partnership or other entity
with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership or other entity consist of the
practice of law except that a lawyer in an MDP controlled by lawyers should be permitted to
do so and a lawyer in an MDP not controlled by lawyers should be permitted to do so
subject to safeguards similar to those identified in paragraph 14.
Id.; see also Reporter's Notes, supra note 58, at 10-11 (discussing recommendation that courts have
discretionary right to review and conduct administrative audit of MDPs to ensure compliance). After
I first wrote this Section, the Commission abandoned the court audit and certification requirements.
See Draft Recommendation, supra note 158. While some of the criticisms of the court audit appeared
valid, that was less true of the certification procedure. Therefore, I am sorry to see these requirements
disappear from the March 2000 Draft Recommendation without further discussion of whether some of
the requirements were feasible. The focus of this section, however, is on applying the requirements
evenhandedly if they are included.
299. See, e.g., Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York; Reply of Sydney M. Cone, III (Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton);
Reply of Consumer Representatives, The Consumer Alliance; Reply of Lawrence J. Fox (Drinker
Biddle & Reath, LLP); Reply of Silvia Ibanez (CPA, JD, CFP).
300. Compare Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Consumer Representatives, The
Consumer Alliance, which worries about the effect of an audit's cost with the other commentators
listed supra note 299. See also Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Louise G. Trubek (Senior
Attorney, Center for Public Representation and Professor of University of Wisconsin-Madison Law
School) (noting "[a] similar system for group and pre-paid plans is working effectively under
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 11.06").
[Vol. 72
A PRIMER ON MDPS
uniformly to all MDPs. There are two main reasons for this conclusion. First, I
think it is important to ask the purpose of the court audit. While discipline and
enforcement is one role a court audit may serve, I consider education an equally
important function. If MDPs are permitted in the U.S., it will be a new
experience for U.S. lawyers. Even lawyers practicing in a lawyer-controlled
MDP will have to face both new and old issues in different contexts. A court
audit could serve an education function. For example, the court audit might
provide a checklist for MDPs. The court audit also provides a context to discuss
issues such as that raised by commentator Silvia Ibanez. She asserts that MDP
lawyers should be required to provide a disclaimer to clients warning them about
possible compromises to confidentiality that could occur when lawyers and
nonlawyers work together.
30 1
Second, a court audit requirement should be uniformly applied because it
would be a waste of resources to have to determine, prior to a court audit,
whether the MDP is controlled by lawyers or nonlawyers. I join those who have
criticized the Commission's failure to provide a definition of control. 3°2 But even
if a definition were provided, there undoubtedly will be some room for
disagreement. The Commission's definitions of MDPs and the court audit, for
example, arguably do not apply to the new law firm of McKee Nelson Ernst &
Young because the firm claims to share costs, but not fees, with Ernst &
Young.30 3 Because McKee Nelson Ernst & Young is breaking new ground,
however, and shares contiguous physical space with the Big Five firm Ernst &
Young, this situation is a prime example of when a court audit procedure might
be useful. In short, I believe the focus should be whether the MDP is operated
in a manner consistent with client and public interests and whether the MDP
somehow compromises a lawyer's core values. The fight (and resources) should
not be about whether to have a court audit in the first place.
In addition, the Commission should provide additional guidance to state
courts about the possible content of a state audit requirement. The
Commission's Report carefully notes that it has not proposed a new federal
regulator and that the court audit procedure and MDP regulation is left to the
states.3° 4 The desire not to step on state courts' toes may explain why the
Commission provided no specific suggestions about the content of a court audit.
Such detail would be useful.
301. See Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Silvia Ibanez, CPA, JD, CFP. Ms.
Ibanez's reference probably should be a reference to waiver of the attorney-client privilege rather than
the duty of confidentiality.
302. See, e.g., Written Replies to Commission, Reply of Sydney M. Cone, III (Counsel, Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton); Reply of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
303. See supra note 40 for the firm's press release.
304. See Report, supra note 191, at 4-5. This section of the Report reads:
This does not mean that a new regulatory body must be established or that regulation must
be done on a national level. The Commission's recommendations provide for continued
regulation of the delivery of legal services by the highest court of each jurisdiction,
regardless of the organizational structure in which a lawyer practices.
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The Commission has spent a significant amount of time educating itself
about the issues and concerns related to MDPs. If the Commission shared its
expertise, it would provide the basis for a better debate about whether the court
audit procedure can serve as an effective control mechanism for lawyers
practicing in MDPs. In addition, state supreme courts have not, and probably
will not, have time to devote equivalent resources to these issues.
It is true that paragraph 14 of the Commission's Recommendation provides
some guidance to state courts. But the Commission has not suggested specific
methodologies or questions that a state supreme court could use when
conducting the audit. In short, I do not think it is fair for the Commission to
suggest an audit procedure but expect state courts to reinvent the wheel.
D. Clarify a Threshold Issue: Revise Recommendation _f I to Include
Competency as a Core Value
In addition to the policy disagreements described above, there were several
places where I thought the Commission's Recommendation was ambiguous. I
assumed that the Commission's failure to include competency as a core value
was an oversight and a drafting error, rather than a deliberate policy choice, as
the Commission later admitted. Loyalty, independence, and confidentiality are
important, among other reasons, because of their relationship to competency.30 5
As the consumer representatives and state bar ethics representatives advised the
Commission, competency is very important to clients. Therefore, any state
regulators relying on Recommendation paragraph 1 should revise it to explicitly
include competency as a core value.
E. Clarify a Form of Association Issue: Revise the Definition of an MDP in
Recommendation 1 3
Paragraph 3 of the Commission's Recommendation defined the term MDP.
As noted earlier, this definition limited MDPs to lawyer-nonlawyer partnerships
and fee-sharing arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers. 3°6 Paragraph 3
should be revised in order to expressly include law firms that hold themselves
out as affiliated with a nonlegal entity such as a Big Five firm.
When the Commission described the Model 4-contract model MDP, it
recognized that the law firm might have a contractual affiliation with a nonlegal
firm, but not purport to share fees.3°7 Under the current definition, these Model
4 MDP lawyers could argue that they are not covered by the Commission's
Report because: (1) they are not a member of an association of lawyers and
305. See supra note 199 and accompanying text for a discussion of three instrumental values-
confidentiality, loyalty, and independence-necessary to achieve client service. The Commission
confirmed in its December 1999 Updated Background Report and again in the March 2000 Draft
Recommendation that competency is a core value. See supra note 195.
306. See supra note 229 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited nature of the
definition of MDPs.
307. See supra note 188 and accompanying text for a hypothetical example of a law firm entering
into a contractual relationship with a professional services firm.
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nonlawyers, but instead are part of an all-lawyer firm; (2) their law firm does not
hold itself out to the public as providing nonlegal services; and (3) there is no
direct or indirect sharing of profits between their law firm and the affiliated firm,
such as a Big Five firm. Instead, there are things such as joint marketing
arrangements, cost-sharing agreements, and contracts to provide back room
services.
30
These three points are similar to the manner in which Commission
witnesses Gerard Nicolay and Neil Cochran described their law firms and is also
similar to the press release announcing the new firm McKee Nelson Ernst &
Young.3°9 I cannot imagine that the Commission intentionally excluded these
types of MDP lawyers from the ambit of its report nor do I think it wise to do so.
Especially where a law firm is practicing in physically contiguous space, it is
useful to have the lawyer subject to special rules that provide guidance on how to
apply the traditional ethics rules in this new setting. For these reasons, I
recommend that the definition of a MDP be revised to include law firms that
hold themselves out as having an affiliation with a nonlegal entity such as a Big
Five firm or include the name of nonlawyers within the name of the law firm.
F. Clarify a Form of Association Issue: Eliminate Any Ambiguity and Permit
Anyone to Join an MDP
Another ambiguity concerns the rules to determine the form of association
issue concerning who may join an MDP. 310 The Commission's definition of an
MDP in Recommendation paragraph 3 contains no limitation on who could join
an MDP. I initially assumed that anyone, including a tow truck driver, is
permitted to form an MDP with a lawyer provided the other requirements are
satisfied.
Appendix A, however, arguably was inconsistent with this conclusion and
the March 2000 Draft Recommendation clearly limits the acceptable MDP
partners.311 In my view, limiting the acceptable MDP partners is undesirable.
My reasoning includes the difficulty of drawing a line because of the fact that
"inappropriate" partners on the one hand may be subject to an ethics code and
included, whereas "appropriate" partners such as a Nobel-prize winning
308. I do not consider this reaction speculative. A lawyer practicing in a Model 4 MDP that is
affiliated with a Big Five firm has advised me that he isn't sure whether the terms of the ABA Report
covers his firm.
309. See supra notes 189 and accompanying text for discussion of witnesses' testimony describing.
Model 4.
310. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. Germany's rule,
for example, limits the individuals with whom a lawyer may join in an MDP although it includes
auditors. One of the Big Five representatives, for example, suggested that there are professions that
are compatible with the profession of a lawyer, and those that are incompatible, and that he knows
them when he sees them. See, e.g., Oral Remarks of Samuel DiPiazza (PricewaterhouseCoopers)
(Mar. 11, 1999). In contrast to these witnesses, I recommended that there be no limitations on the
individuals with whom a lawyer may join in an MDP. See Terry Appendix B-2 (Mar. 12, 1999), supra
note 4, at Forms of Association, Issue A (containing my recommendation).
311. See supra note 209 for a discussion of who may join an MDP.
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economist might not fit the definition. In short, I think the market rather than
regulators will be a better measure of the types of partnerships that can prove
beneficial to clients. And if the tow truck driver example gives one pause, I
think a better solution is to ask why (e.g. concerns about solicitation) and then
address those concerns directly. Consequently, I recommend that state
regulators revise the language of Comment 2 to Model Rule 5.8 of Appendix A
in order to avoid creating any confusion. Comment 2 states: "'MDP' is defined
in the Terminology section. Examples of professions that may appropriately be
included in MDPs are [an alphabetical list follows.]" 312  The word
"appropriately" is confusing and ambiguous. The inclusion of this word arguably
suggests a test of compatibility or appropriateness, independent of issues related
to the lawyer's ability to maintain the lawyer's core values. Therefore, in order
to avoid any confusion about the Recommendation, I suggest deletion of the
word "appropriately."
G. Clarify a Functional Ethics Issue: Make Recommendation f 5 Clearer About
When the Ethics Rules Apply to MDP Lawyers and Whether the Decision is
Based on the Lawyer's Status or the Particular Activity
With respect to functional ethics, the Commission decided that lawyers
practicing in an MDP should be subject to legal ethics rules. Paragraph 5 of the
Commission's Recommendation states: "A lawyer in an MDP who delivers legal
services to the MDP's clients should be bound by the rules of professional
conduct. '313 Paragraph 5 should be revised to make it clearer that whether the
legal ethics rules apply depends on the lawyer's status in the MDP and not the
particular activity in which the lawyer is engaged at the moment.
Every witness who addressed the issue agreed that if MDPs are permitted,
lawyers practicing in an MDP should be bound in some respects by legal ethics
and other rules governing lawyers; they disagreed, however, about when to apply
such rules.314 Some witnesses asserted that an MDP lawyer's use of the ethics
rules should be based on the lawyer's status within the MDP, i.e., whether the
lawyer is holding him or herself out to the public.315 Other witnesses asserted
that one must look at the particular activities provided to a specific client in
order to determine whether the legal ethics rules apply.
316
As currently written, neither the March 2000 Draft Recommendation nor
paragraph 5 of the June 1999 Recommendation resolves this controversy.
312. Appendix A, supra note 134, at Rule 5.8, cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
313. Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 5.
314. See generally Terry Appendices B1-B7 (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at Functional Analysis
of MDP Ethics & Discipline Issues, Item A (presenting views on whether MDP lawyers must obey
legal ethics rules).
315. See, e.g., Written Remarks of James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999);
Testimony of M. Peter Moser (ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility)
(Nov. 13, 1998).
316. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of John Dzienkowski (Professor, University of Texas School of
Law) (Feb. 5, 1999); Oral Testimony of Kathryn Oberly (Vice Chair and General Counsel, Ernst &
Young) (Feb. 4, 1999).
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Although I have assumed that the Commission intended to adopt the "status"
approach, paragraph 5 could be interpreted to mean "a lawyer who delivers legal
services [in this particular matter] to [these] MDP clients should be bound by the
rules of professional conduct."
Because I believe it is possible that someone could argue that the
Recommendation focuses on the lawyer's activity, rather than the lawyer's status,
and because I disagree with this approach, Recommendation paragraph 5 should
be revised in order to eliminate any chance of ambiguity. The addition of four
words would make this paragraph much clearer. Paragraph 5 could be revised to
say: "A lawyer whose function in an MDP is to deliver legal services to the MDP
clients should be bound by the rules of professional conduct." If and when a
Model Rule ultimately is drafted, the comment could discuss how a lawyer might
establish the fact that his or her function in the MDP is to provide something
other than legal services. Placement of the lawyer somewhere other than in a
"legal department" and not holding oneself out as a lawyer are two factors that
might be relevant.
Lawyers, regulators, clients, the public, and other professionals in an MDP
need a bright, simple line they can use to define when a lawyer must comply with
the legal profession's ethics and discipline system. An individual lawyer's status
as an actively licensed lawyer, absent clear caveats to the contrary, provides such
a line. There is obviously an overlap between this issue and the appropriate
MDP model, but a lawyer's disclosure about status must be clear, regardless of
the method in which the MDP is organized.
Obviously, this status approach has limitations because not everyone who
has taken a bar examination will forever practice law. There also are some
inconsistencies with the attorney-client privilege case law; not everything a
lawyer does is covered by the privilege. These problems are minor, however,
compared to the limitations of the activities approach.
Virtually every witness asked about the topic conceded that there was no
effective definition of activities that can be used to establish the exclusive areas
of practice for lawyers (i.e., there is no effective UPL definition). 317 Witness
William Freivogel of ALAS provided twelve examples of items that ALAS
defines as the practice of law for coverage purposes and noted that other carriers
used similar definitions; in response to a question, however, he conceded that the
list included many things that nonlawyers could do.318 In other words, the items
defined as the "practice of law" are not the exclusive province of lawyers.
Witness William Elliott's testimony concerning the fate of the State Bar of
Texas' UPL complaint against Arthur Andersen revealed the difficulty of
pursuing a UPL claim in today's environment.319 Witness James Jones perhaps
317. See generally Terry Appendices B1-B7 (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at Scope of Practice,
Item C (summarizing testimony at MDP public hearings).
31& See Testimony of William Freivogel (Attorney Liability Assurance Society) (Nov. 13, 1998).
319. Testimony of William Elliott (Kane, Russell, Coleman & Logan) (Nov. 13, 1998). Other
witnesses also spoke about the difficulty of defining the practice of law. See Testimony of Ward
Bower (Altman Weil) (Nov. 12, 1998); Testimony of Linda Galler (other than in-court appearances)
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said it best when he testified:
... [T]he definition of the "practice of law" is frustratingly illusive.
Indeed aside from a few obvious functions (like filing of pleadings in
court or the rendering of formal opinions), it is almost impossible to
define with precision what constitutes the practice of law in the United
States today, at least in any exclusive sense. While it is certainly
possible to list the hundreds of things that lawyers do, as bar counsel
and many courts have discovered, it is very difficult to come up with a
comprehensive list of many things that only lawyers can do. To cite
but a few examples: [contract negotiation, lobbying, tax and estate
planning are considered legal services when performed by a lawyer but
few would argue that nonlawyers cannot do this.]
Stated differently, the scope of the "legal monopoly" in the U.S.- i.e.,
those activities that only lawyers may engage in-is fairly narrow and
arguably getting narrower. Thus, any regulatory scheme that is
premised on a tightly drawn exclusive definition of lawyering is likely
to be either too narrow to be much good in a regulatory sense or too
broad to be enforceable. I would accordingly be very suspicious of any
regulatory approach to dealing with the MDP concept that depends for
its effectiveness on a precise definition of the "practice of law."
320
Based on this testimony, among other reasons, I concluded that if the
Commission or a state regulator uses a lawyer's activities or the term "practice of
law" to determine when legal ethics rules apply to lawyers within an MDP, we
may never emerge from the UPL quagmire. In contrast, an MDP lawyer's status
should prove to be a relatively easy line to apply. Therefore, I recommend that
if a regulator adopts a provision similar to Recommendation paragraph 5, it
specify that the legal ethics rules apply to a lawyer based on the lawyer's status
within the MDP, i.e., the manner in which the lawyer holds him or herself out to
the public.
Some commentators have criticized the Commission's Report insofar as it
subjects MDP lawyers to the legal ethics rules. They suggest that the
Commission's requirements are so onerous that lawyers practicing in an MDP
simply will "opt out" of the system and will choose to no longer hold themselves
out as lawyers.321 I was not convinced that this would occur. Because I believe
that many lawyers would like to be able to hold themselves out as lawyers
(Nov. 13, 1998); Oral Remarks of Lawrence M. Hill (White & Case) (Feb. 4, 1999); Testimony of M.
Peter Moser (ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility) (Nov. 13, 1998);
Testimony of Gerald Nicolay (PricewaterhouseCoopers) (Nov. 12, 1998); Testimony of Charles F.
Robinson (Law Offices of Charles F. Robinson) (Feb. 5, 1999); Samuel B. Sterett (Vinson & Elkins)
(Feb. 4, 1999); Oral Testimony of Stefan Tucker (Chair, ABA Section of Taxation) (Feb. 4, 1999);
Oral Testimony of James Turner (Executive Director, H.A.L.T.) (Feb. 5, 1999). But see Witness
Shely (Feb. 5, 1999), who referred the Commission to the ABA's UPL study and suggested it pick the
best of those definitions and Witness Foonberg (Feb. 6, 1999), whose report accompanying Resolution
105 lists activities lawyers engage in.
320. Written Remarks of James W. Jones (APCO Associates, Inc.) (Feb. 6, 1999).
321. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Bar's MDP Moves Risky, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 13, 1999, at
A29 (discussing problems MDPs pose in hiring lawyers in large accounting firms, which raises
professional conduct issues).
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practicing law within an MDP setting, and because I believe many MDPs would
like to be able to advertise "one-stop shopping," I recommend this approach. A
regulator may revisit this question if many MDP lawyers "opt out," thus creating
the problem of parallel worlds of regulated and nonregulated lawyers. Until that
happens, however, I would adopt a rule that requires an MDP lawyer, who holds
him or herself out as a lawyer, to abide by the legal ethics rules.
H. Clarify a Functional Ethics/Scope of Practice Issue: Delete the Reference to
the "Practice of Law" or Clarify That it Applies to "Holding Out"
One of the most controversial aspects of the Commission's work is the
Commission's various pronouncements about the practice of law. At least one-
quarter of the written responses to the Commission's Report criticized this
aspect.322 Even individuals and organizations that supported MDPs generally
rejected this aspect of the Commission's earlier work.323
The provisions that have provoked this controversy are paragraphs 4 and 11
of the Recommendation, together with the definition in the terminology section
of Appendix A. Paragraph 4 states: "Nonlawyers in an MDP, or otherwise,
should not be permitted to deliver legal services." 324 Paragraph 11 states:
A lawyer in an MDP should not represent to the public generally or to
a specific client that services the lawyer provides are not legal services
if those same services would constitute the practice of law if provided
by a lawyer in a law firm. Such a representation would presumptively
constitute a material misrepresentation of fact.
325
The proposed amendments to the terminology section included adding a
definition of the "practice of law," including a presumption that one is practicing
law if engaged in any of the activities identified in six subsections.326 This
definition potentially could be used when interpreting Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized
Practice of Law) and perhaps even in a criminal UPL case.
Not surprisingly then, some commentators have concluded that the
Commission's work product could serve to increase the lawyer's monopoly and
decrease the choices available to consumers. Criticism has come from entities as
diverse as James Schaller (the former chair of the D.C. Court of Appeals
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law and chair of the ad hoc
committee that drafted the definition that was the basis for the Commission's
definition); 327 the Ethics 2000 Commission reporters;328 Louise Trubek (Senior
322. See supra note 228 for identification of those written replies that criticized the Commission's
inclusion of a practice of law definition.
323. See, e.g., Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Consumer Representatives, The
Consumer Alliance; Reply of American Antitrust Institute; ACCA Fears ABA Plan May Kill MDPs
(visited July 7, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.comlpublic/news/hotnews/news9906/news990625.4.html>
(discussing that imposition of ethical rules on MDPs will have adverse effects).
324. Recommendation, supra note 193, 4.
325. Id. at 1 11.
326. See Appendix A, supra note 134, at 1 (presenting definition of "practice of law" for
Commission's proposed changes to Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
327. See Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of James P. Schaller, Esq.
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Attorney, Center for Public Representation, and Professor of Law, University of
Wisconsin-Madison); 329 six individuals who wrote on behalf of the consumer
advocacy community;330 the American Antitrust Institute, 331 and the American
Corporate Counsel Association332 (the last three previously endorsed the
concept of MDPs).
Much of this criticism is justified. If read in isolation, paragraph 4 is
acceptable because it could be read simply as a factual statement that the
Commission has not recommended any changes to the current criminal
unauthorized practice of law provisions to permit nonlawyer practice; indeed the
March 2000 Draft Recommendation stops here.
333
Paragraph 11, however, is more problematic. At first blush, one might
conclude that it is simply an effort to ensure that MDP lawyers accurately
describe their function in the MDP. In reality, however, paragraph 11 does
much more. Paragraph 11 responds to MDP lawyers who might "opt out" of the
new regulatory system by continuing to claim that they are not engaged in the
practice of law.334 Paragraph 11 attempts to bring these MDP lawyers into the
328. See Working Draft-For Use by Ethics 2000 Commission Only, The Report of the Commission
on Multidisciplinary Practice (for Discussion at August 1999 [Ethics 2000] Commission meeting),
"Initial Reactions to the [MDP Commission] Report" (July 19, 1999), 6 at 4-5 [hereinafter Working
Draft-Ethics 2000] (on file with author) (stating that proposal to define "practice of law" is
"questionable").
329. See Written Replies to Commission, Reply of Louise Trubek (Senior Attorney, Center for
Public Representation and Professor of University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School).
330. See Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Consumer Representatives, The
Consumer Alliance.
331. See Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of American Antitrust Institute.
332. See ACCA Fears ABA Plan May Kill MDPs (visited July 7, 1999) <http://www.lawmoney.
com/public/news/hotnews/news9906/news990625.4.html> (discussing debate of how to implement
MDPs).
333. In my view, the Commission was worried that lawyers might perceive their work as
authorizing the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers. Therefore, the Commission on several
different occasions took the opportunity to stress that it was not changing the rules about nonlawyer
UPL. See, e.g., Recommendation, supra note 193, 4 ("Nonlawyers in an MDP, or otherwise, should
not be permitted to deliver legal services."); see also Report, supra note 191, at 2. The Report states:
To ensure that those values are preserved the Commission has specifically proposed that a
lawyer in an MDP who delivers legal services to the MDP's clients is bound by the rules of
professional conduct and all the rules of professional conduct that apply to a law firm also
apply to an MDP. It should be stressed that the Commission is not recommending that
nonlawyers be permitted to deliver legal services.
Id. This concern may have lead to overcompensation and the problems caused by including a
definition of the practice of law. Although the definition of a practice of law was not carried over to
the Commission's March 2000 Draft Recommendation, the concern about nonlawyers practicing law
apparently was. There are only four paragraphs in the Draft Recommendation but one of them
includes the statement that "[t]his Recommendation does not alter the prohibition on nonlawyers
delivering legal services and the obligations of all lawyers to observe the rules of professional
conduct." See Draft Recommendation, supra note 158, 4.
334. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the MDP phenomenon in
which lawyers work outside the setting of a traditional law firm, but are engaged in activities that if
done by lawyers in a law firm would be treated as the practice of law.
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"tent of regulation," to use one of the phrases from the Commission hearings. It
does so by defining the conduct that will subject these MDP lawyers to legal
ethics.
This is a mistake. In my view, any effort to define the practice of law is ill-
fated from the start and inevitably will lead to problems.335 Nor did I consider
such a definition necessary at this time. Although there are some risks and
difficulties inherent in omitting a definition of the practice of law, the resulting
problems are less severe than the issues that occur when one tries to define the
practice of law.
Therefore, my recommendation is that the Commission delete the
definition of the practice of law in the terminology section and revise
Recommendation paragraph 11 to state:
A lawyer in an MDP who represents to the public generally or to a
specific client that the lawyer is a practicing lawyer or that the lawyer is
providing legal services must be registered with the appropriate
authorities and must comply with the appropriate Rules of Professional
Conduct and other regulations governing the practice of law. The
lawyer must ensure that the MDP does not misrepresent the lawyer's
status or function in the firm or convey that the lawyer is practicing law
when the lawyer is not.
As this revision demonstrates, paragraph 11 should only address the situation of
misrepresentation, in which MDP lawyers or the MDP itself, falsely holds the
individual out as a licensed, practicing lawyer, when the lawyer is not.
This "misrepresentation" approach does not address the situation of
lawyers who "opt out" of the system, but it need not. Several MDP lawyers
testified that they would like to be able to hold themselves out as lawyers.
Moreover, if the MDPs truly want to offer one-stop shopping, they will have to
acknowledge the presence of lawyers who deliver legal services; this will bring
these lawyers within the "tent of regulation." In short, in the absence of
evidence that the "opt out" problem is real and significant, I would avoid the
inherent problems that arise when one attempts to define the practice of law in
an exclusive sense.
336
335. See Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at 12-13 (observing
difficulties caused by attempting to define practice of law); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 5.5:103 (2d ed. 1998) ("Defining the outer limits of the 'practice of law' is
practically impossible. In our law-dominated society, almost every significant financial decision has at
least some legal element to it, and legal elements predominate in many other common transactions.");
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 138, § 4, cmt. c ("The
definitions and tests employed by courts to delineate unauthorized practice by non-lawyers have been
vague or conclusory, while jurisdictions have differed significantly in describing what constitutes
unauthorized practice in particular areas.").
336. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text, which explained that it is very easy to
describe what lawyers do in an inclusive sense. For example, this is what is done on a malpractice
insurance policy. It is extremely difficult, however, to describe the practice of law in an exclusive
sense, meaning that nonlawyers (or nonpracticing lawyers) could be subject to criminal penalties for
engaging in these activities.
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I. Clarify a Functional Ethics Issue: Revise the "Signature" Requirement in
Recommendation 114 so That it is Suitable for Main Street MDPs as well as
Wall Street MDPs
Throughout the hearings, the Commission members repeatedly stated that
they were particularly interested in hearing about the risks and benefits of MDPs
to smaller, consumer-oriented clients. Elder care and family care MDPs were
cited as examples of MDPs that might benefit Main Street clients and lawyers.
Because the signature language in Recommendation paragraph 14 may
discourage these Main Street MDPs, I would revise the following language:
As a condition of permitting a lawyer to engage in the practice of law
in an MDP not controlled by lawyers, the MDP should be required to
give to the highest court with the authority to regulate the legal
profession in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the
delivery of legal services (the "court"), a written undertaking, signed
by the chief executive officer (or similar official) and the board of
directors (or similar body), that. ... 337
Paragraph 14 will apply to those Main Street MDPs that lack a lawyer majority.
One example mentioned during the hearings was an MDP consisting of a lawyer
In my July 1999 response to the Commission's Report, I asserted that it was possible to interpret
Paragraph 11 as an effort to provide an inclusive definition of the practice of law. I offered the
following explanation:
If the Commission insists on including a definition of the practice of law, then the
Commission should clarify that this definition be used "inclusively" but not exclusively. This
inclusive definition would tell lawyers practicing in an MDP the contexts in which the Model
Rules would apply to them. [Paragraph] 11, combined with a definition of the "practice of
law" is one way to achieve this.... (This "inclusive" approach could be analogized to the
definitions of covered activities that are used in malpractice insurance policies.)
On the other hand, I believe that it is a major mistake for the Commission (or the ABA) to
attempt to define the practice of law in an "exclusive" sense, which is intended to limit the
activities of nonlawyers. The Commission heard significant testimony about the difficulty of
devising such an exclusive definition (not to mention the antitrust concerns). The
Commission has enough difficult issues to face and resolve without trying to address or solve
the UPL issue.
Consequently, the Commission's Recommendation would be much better if paragraph 4
were deleted. [If this solution is rejected, then] at a minimum, I would hope that clarifying
language would be added so that it is clear that any definition of the "practice of law" is
intended to be [inclusive] only, in order to explain to MDP lawyers when the Model Rules
apply to them. This definition [should not exclude lawyers or nonlawyers] from certain
activities nor would it be used when interpreting Rule 5.5.
Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Laurel S. Terry (Professor, Penn State Dickinson School
of Law) (July 1999). Upon further reflection, I reaffirm my conclusion to delete or amend paragraph
11, but have revised my analysis. I now believe that paragraph 11 attempts to define the practice of
law in an exclusive sense. It defines certain activities that only licensed practicing lawyers may
perform. It prohibits MDP lawyers from engaging in these activities if these lawyers assert that they
are not engaged in the practice of law. In other words, Paragraph 11 is simply a UPL provision
directed toward MDP lawyers. For the reasons described in the text and in the prior section of this
article, I conclude that this effort to define the practice of law in an exclusive sense is doomed to
failure.
337. Recommendation, supra note 193, 114 (emphasis added).
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specializing in elder law, a financial planner, and others.
338
Despite the application of paragraph 14 to the three-person MDP, this
language does not lend itself particularly well to this setting. This choice of
language suggests a lack of interest in Main Street MDPs that does not reflect
the Commission's hearings generally.339 For this reason, paragraph 14's language
should be revised so that it clearly signals the applicability of regulation to Main
Street clients and lawyers.
J. Clarify a Substantive Ethics Issue: Revise Recommendation [ 8 to be More
Precise With Respect to MDP-Wide Imputation
Not surprisingly, one of the most controversial of the Commission's
conclusions was Recommendation paragraph 8, which sets forth the scope of
imputation within an MDP; this issue was omitted from the March 2000 Draft
Recommendation.34° Paragraph 8 states, "all clients of an MDP should be
treated as the lawyer's clients for purposes of conflicts of interest and imputation
in the same manner as if the MDP were a law firm and all employees, partners,
shareholders or the like were lawyers." 341 The Commission thus concluded that
338. See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Charles F. Robinson (Law Offices of Charles F. Robinson)
(Feb. 5, 1999). When Mr. Robinson was asked what kind of law firm he might like to have, he
answered his:
[WIould still be a large solo law firm but he would want a multidisciplinary virtual team (i.e.,
CPA, financial planner) to deal with client elder law issues and present one bill. If he
decided to build a firm it would be multidisciplinary and include accounting and also likely
financial management. He would also consider folding his practice into a CPA firm and, as a
partner, building its elder care assurance area.
ld.; see also Testimony of Theodore Debro (Board Chairman, Consumers for Affordable and Reliable
Services of Alabama) (Feb. 12, 2000) (providing additional examples and contrasting the inability of
the private sector to provide MDPs although the public sector currently does so); Written Remarks of
Lora H. Weber (Consumers Alliance of the Southeast) (Mar. 11, 1999) (expressing view that
consumers would very much like MDPs, and giving examples of having MDPs to provide house
renovation or purchases, small business owners, and by combining tax preparers and lawyers, one-half
of population without a will might get one).
339. See generally Reporter's Notes, supra note 58, at 7 (discussing Main Street MDPs).
340. See Draft Recommendation, supra note 158 (omitting imputation issue). The witnesses
before the Commission both endorsed and rejected the principle of MDP-wide imputation. For
examples of witnesses rejecting the Commission's MDP-wide imputation stance, see Written Replies
to Commission, Reply of American Antitrust Institute, and Written Replies to Commission, Reply of
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). For examples of witnesses endorsing
MDP-wide imputation, see Written Replies to Commission, Reply of The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York.
The Ethics 2000 Commission reporters also were skeptical of the ABA Commission's MDP-wide
imputation rule:
There seems no doubt that accountants should not have less constraints than lawyers, i.e.,
they should not be immune from imputation or permitted to screen when lawyers are treated
otherwise. However, saying that every audit client is automatically treated as if it were a law
client seems to be a stretch. We will want to come back to this when we get to Rule 1.10
again.
Working Draft-Ethics 2000, supra note 328, 5, at 4.
341. Recommendation, supra note 193, 1 8.
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conflicts of interest imputation should be applied to the entire MDP firm, rather
than just the lawyers working within the firm.342
Some Commission critics assert that the Commission has tried to impose
lawyers' ethical rules, as a general matter, on nonlawyers. 343 The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, for example, adopted the following
resolution:
The AICPA further objects, as clearly inappropriate and overreaching,
to the Commission's proposal to unilaterally impose the legal rules of
conduct on accounting firms that include lawyers. This in turn has the
potential to subject any accounting firm that employs an individual
licensed as a lawyer to the rules of the legal profession including the
legal profession's rules concerning conflicts of interest and solicitation
of clients, for all firm engagements. This would create conflict
situations in the same circumstances where none existed before.
344
Such statements arguably misconstrue the Commission's work.
Recommendation paragraph 8 clearly states that the imputation rule applies only
in connection with the delivery of legal services. Consequently, this imputation
rule does not make nonlawyers generally subject to the legal ethics rules; these
rules apply to nonlawyers only in connection with the provision of legal services
by the MDP.
Although I endorse an MDP-wide substantive ethics imputation rule,345 the
clarity of the imputation rule is even more important than its substance. 346
342. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text describing as a functional ethics issue,
regulation of an MDP nonlawyer. The Commission's substantive ethics imputation rule results in the
functional ethics "middle-ground" approach to MDP nonlawyer regulation. In other words, the
consequence of the Commission's imputation rule is that nonlawyers are not generally subject to the
legal ethics rules, but must comply with the legal ethics rules if a legal services client is involved.
343. See, e.g., Written Replies to Commission, Reply of American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA); Reply of The National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public
Accountants; Reply of American Antitrust Institute. In my view, all of these entities came quite close
to making this point.
344. Written Replies to Commission, Reply of American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA).
345. My endorsement is clear for the fully-integrated Model 5 MDP. I am less sure how to
handle Model 4 MDPs.
346. See Written Remarks of Laurel S. Terry (Mar. 12, 1999), supra note 4, at 15-16; Written
Replies to the Commission, Reply by Laurel S. Terry at 10-11 (observing Recommendation paragraph
8 should be revised to be more precise). I find the imputation question for Model 4 MDPs much more
problematic than for Model 5 MDPs. I still have not resolved how I think imputation should be
handled in this context. As noted in the conclusion, I would benefit by the opportunity to discuss and
debate these types of details. On the one hand, if a law firm is completely comprised of lawyers and
has only a contractual relationship with nonlawyers, one can see the argument in favor of not imputing
conflicts to the entire MDP firm. On the other hand, the "seamlessness" described by various
Commission witnesses, along with the physical proximity that is possible in a Model 4 context, suggest
that an MDP-wide imputation rule would also be appropriate in the Model 4 context. In addition, I
am troubled by the notion of Model 4 MDPs which advertise their affiliation, getting the benefit of the
public's perception of the network, but who are not subject to the same imputation rules as traditional
law firms that advertise their networks. In short, I would welcome the opportunity for further
extended discussion of this issue.
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Because Recommendation paragraph 8 creates two different kinds of
ambiguities, it should be revised.
Currently, paragraph 8 states:
In connection with the delivery of legal services, all clients of an MDP
should be treated as the lawyer's clients for purposes of conflicts of
interest and imputation in the same manner as if the MDP were a law
firm and all employees, partners, shareholders or the like were
lawyers.
347
This paragraph would be clearer if a period were placed after the words "as if the
MDP were a law firm." The deleted language serves only to confuse the issue,
given that the current ethics law does not treat all employees of a law firm as if
they were lawyers.348 This last portion of this sentence is thus over-inconclusive
and simply provides room for confusion.
The second ambiguity in paragraph 8 is much more subtle. Paragraph 8 is
written in the passive voice and, therefore, focuses on the object of the sentence,
the clients. In my view, drafting the sentence in the passive, rather than the
active, voice creates ambiguities.
Two different types of situations can raise imputation issues. In the first
situation, an MDP nonlawyer might provide nonlegal services to Client 1 and
subsequently an MDP lawyer might be asked to provide legal services to Client 2
(who might be Client l's adversary or competitor.) 349 In the second situation,
the MDP legal services to Client 1 come first, followed by the requested MDP
nonlegal services for Client 2.350
In each of these two situations, the second professional must decide: (1)
whether to accept Client 2; (2) whether to consider his or her colleague's
representation of Client 1 when making that decision; and (3) whether legal
ethics principles govern the decision to accept Client 2. In the first situation, the
lawyer is the professional who must decide whether to accept Client 2. In the
second situation, the nonlawyer is the professional who must decide whether to
accept Client 2.
Because paragraph 8 is written in the passive voice, it does not specify
whether the Commission's imputation rule applies to lawyers, nonlawyers, or
both. This failure to specify the professionals to whom paragraph 8 applies
creates ambiguity and should be changed. 351
347. Recommendation, supra note 193, 8.
348. See, e.g., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 23, at 169-70 (summarizing cases on
imputation due to nonlawyer employees, many of which permit screening of conflicts involving
paralegals, summer associates, and secretaries); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.10 (1999) (providing rule where screening is generally not permitted). As the Annotated
Model Rules show, in a disqualification context, courts recognize screening more than Rule 1.10 does.
349. See, e.g., Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 187, at Hypothetical 4.1 (describing situation
in which MDP nonlawyers reviewed books of husband's business and thereafter MDP lawyers were
asked to represent wife against husband in her divorce).
350. Id. at Hypothetical 5.2 (presenting situation where MDP lawyers represent Client 1 who
seeks license; thereafter Client 2 seeks to hire MDP nonlawyers in effort to obtain same license).
351. One might argue that paragraph 10 covers the second situation in which a nonlawyer is
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Substantively, I recommend that the Commission revise the rule so that it
applies to both situations described above. I assume that situation two is the
more controversial. The following hypothetical provides the basis for my
recommendation.
352
Imagine that Prince Jefri (Client 1) is a law client and that MDP lawyers
represented Prince Jefri's company in connection with something called the
Project Lucy litigation. After that litigation concluded, the Brunei Investment
Agency (Client 2) asks forensic accountants from the same MDP to investigate a
misappropriation charge against Prince Jefri. Imagine that the investigation of
the misappropriation charge will be substantially related in many respects to the
Project Lucy litigation.
Absent client consent, should the legal ethics rules prevent the MDP
nonlawyer from subsequently opposing an MDP legal client if the matters are
substantially related? This question raises the issue of whether the lawyers'
conflict should be imputed to the nonlawyers, in order to protect the lawyer's
core value of confidentiality. I would extend imputation to this fact pattern.
Unless lawyer confidentiality assumptions are radically changed, Prince Jefri can
assume that his confidential information was shared within the MDP. Because
of this fact and the duty of the MDP lawyers to protect Prince Jefri's confidential
information after the representation is over, I would extend imputation.
Without imputation, Prince Jefri never learns of the adverse representation and
never has a chance to object.
Moreover, although the MDP debate currently is driven by the actions of
the Big Five, if MDPs are permitted, numerous small Main Street MDPs may
take advantage of the rule change. I consider MDP-wide imputation particularly
important in the small MDP context because the likelihood is even greater that
information will be shared among the different MDP professionals.
Many critics have challenged the MDP-wide imputation rule, arguing that it
asked to represent Client 2. See Recommendation, supra note 193, which states:
A lawyer in an MDP who delivers legal services to a client of the MDP and who works with,
or is assisted by, a nonlawyer who is delivering nonlegal services in connection with the
delivery of legal services to the client should be required to make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the MDP has in effect measures to ensure that the nonlawyer's conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.
Id. 1 10. Paragraph 10 does not, however, require nonlawyers as a general matter to comply with legal
ethics when deciding whether to accept Client 2 because it only applies to some of the MDP's
nonlawyers, namely those working in connection with the delivery of legal services.
352. This hypothetical is based on a variation of the facts of Brunei Investment Agency's
("BIA") investigation of Prince Jefri, its former chairman. See Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. KPMG, 2
W.L.R. 215, 218-22 (H.L.(E.) 1999) (presenting facts of case concerning Prince Jefri's relationship with
BIA). In that case, the English House of Lords reversed an appellate court decision that had
permitted KMPG forensic accountants to represent the BIA in investigation against Prince Jefri where
KPMG accountants previously had represented the Prince's company. Id. at 229 (reversing lower
court's dissolution of injunction because "not satisfied on the evidence that KPMG... discharged the
heavy burden of showing that there is no risk that information" confidential to Prince Jefri and from
client relationship with him is disclosed to BIA). The court determined that KPMG's Chinese Wall
did not justify the representation. Id. at 228 (finding steps taken by KPMG were not enough because
"established ad hoc and were created within a single department").
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is unfair and unworkable. I believe the proper forum for these arguments is the
Ethics 2000 Commission. And if these critics are correct that the proposed rules,
taken together, are unworkable, then I would prefer to amend the
nonconsentable conflicts rule in an MDP context, rather than narrow the scope
of imputation. Particularly if the scope of nonconsentable conflicts were
narrowed, the major impact of an MDP-wide imputation rule is to require
disclosure and consent. 353 I favor more rather than less disclosure. Greater
disclosure is better achieved through a broad imputation rule.
In summary, the Commission reached the correct conclusion when it
recommended that Rule 5.4's MDP ban be eliminated and provided a useful
start in analyzing how MDPs should be regulated; significant progress must now
be accomplished to flesh out the Commission's recommendations, clarify
ambiguities, and reconsider key policy decisions.
CONCLUSION: THE POST-REPORT SHAKEOUT
Very few people have expressed satisfaction with the Commission's Report,
which may explain why the Commission recently abandoned its efforts to
determine how MDPs should be regulated and instead focused on whether they
should be permitted. The critiques of the Commission's original approach varied
widely from those who thought it is too permissive to those who thought it too
restrictive. Accordingly, the Commission may feel that it has been engaged in a
thankless task.
The alternative perspective, which I endorse, is that the Commission's work
has been a resounding success. The topic of MDPs appears on almost a daily
basis in the legal and popular press throughout the country. State regulators are
trying to get beyond mere rhetoric and to learn about the issues in a thoughtful
manner.354 Even some of the Commission's most vocal critics concede that the
Commission asked the right questions and focused on the right issues, although
they do not like the Commission's answers. Critics such as Larry Fox and
Professor Bernard Wolfman, for example, have commended the Commission for
its acknowledgment of the lawyer's core values of confidentiality, loyalty, and
independence. The Ethics 2000 Commission reporters noted: "The MDP
Commission should be congratulated for taking a serious, independent look at
an issue on which knee-jerk reactions are very easy. The report correctly keeps
353. I realize that clients sometimes withhold consent inappropriately in order to hurt an
adversary. Absent empirical evidence to the contrary, however, I do not believe that this represents
the majority of cases in which clients would withhold consent.
354. For example, I was invited to participate on a panel that addressed the Pennsylvania
Disciplinary Board, which is the body that makes rule change recommendations to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. The Board allocated four hours for discussion and appeared ready to continue the
discussion even beyond the allotted time. I considered the session to be a thoughtful exchange of
ideas; the lengthy time and dialogue created an atmosphere that seemed to go beyond mere rhetoric.
The Commission's webpage suggests that other regulatory bodies are engaged in similar efforts.
See Meetings and Programs Where Commission Representatives Have Appeared (last modified Dec. 15,
1999) (visited Dec. 8, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpmtgs.html> (listing dates of various
programs and meetings which Commission representatives have attended).
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its focus on client needs rather than lawyer preferences for the status quo."355
Moreover, through the Commission's hearing process, the debate has
become much more focused, and there are now issues on which a consensus has
emerged.
356
At this time, the key points of disagreement include the issue of where to
assign the burden of proof; whether the threats posed by an MDP are sufficiently
distinguishable from other threats so as to justify a paternalistic rule prohibiting
MDPs; whether it is possible to stop alleged UPL by MDP lawyers; whether
MDPs themselves and MDP lawyers could be trusted to follow a new regulatory
scheme; and the efficacy of any enforcement mechanism. This disagreement has
crystalized into a debate about whether to have MDPs and if so, whether to limit
them to lawyer-controlled MDPs.
The best summary of the competing paradigms for the MDP debate may be
the simplest. On the one hand, there are those who say "If it ain't broke, don't
fix it." ' 35 7 On the other hand, there are those who say that "the train has left the
station," so the time to regulate MDPs is now or never.358 Although this Article
appears in an academic journal, as time has progressed, the primary basis for my
recommendations has become pragmatic rather than theoretical. I choose to
regulate MDPs because I see no viable alternative. Ignoring MDPs creates
serious problems and stopping them is not viable given the difficulty of defining
the practice of law. I prefer the Commission's earlier Recommendation because
I believe regulators will have to confront the mechanics of how to regulate
MDPs. Thus, although the Commission has backed away from its earlier
proposal, I predict that it will be consulted frequently by those considering the
MDP issue.
Accordingly, while I commend this Symposium, I hope the next Phyllis
355. Working Draft- Ethics 2000, supra note 328.
356. See supra Part VI.A for a discussion of points on which the testimony before the
Commission revealed a consensus.
357. See Written Replies to the Commission, Reply of Stuart P. Werling, Esq. ("As for me, I am
proud to be a lawyer and very proud of our rich heritage of independence and loyalty to our client.
The American Bar produces most of the world's very best lawyers. It ain't broke. Don't fix it.")
358. See Oral Testimony of Stefan Tucker (Chair, ABA Section of Taxation) (Feb. 4, 1999)
("The Section considers that a rapid response from the ABA is absolutely necessary. As the train has
left the station and headed down the track, the Section urges that the Bar's response be focused on the
direction and configuration of the tracks ahead."); see also Written Comments Not Presented at
Hearings, Comment of Ethics 2000 Liaison Committee, Los Angeles County Bar Association. The
committee wrote:
First, we believe that market forces and demand, competitive business considerations and
the drive towards greater efficiency, and the globalization of the economy mean the question
is not if there will be MDP's, but rather, when, what their structure will be and how they will
be regulated. That process has already started. It is more advanced in European countries,
but it is happening in the United States as well. The legal profession can either be an active
participant in that dialogue, providing valuable input, or be a bystander, watching the form,
structure and regulation of MDP be designed by others. We believe a proactive stance is
best for all concerned.
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Beck Chair in Law Symposium will host a conference that focuses not on
whether to permit MDPs, but how they should be regulated. The task is a
monumental one. It is, and was, unreasonable to expect the Commission to get
all the details correct given the necessity to first decide whether to permit MDPs.




AN "ISSUE CHECKLIST" FOR THE ABA COMMISSION
ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE (CMDP)
APPENDIX A TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROFESSOR
LAUREL S. TERRY, PENN STATE DICKINSON SCHOOL
OF LAW*
I. THRESHOLD ISSUES THE CMDP SHOULD CONSIDER WHEN
DECIDING WHETHER TO RECOMMEND A REVISION TO MRPC
5.4:
A. WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD THE CMDP USE WHEN
DECIDING WHETHER TO RECOMMEND RETAINING MRPC






3. Protecting lawyers' "turf";
4. Defining the "public interest" more specifically, e.g., to include:
a. Preserving the "rule of law" (e.g., from the IBA policy
statement);
b. Preserving the independence of the lawyer;
c. Bringing lawyers "into the tent" so that they participate in, and
* Copyright © 1999 Prof. Laurel S. Terry, Penn State Dickinson School of Law. Permission to
reproduce is granted provided the following notice is included: © Prof. Laurel S. Terry, Penn State
Dickinson School of Law, Reprinted with Permission of the author, LTerry@psu.edu.".
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are subject to, the lawyer regulatory system;
d. Preserving the number of law firms available in order to
maximize client choice (see Consultation Report of the Law
Society of England and Wales, at p. 19; prior CCBE policy);
e. Providing freedom of choice for both lawyer and client (id.);
f. Preventing harm to the public from nonlawyer practice;
g. Keeping lawyers competitive and/or relevant to clients; and/or
h. Efficient delivery of legal services (which might include cost &
ease of administration).
5. Deregulating the provision of legal services and letting clients and
the market decide how much "ethics," such as confidentiality and
conflicts, are important to them
B. WHAT ARE THE CORE VALUES OF LAWYERS THAT MUST
BE PROTECTED IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THE
REGULATORY AIMS IDENTIFIED IN QUESTION A, ABOVE?
Recommended Answer:
1. Competence;
2. Independent legal judgment;
3. Confidentiality;
4. Loyalty (as ensured through conflicts of interest rules)
Alternatives:
5. Lawyer's role as collaborator of justice (similarly, preserving the
lawyer's role in ensuring the rule of law);
6. Honesty & integrity;
7. Service to the client, including pro bono publico obligations;
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8. The standing and independence of the profession as a whole (Law
Society Report, at p. 19);
9. Stopping the unauthorized practice of law;
10. Lawyer self-governance;
11. Protecting the attorney-client privilege
C. SHOULD THE CMDP's RECOMMENDATIONS APPLY
EQUALLY TO LARGE "WALL STREET" FIRMS AND
SMALLER "MAIN STREET"-TYPE FIRMS? AND IS THE ISSUE
RELEVANT TO BOTH?
Recommended Answer:
1. Yes; there should be the same rules, and the issue is relevant to both
Main Street and Wall Street lawyers and clients.
Alternatives:
2. Yes; there should be the same rules, which are relevant to both; but
perhaps there should be different interpretations of the rules when
applied to different fact patterns. For example, more disclosure
might be required with respect to unsophisticated clients.
3. No; have different rules for Wall Street and Main Street lawyers
(e.g., permit only small MDPs).
D. WHERE DOES THE "BURDEN OF PROOF" LIE? I.E., SHOULD
THE CMDP RECOMMEND REVISING MRPC 5.4 UNLESS THE
CMDP IS CONVINCED THE STANDARDS IN SECTION A,
ABOVE (E.G., CLIENT PROTECTION/PUBLIC INTEREST)
WILL BE INJURED? OR SHOULD THE CMDP RECOMMEND
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO UNLESS IT IS CONVINCED
THAT THESE VALUES WILL NOT BE INJURED?
Recommended Answer:
1. Those seeking the status quo have the "burden of proof': Since
MRPC restricts both lawyer and client autonomy and choice and
since all lawyer regulation should be justifiable, the CMDP should
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recommend retaining the current version of MRPC 5.4 only if it is
convinced that the regulatory interests set forth in §A above require
the current rule.
Alternative:
2. Those seeking to change the rule have the "burden of proof': Before
it recommends any change in the status quo, the CMDP should be
convinced that the core values of the legal profession will not be
harmed and that the regulatory aims can be protected should MRPC
5.4 be revised and MDPs permitted.
E. WHICHEVER SIDE HAS THE BURDEN, HOW MUCH
"EVIDENCE" IS NEEDED BEFORE THE CMDP RECOMMENDS
RETAINING (REVISING) MRPC 5.4?
Recommended Answer:
1. Something akin to clear and convincing evidence
Alternatives:
2. Something akin to a preponderance of the evidence standard;
3. Something akin to a beyond a reasonable doubt standard
F. IS THERE CURRENTLY A CLIENT NEED OR DEMAND FOR
MDPS AND WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS
QUESTION?
Recommended Answer:
1. Yes; there is at least some client demand and perceived need for
MDPs, as demonstrated by the direct testimony of Witnesses
Elizabeth Wall and Steven Bennett, who presented the views of
corporate counsel "clients," and the indirect testimony of Witnesses
Lynda Shely (State Bar of Arizona) and Abbie Willard (Assistant
Dean of Career Services, Georgetown University Law School),
among others. Given at least some client demand and perceived
need for MDPs, the question of the degree of client need or demand
for MDPs is irrelevant. The CMDP must face the issue of whether
the current MRPC 5.4 is a justifiable restriction upon the autonomy
1999]
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and choices available to at least some clients and lawyers.
Alternatives:
2. Yes; not only is there client need and demand for these services, but
if lawyers do not begin to offer MDP services, they risk having
nothing of value to offer clients because of clients' changing needs
and demands.
3. No; the perceived demand is really "smoke & mirrors" and other
service-providers exist.
4. No; the perceived "client" demand" for MDPs is in fact being driven
by the MDP "supply" and in the absence of significant demand, the
CMDP should not change rules that historically have worked quite
well.
5. Irrelevant; lawyers must decide what rules are appropriate and client
demand should not control the analysis.
G. DO U.S. LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS WHO PRACTICE IN
AN MDP APPEAR TO BE OFFERING WHAT WOULD BE
CALLED "LEGAL SERVICES" IF OFFERED IN A
TRADITIONAL U.S. LAW FIRM?
Recommended Answer:
1. Yes; substantial testimony showed that lawyers and nonlawyers in
MDPs were offering services that would be called legal services if
provided by lawyers in an traditional law firm (see, e.g., Witnesses
Holden, Powell, Bower, Moser, Galler, Fox, Dzienkowski, Jones).
Alternatives:
2. No; lawyers in MDPs are not offering what would be called "legal
services" if offered in a traditional law firm.
3. No; nonlawyers in MDPs are not offering what would be called
"legal services" if offered in a traditional law firm.
H. HAS THE CMDP HEARD TESTIMONY OF ANY ACTUAL
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY AN MDP?
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Recommended Answer:
1. Yes; Witness Elizabeth Wall, who has been an MDP client, testified
concerning legal services being provided without disclosure that
they were part of the "bundled" product; about information being
disclosed by one MDP consulting branch to the MDP legal branch,
despite being requested not to; and about MDP lawyers' failure to
disclose their status during meetings. Witness Karen Petrillo
testified, as a lawyer observer, about incompetent work performed
by nonlawyers in MDPs. Witness Hellwig referred to conflicts
problems and Witness Fox cited reports of MDPs using the audit
power to steer clients.
Alternative:
2. No.
I. THE ULTIMATE QUESTION: SHOULD MRPC 5.4 BE
AMENDED TO PERMIT MDPS IN SOME FASHION?
Recommended Answer:
1. Yes; see Terry Testimony for explanation.
Alternatives:
2. No.
3. Reformulate the Question:
a. Is the current MDP ban in MRPC 5.4 necessary in order to
protect lawyers' core values and to advance legitimate regulatory
aims?
b. Has there been convincing evidence of a sufficient need or reason
to change the current ban and a showing that lawyer core values
can be protected in an MDP environment?
c. Should the CMDP know what it would answer to the




d. Will the failure to allow MDPs mean that lawyers will be driven
out of the market because they are not adapting and offering the
services that clients need or want?
II. IF THE CMDP RECOMMENDS REVISING MRPC 5.4, HOW SHOULD
THE "FUNCTIONAL" ISSUES REGARDING ACCEPTABLE MDP
"FORMS OF ASSOCIATION" BE ANSWERED?
A. SHOULD THE CMDP PLACE ANY LIMITS ON THE TYPES OF





2. Yes; a lawyer should only be able to participate in an MDP with a
limited category of professionals who share the same values as
lawyers. (Note that in Germany, this includes accountants
(auditors), but in The Netherlands, it does not).
3. Yes; a lawyer should only be able to participate in an MDP with
other licensed "professionals" (perhaps defined as those with
licensure requirements and codes of ethics).
4. Yes, a lawyer should only be able to participate in an MDP with
"registered" nonlawyers, who have been "vetted" by the bar (See
Law Society of England and Wales Consultation Report, at p. 13).
B. SHOULD THE CMDP RECOMMEND THAT LAWYER
PARTICIPATION IN MDPS BE LIMITED TO MDPS WHOSE
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2. Yes. (This would be comparable to D.C. Rule 5.4)
C. WHAT NAME WILL YOU PERMIT THE LEGAL SERVICES ARM
OF THE MDP TO USE?
Recommended Answer:
1. If separately organized, the legal services arm of an MDP may use
any name it wants, so long as the name is not misleading. See
MRPC 7.5. The use of a trade name, (e.g., MDP Legal Services
Worldwide), is not misleading.
Alternatives:
2. The legal services arm is required to use the name of lawyers
currently practicing in the firm.
3. The legal services arm need not use the names of lawyers currently
practicing in the firm, but use of the MDP's name will be considered
to be false and misleading.
4. The legal services arm must use either #2 or #3 above, but is
permitted to add a sentence saying that it is affiliated with the MDP
firm.
5. An MDP's name must disclose its nature (Compare to Germany,
where firm letterhead reveals how the firm is organized, i.e., whether
it is a Wirtschaftsprifer GmbH, Rechtsanwalt GmbH, partnership of
the two, etc.).
D. IF THE CMDP RECOMMENDS RELAXING MRPC 5.4, SHOULD
IT RECOMMEND RULES REGARDING LAWYER MAJORITY
OWNERSHIP AND/OR CONTROL, OR REQUIRE THE LEGAL
SERVICES ARM TO BE A SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY FROM
THE REST OF THE MDP?
Recommended Answer:
1. No, see Terry Testimony. (Cf. Fully-integrated model listed in the
Commission's Hypotheticals.) Experience in the U.S. and Germany
suggests this won't stop the Big Five-affiliated MDPs, which seems
to be one of the major rationales for such a rule. Instead, its major
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impact likely wil be on small Main Street firms and clients.
Alternatives:
2. Yes; e.g., the CMDP might recommend a rule that requires lawyers
to have the majority ownership interest in an MDP. (This would be
similar to what is required under the German statute creating limited
liability partnerships for lawyers.)
3. Yes; e.g., the CMDP might recommend a rule that requires lawyers
to have the controlling managerial interest in an MDP. (Cf.
Command and Control Model listed in the Commission's
Hypotheticals).
4. Yes; e.g., the CMDP might recommend a rule similar to the prior
New South Wales' rule that required lawyers to earn 51% of gross
profits.
5. Yes; e.g., the CMDP might recommend a rule in which a law firm
operates an ancillary business that provides professional services to
its clients. (Cf. Ancillary Business Model listed in the Commission's
Hypotheticals).
6. Yes, e.g., the CMDP might recommend a rule that requires the legal
services arm to be separate from the MDP. (This would be similar
to what is required under the current French rules.) This rule might
permit lawyers to share fees or profits with the MDP or might only
permit cost sharing. (Cf. Contract Model listed in the Commission's
Hypotheticals).
7. Yes; e.g., the CMDP might adopt one of the many variations on the
above listed on p. 13 of the Consultation Report of the Law Society
of England and Wales.
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2. Yes.
F. SHOULD THE CMDP REQUIRE TRANSPARENCY, AND IF SO,
WHAT KIND?
Recommended Answers:
1. Yes; require disclosure to clients by lawyers;
2. Recommend to either the Ethics 2000 Commission or a new mega-
regulator, consideration of the issue of requiring disclosure of the
MDP Agreement.
Alternatives:
3. No; there shouldn't be any required disclosure from lawyer to client.
4. No; there shouldn't be disclosure of the MDP agreement.
5. Reformulate the question to specify the types of lawyer-client
disclosure required. Possibilities include:
a. the nature of the MDP firm (or the relationship between firms
under the Ancillary Business and Contract models);
b. identification of lawyers qua lawyers on business cards,
announcements, etc.;
c. disclosure of lawyer participation in a particular project (i.e., no
Trojan horses);
d. the fact that a client who uses one set of services of the MDP
(e.g., audit) is under absolutely no obligation and will face no
penalties if it does not use other services of the MDP;
e. possible compromises to the attorney-client privilege from using
an MDP; and
f. the amount of any MDP fee attributable to legal services.
III. IF THE CMDP RECOMMENDS REVISING MRPC 5.4, HOW SHOULD
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THE "FUNCTIONAL" ISSUES REGARDING AN MDP LAWYER'S
"SCOPE OF PRACTICE" BE ANSWERED?
A. SHOULD THE CMDP RECOMMEND ANY LIMITS ON THE
SCOPE OF A LAWYER'S PRACTICE WITHIN AN MDP?
Recommended Answer:
1. Yes; if the MDP is organized in such a way that fees among branches
are shared and confidences and conflicts are imputed, then a lawyer
affiliated with an MDP should be precluded from representing a
client if the audit arm of the MDP currently represents the client.
Alternatives:
2. Yes; a lawyer practicing in an MDP should be precluded from trying
cases in a court, although the lawyer would be permitted to handle
discovery and arbitration (Witness Dzienkowski's proposal).
3. No, there should be no limitations on a lawyer's scope of practice
within an MDP.
B. WHAT IF ANYTHING SHOULD THE CMDP RECOMMEND BE
DONE WITH RESPECT TO LAWYERS WHO "OPT OUT" OF





2. Attempt to find some method of holding these lawyers accountable;
3. Reject any recommended revision to MRPC 5.4 on this basis
C. CAN OR SHOULD A REGULATOR EFFECTIVELY LIMIT THE
"UPL" ACTIVITIES OF NONLAWYERS?
Recommended Answer:
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1. No (and the CMDP should leave the situation and UPL laws as is for
the moment).
Alternatives:
2. No (and the CMDP should recommend changes in UPL law).
3. Yes; leave to states to enforce UPL, as currently.
4. Yes; and the ABA should monitor and support UPL prosecutions as
set forth in Witness Foonberg's Resolution 105.
IV. IF THE CMDP RECOMMENDS REVISING MRPC 5.4, HOW SHOULD
THE FUNCTIONAL "ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE" ISSUES BE
RESOLVED?





2. No; the lawyer must use another profession's ethics rules.
3. No; the lawyer is not subject to any ethics rules.
B. SHOULD THE CMDP RECOMMEND THAT NONLAWYERS IN
AN MDP USE LAWYERS' ETHICS RULES?
Recommended Answer:
1. Yes, in certain circumstances; the nonlawyers in an MDP should
follow the lawyers' ethics rules when working at the lawyer's
direction on a matter or when necessary for the lawyers to honor
their own ethical obligations.
Alternatives:
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2. Yes; the nonlawyers in an MDP must always comply with all of the
lawyers' ethics rules, which would be enforceable through discipline
of the lawyers in the MDP. (This is the German approach).
3. Yes; in order for lawyers to work in an MDP, the nonlawyers might
have to agree to register with the bar and be subject to the lawyers'
ethics rules (See Law Society Report).
4. No; the nonlawyers in an MDP are never required to follow lawyers'
ethics rules, but instead should comply either with the ethics rules of
those professionals having a controlling interest in the MDP or their
own ethics rules.
5. Maybe; have a mega-regulator develop new rules that would apply
to an MDP.
6. Maybe; have the professions involved negotiate this.
C. WHOSE RULES PREVAIL WHEN DIFFERENT SETS OF ETHICS
RULES WITHIN AN MDP CLASH?
Recommended Answer:
1. It depends (the procedural answer); an MDP must have in place
procedures to address the situations in which different sets of ethics
rules clash. But the lawyer might have to take appropriate steps,
such as withdrawal, if he or she could not comply with the applicable
ethics regulations.
Alternatives:
2. Lawyer's rules should always take precedence.
3. The "stricter" rules should always take precedence.
4. The dominant professional's rules should take precedence since
those persons have the oversight and liability responsibilities.
5. The CMDP could leave this issue silent.
6. A new "mega-regulator" might decide how to resolve such issues.
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7. The professions (or some advisory group) should determine this.
D. SHOULD THE CMDP RECOMMEND THAT EITHER AN
EXISTING OR NEWLY-CREATED ENTITY REGULATE THE
MDP ITSELF AND/OR ALL OF THE INDIVIDUALS IN THE
MDP?
Recommendation:
1. Maybe; the CMDP should evaluate whether its goal is to come up
with an ideal solution or an achievable solution. If the latter, it must
evaluate the political realities on this issue.
Alternatives:
2. Yes; the CMDP should recommend establishment of a federal
"mega-regulator"(either for lawyer-auditor MDPs or more
generally) on an opt-in basis. (Witness Holden's recommendation)
3. Yes; the CMDP should recommend establishment of a federal
"mega-regulator"(either for lawyer-auditor MDPs or more
generally) on a mandatory basis.
4. Yes; the CMDP should recommend establishment of multiple state
"mega-regulators."
5. Yes; the CMDP should recommend that the MDP be required to
register with the Bar, as suggested by the Consultation Paper of the
Law Society of England and Wales.
6. Yes; the CMDP should recommend that an existing entity, other
than the bar, regulate the MDP itself.
7. No; but the CMDP should recommend significant changes in the
state systems to permit mutual recognition of licenses; i.e., a lawyer
licensed in one state can register and then practice in another state.
8. No; but the CMDP should recommend changes to fix enforcement
problems in the existing regulatory structure.
9. No; no special action is needed.
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E. DO LAWYER-MDPS PRESENT SPECIAL ISSUES THE CMDP




a. the CMDP should articulate its vision of how the lawyers' conflict
of interest provisions would operate in an MDP context; and
b. the CMDP should recommend that the ABA Ethics 2000
Commission seriously consider adopting mandatory malpractice
insurance requirements.
Alternatives:
2. Yes; there probably will be difficulties finding an MDP carrier and
the CMDP should take steps to facilitate such coverage.
3. No:
a. the CMDP should not articulate a vision of how the lawyer's
conflict of interest provision would operate in an MDP context;
and/or
b. the CMDP should recommend a mandatory malpractice
insurance requirement for lawyers practicing law in an MDP
context.
4. No; there are no special malpractice issues that require CMDP
recommendations.
V. IF THE CMDP RECOMMENDS REVISING MRPC 5.4, WHAT ARE
THE CMDP'S THRESHOLD ETHICS PREMISES?
(Note: numbers rather than letters are used to conform to the
organization on the Appendix B1-B5 charts. The chart used letters to
designate the threshold and functional analyses questions and numbers
to designate the ethics analysis questions.)
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1. IS AN MDP LAWYER'S OBLIGATION TO USE LAWYER
ETHICS RULES JUDGED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS?
Recommended Answer:
a. No; lawyers within an MDP, who are actively licensed lawyers and
have not indicated that they are NOT practicing law, should be
treated as normal lawyers and be subject to the same regulatory
system, ethics rules, and discipline system as other lawyers.
Alternatives:
b. Yes; lawyers in an MDP are subject to the legal ethics rules
whenever they provide "legal services" with respect to any given
matter.
c. Yes; lawyers in an MDP should follow the ethics rules of the
"dominant" professionals in the MDP, i.e., those with the majority
ownership or control.
d. Yes; lawyers in an MDP should follow the ethics rules of the
professional that is "driving the deal."
e. No; lawyers in an MDP are not subject to any ethics rules.
2. SHOULD AN MDP LAWYER'S ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
VARY, DEPENDING ON THE WAY IN WHICH THE MDP IS
STRUCTURED?
Recommended Answer:
a. Yes; the analysis that follows should apply generally to a lawyer
practicing law in an MDP context. However, lawyers may choose to
provide legal services in a manner that is so separate from the MDP
that the analysis will differ; at some point, an MDP could approach
the Cooperative model listed on the Commission's Hypotheticals and
probably should be treated differently than other "MDPs." (Note:
This issue needs significant further development).
Alternatives:
b. No; the CMDP should recommend a specified manner in which the
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ethics rules would apply to lawyers practicing law in an MDP context
and this interpretation should not depend on the manner in which
the MDP's legal services are delivered. In other words, the model
used for an MDP might vary, but the ethics rules would never vary.
c. No; the CMDP should recommend a specified and exclusive model
by which the MDP may deliver services; accordingly, the ethics rules
would not vary because the model used would not vary.
3. HOW SHOULD THE MRPC TERM "FIRM" BE DEFINED WHEN
USED IN AN MDP CONTEXT?
Recommended Answer:
a. As the entire MDP firm, not just the legal services branch of the
MDP firm.
Alternatives:
b. As the legal services branch of the MDP provided that the lawyers
take steps to separate themselves in some fashion from the rest of
the MDP.
c. The term shouldn't be used; in the MDP context, one should only
look at the activities of the individual lawyer in question.
4. DOES AN MDP LAWYER'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
FORBID GIVING INFORMATION TO NONLAWYERS IN THE
MDP?
Recommended Answer:
a. No; the MDP lawyer should be treated like lawyers in traditional law
firms. The lawyer is encouraged to keep client information as
confidential as possible and is required to keep client information
confidential with respect to individuals outside of the MDP firm, but
is permitted to share information within the MDP firm in order to
assist the lawyer in serving the client.
Alternatives:
b. Yes; the lawyer is required to keep client information confidential
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even with respect to nonlawyers in the MDP firm unless the lawyer
has received informed client consent to such disclosure (i.e., a
waiver).
c. Yes; the lawyer is required to keep client information confidential
even with respect to lawyers in the MDP firm unless the lawyer has
received informed client consent to such disclosure (i.e., a waiver).
d. There are many possible alternatives in addition to these two. For
example, a lawyer might be permitted to share confidential client
information only with those who are on the same MDP "team," i.e.,
on the same side of the "firewall." This might be done even without
seeking client consent.
5. IMPUTATION OF KNOWLEDGE: SHOULD THE CMDP
ASSUME THAT, ABSENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY
SPECIAL MEASURES AUTHORIZED BY LAW, A LAWYER IS
IMPUTED TO KNOW WHATEVER INFORMATION OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE MDP KNOW, INCLUDING NONLAWYERS?
Recommended Answer:
a. Yes; absent special steps endorsed by the CMDP or applicable law,
knowledge possessed by nonlawyers within an MDP firm should be
imputed to the lawyers within a firm when analyzing the lawyer's
ethical obligations.
Alternatives:
b. No; knowledge possessed by nonlawyers in an MDP firm should not
be imputed to the lawyers in the MDP firm for the purpose of
conducting an analysis of the lawyers' ethical obligations.
c. No; provided special steps are taken to put an effective screen in
place, knowledge possessed by nonlawyers in an MDP firm should
not be imputed to the lawyers in the MDP firm, for the purpose of
conducting an analysis of the lawyers' ethical obligations
6. SHOULD THE CMDP ASSUME THAT NONLAWYER





a. Yes; in devising its recommendations, the CMDP should assume that
the nonlawyers in the MDP have had access to the confidential
information given to MDP lawyers. In other words, where relevant,
knowledge should be imputed from the MDP lawyers to MDP
nonlawyers.
Alternatives:
b. No; the CMDP should assume that an MDP lawyer's knowledge will
not be imputed to the nonlawyers within the MDP firm.
7. SHOULD THE CMDP CONSIDER RECOMMENDING A NEW
MRPC AS A PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING OF, AND
COMPLIANCE WITH, AN MDP LAWYER'S OBLIGATION TO
EXERCISE INDEPENDENT LEGAL JUDGMENT?
Recommended Answer:
a. Yes; a new MRPC covering lawyers practicing in an MDP context
would be particularly useful.
Alternative:
b. No; the CMDP should not recommend a new MRPC provision
covering lawyers practicing in an MDP, either because the CMDP
does not currently have enough experience to address the issues or
because such a rule is unnecessary.
7a. IF THE CMDP DECIDES TO DRAFT A NEW MRPC PROVISION
TO APPLY TO LAWYERS PRACTICING IN MDPS, WHAT
PROVISIONS SHOULD IT INCLUDE?
Recommended Answer:
a. The CMDP should draft a MRPC provision with the following
elements:
1) have lawyers subject to the legal profession's existing regulatory
and discipline;
2) require clear identification of a lawyer's role within the MDP
(i.e., is the lawyer offering legal services or working in a nonlegal
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capacity?);
3) require consistency in the lawyer's function within the MDP, i.e.,
the lawyer should not be able to decide that today I am providing
legal services but tomorrow I am not;
4) require appropriate disclosures, including: disclosure to the client
of situations in which a "product" provided by the MDP is based
on legal analysis or services rendered by the MDP; the nature of
the MDP firm (or the relationship between firms under the
Ancillary Business and Contract models); the identification of
lawyers qua lawyers on business cards, announcements, etc.; and
disclosure of lawyer participation in a particular project (i.e., no
Trojan horses); the fact that a client who uses one set of services
of the MDP (e.g., audit) is under absolutely no obligation and will
face no penalties if it does not use other services of the MDP; and
possible compromises to the attorney-client privilege from using
an MDP;
5) require supervision and training of lawyers by a lawyer;
6) require evaluation of lawyers' work by other lawyers;
7) require clearly established lines of authority, so that junior
lawyers understand who they report to and so that independence
of judgment is preserved;
8) provide clear rules regarding the interpretation of confidentiality,
independence, and loyalty requirements in an MDP context (i.e.,
how should conflicts be evaluated and imputed, etc.); and
9) require a physical situation, including offices, files, and
computers, among other things, consistent with the lawyer's
confidentiality, loyalty, and independence obligations.
Alternatives:
10) transparency with respect to the MDP Agreement;
11) require a separate legal firm or department;
12) disclosure of possible lesser rights, similar to the "warnings"
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discussed in the Consultation Report of the Law Society of
England and Wales;
13) disclosure of the amount of any MDP fee attributable to legal
services; and/or
14) a provision similar to Pennsylvania RPC 5.7, which requires
application of the MRPC unless the client knows or reasonably
should know that he or she is not receiving the protections of a
client-lawyer relationship. See Laurel S. Terry, Pennsylvania
Adopts Ancillary Business Rule, 8 The Professional Lawyer 10
(Nov. 1996).
8. SHOULD THE CMDP RECOMMEND THAT LAWYERS IN AN
MDP OWE A DUTY OF LOYALTY TO THE CUSTOMERS OF
THE MDP NONLAWYERS?
Recommended Answer:
a. Yes; assuming a fully-integrated MDP, the MDP lawyers should be
viewed as having a duty of loyalty to the customers of the MDP
nonlawyers. Consequently, when analyzing their obligations under
conflict of interest and other rules, the MDP lawyer should take into
account any conflicts of interest arising from the MDP firm's
representation of customers of the MDP nonlawyers.
Alternative
b. No; even in a fully-integrated MDP, the MDP lawyers should not be
viewed as owing a duty of loyalty to customers served by the MDP
nonlawyers. Consequently, when analyzing their obligations under
conflict of interest and other rules, MDP lawyers need not take into
account conflicts of interest with customers served by the MDP
nonlawyers.
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